The Structure of יִשְׂרָאֵל

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IN the mishnah the term יִשְׂרָאֵל is employed to describe the structure of the camp of יִשְׂרָאֵל in the mishnah. Each camp was led by one standard bearer as its אָשֶׁר דָּל, or standard bearer. The fact that the mishnah includes thirty-one passages on this subject demonstrates the importance of this topic; each detail must be significant. The four בְּאֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל were led by four אָשֶׁר דָּל, אֲפָרִים, וֹוֶדֶה, וֹאֵבֶנֶק, and יִד. Why were these particular אָשֶׁר דָּל chosen, instead of the other eight?

The reason why אָשֶׁר דָּל was chosen seems obvious. He was, after all, the בֵּן יִשְׂרָאֵל of ·˜יַיְנָו’s sons. The mishnah considers the status of אָשֶׁר דָּל very important. However, ·ה:א (דְּבוֹרָה יִתְיֶהוֹ, אֱוִילָה), says something striking:

These two passages imply that אָשֶׁר דָּל’s sin with прав דָּל caused him to lose the privileges associated with the בְּאֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל: namely leadership and double inheritance. These were taken from him and given to וֹאֵבֶנֶק and יִד respectively.

According to ·ה:א raises this issue in his comment on יִשְׂרָאֵל. אֱוִילָה and прав דָּל complained that as descendants of וֹאֵבֶנֶק they deserved both the privileges of בְּאֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל and the double portion in יִשְׂרָאֵל that was given to וֹאֵבֶנֶק (as will be described below, וֹאֵבֶנֶק וֹאֵבֶנֶק each had their own מֶנֶשֶׁה).

In what we find ·ה:א יִשְׂרָאֵל us as an explanation for his appointment as king. In the time of ·˜יַיְנָו there was a constant struggle for leadership between the הבכורות, the most predominant one between וֹאֵבֶנֶק וֹאֵבֶנֶק and praw דָּל. Both took leadership roles during the episode of וֹאֵבֶנֶק וֹאֵבֶנֶק, each suggesting a different plan for what to do with וֹאֵבֶנֶק וֹאֵבֶנֶק’s plan ultimately prevailed: יִשְׂרָאֵל. Later, each attempted to con-
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 Vince to send to ingen to under his supervision. Each tried to prove his own competence and responsibility, and outdo the other's leadership. In the end, Vince relented to the word of władz, implicitly acknowledging their leadership. This position was reinforced when władę was sent to the rest of the family: (バルシュ, 모씨) (את תהיה ולהנה שלח לה לא תהי). The explicates that władę went first because the king always goes first (דמשק, מ şeklin). The erklärt that władę inherited the mantle władę due to his superior leadership abilities. It seems reasonable that władę merited the position of because the same.

The same אפרים helped explain why władę, the son of אפרים, was also a ברך in places of אפרים. Many explicates that this position was manifest in the double portion of land which władę inherited, when both of his sons, אפרים, and אברם, each received a portion. This double portion seems consistent with влад 's partiality toward влад 's privileged role also has implications for władę's role as leader. The same explains why władę is, in part, a symbol of royalty. In the the is described as a distinctively royal garment. The daughter of אברם, wore a cloak which i Explains (דמשק, מ refunded the money given to władę by his brothers. As erklärt that this double language in this case refers to the double portion of inheritance, which the brothers felt should have rightly been given to אברם, the olan of the family.

We have seen that władę and władę acquired the leadership from влад. If so, why did władę become a ברך, if his leadership had been taken by others? It seems that влад retained some of his status as leader, despite everything. The explicates this explicit, when it describes władę as a ברך (ד microsoft). Indeed, the explicates immediately following władę’s sin with — the very sin for which władę lost his leadership — still refers to him as влад. Despite everything, retained his status as влад, as explicates (ד microsoft). It seems that there are two forms of влад. The first is an innate status, which depends entirely on
order of birth. It can never be removed. The second is an acquired status, which
grants the person who achieves it benefits and leadership. This status can be
gained and lost, just as רָאוּבֵן lost this aspect of the הָעָדָה and second is an acquired status, which
grants the person who achieves it benefits and leadership. This status can be
 gained and lost, just as רָאוּבֵן lost this aspect of the הָעָדָה and
shows that there are three means by which יִהוּדָה chooses people who will be particularly close to Him. Either they 1) are
chosen from birth, 2) gain the status through their own effort, or 3) they gain
that status through an act of לֵוָר. The first method seems to be the reason
why רָאוּבֵן was chosen to be a זָה יִהוּדָה. It seems that יִהוּדָה’s role as זָה יִהוּדָה was
acquired through the second technique. Although chronologically he should have remained the less
powerful of the two brothers, יִהוּדָה chose to give him leadership for reasons
which we do not know. Together, רָאוּבֵן, יִהוּדָה, and הָעָדָה represent the three
different ways in which יִהוּדָה chooses people to become close to Him.

The question then arises: why was דָוִד chosen to be the fourth זָה יִהוּדָה? Is דָוִד somehow intertwined in the transfer of power from רָאוּבֵן to the other
brothers, or is his status completely separate from theirs? The fact that דָוִד was the eldest son of his mother, מִלְטָה, does not adequately answer the question.
After all, דָוִד, who was the eldest son of his mother, מִלְטָה, was not chosen.
Granted, דָוִד was the eldest son of the הָעָדָה, but we do not find anywhere in יִהוּדָה that he is called a זָה יִהוּדָה of any kind. וּדָוִד must exhibit some other quality that
qualified him to be a leader of יִשְׂרָאֵל.

It seems that it was the quality of יִשְׂרָאֵל that entitled דָוִד to the role of יִהוּדָה’s blessing to the הָעָדָה reflects the quality of יִרְאוּבֵן, when it refers
to יִרְאוּבֵן. This is reminiscent of יִרְאוּבֵן’s blessing to רָאוּבֵן, יִרְאוּבֵן says, יִרְאוּבֵן explains that מִלְטָה was a זָה יִהוּדָה because he had the strength of a lion. Similarly, יִרְאוּבֵן says, יִרְאוּבֵן explains that מִלְטָה was a זָה יִהוּדָה because he was also a זָה יִרְאוּבֵן. Because
of their lion-like strength, יִרְאוּבֵן and דָוִד were placed at the front and back of
the camp, in order to protect the camp. This is what יִרְאוּבֵן meant when he said that what was יִרְאוּבֵן was also a זָה יִרְאוּבֵן. דָוִד was just like יִרְאוּבֵן. Similarly, יִרְאוּבֵן explains the words יִרְאוּבֵן to mean that דָוִד could reach the same heights of greatness as the other brothers,
even though he was born to a זָה יִרְאוּבֵן.

David was chosen to lead a division of יִשְׂרָאֵל because of the natural
result of his being born first. דָוִד received this honor because יִרְאוּבֵן earned his leadership through personal effort and excellence. The three are interconnected, as both יִרְאוּבֵן and דָוִד received part of the זָה יִרְאוּבֵן. דָוִד, on the other hand, did not receive
his leadership by taking power from someone else. He fulfilled his own po-
potential through his own labor, pulling himself from lowliness to greatness with sheer strength. Together these four composed a leadership that was able to successfully guide the nation through the desert. They were able to create an ציר with physical power and spiritual prominence.
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Shuli Taubes

The STATES, and political theory are not mentioned in the text. This is followed by an elaborate list of commandments regarding the king. The king must be chosen by God, cannot take too many wives, or gather too many horses, etc.

The word in this verse helps raises unique problems. If appointing a king were a regular commandment, the verse would have omitted the clause. Perhaps, then, there is no commandment to appoint a king. Instead, the verse merely predicts what will happen in the future, and regulates how that king should behave once he is appointed. Alternatively, perhaps the verse should be considered a classic commandment, in which case there would be a command to appoint a king. In attempting to answer this question, we will inevitably raise the question of what the considers the ideal form of government.

In order to properly deal with these questions, one must first look at the verse which actually made the aforementioned request for a king: (verse 2). Yet, this request is not viewed positively, either by God or by humanity. proceeds as God had commanded, to warn the people about the hardships and burdens of monarchy. This includes a list of actions which the king will take in the future.
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Despite the warning, the people insist on the appointment of a king, and, reluctantly, God indeed commands to appoint a king over them. If there is a need to appoint a king, then why did both ŞÀ and ŞØ consider it a rebellion against ŞØ? Alternatively, if it is not a need to appoint a king, then why did God acquiesce to the people's request? The 'Óµ in Ò·ÈÔ¨ Î Ú¢· presents a theorem regarding these questions.

רבי יהודה אומר: משם נתן ישראל בננות אלעזר: להנвшего להם מלך, וلاحורית ורגוי על עמים, הל[method], שמיה היה בית המדרשו. רבי נחמן אומר: אלא נאמרה פרשיה ואלא קנה תרנגולת.

רבי יהודה holds that it is in fact a commandment to appoint a king, while şà believes that there is no need to appoint a king. Rather, the verses grants permission to appoint a king if the people insist on it.

This theorem is continued in the שמואל and אבוקוס. Dealing with שמואל's negative reaction to the people's request for a king, the theorem can be divided into two main categories. The first group argues that the request for a king is inappropriate because a human monarch is not the ŞØ's ideal. Rather, the ŞØ reluctantly grants permission to appoint a king due to human weakness. The apparent "commandment" in Şµ is simply a reluctant acquiescence, but not an imperative. Those in the second category hold that there is a need to appoint a king. Yet, while the request for a monarch is good, şà made their request at the wrong time or with the wrong motivations.

ארבניאל is the most prominent of those who hold that there is no commandment to appoint a king. Serving as the finance minister of Portugal and then Spain during the 1400's, prior to the expulsion, he was quite familiar with the function of monarchy, and he suffered personally at the hands of absolute monarchs. Arbenel explains that שמואל was angry at the people because kingship is a superfluous, indeed dangerous, institution. He says that şà did not request a king because they felt an immediate political or military need for centralized leadership, but because they wanted to be considered. Indeed, they waited until after the conquest of יבון מצידא was complete, even though it would have been most natural to ask for a king during the military conflict itself. Therefore, both God and şà saw it as a need to appoint a king.
their request as representing a lack of gratitude for the fact that it made them militarily successful without a king.

And political theory understands the passage in דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל as an anticipation of future Jewish murmurings. Hence, the first פסוק reads, יִשְׂרָאֵל יֵשָׁהוּ עֲלֵי מִלְּכָּה כָּכָל הַגּוֹיֶה אֲשֶׁר סִיפְרוּת:

The first וֹרֵשָׁתִי וְיֵשְׁבֵּתָה וְאָמָרָה אֱשֶׁר עֲלֵי מִלְּכָּה כָּכָל הַגּוֹיֶה אֲשֶׁר סִיפְרוּת.

The first וֹרֵשָׁתִי וְיֵשְׁבֵּתָה וְאָמָרָה כֵּן יִשְׂרָאֵל he anticipates that only after military success — when there is certainly no longer any benefit from a king. כֵּן יִשְׂרָאֵל יֶשְׁרָאֵל posesses a sinful desire to be just like the other nations, who suffer under the harsh hand of absolute monarchs.

How then does דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל deal with the next פסוק, which seems to describe an imperative to appoint a king: יִשְׂרָאֵל? Yeshim Ulde Malka. דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל explains that these פסוקים are primarily concerned with limiting the power of a king, should the people mistakenly request one. The rest of the paragraph is the essence of the command. If דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל want to have a king, then it shall not be one whom they shall choose. Rather it shall be one whom God chooses, and he shall not maintain for himself too much power and wealth. There is thus, according to דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, no commandment to request or appoint a king. דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל explains which the first וֹרֵשָׁתִי established to deal with human weakness, and it would be far better not to have one.

דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל finds a linguistic parallel to prove his point. He brings the example of the beautiful woman captured in war. He agrees with יִשְׂרָאֵל that allowing one to bring home and marry such a woman is merely a concession to human weakness, and is obviously not a commandment. If one desires to have relations with the captured woman, the first וֹרֵשָׁתִי begrudgingly allows it, but imposes rigid regulations on the relationship. The laws of kings are a similar phenomenon. Appointing a king is not a commandment, but if a king is to be appointed, his power must be restricted by guidelines.

Develops five proofs to show that appointing a king is permissible but not obligatory. His first proof is that if appointing a king was a commandment, there would be no need for the וֹרֵשָׁתִי to tell us that the people must ask for one. The second proof is the argument that if there is a commandment to appoint a king, why does the וֹרֵשָׁתִי tell the people to request a king for the sake of being “like the other nations”? This is, after all, the exact opposite of the commandment in the וֹרֵשָׁתִי that the Jews should not emulate the culture of the gentiles around them! Furthermore, he continues, the opening of the passage in דְּבָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל points to the fact that it is not a commandment. The first וֹרֵשָׁתִי explains, יִשָּׁהוּ עֲלֵי מִלְּכָּה כָּכָל הַגּוֹיֶה אֲשֶׁר knew the יִשָּׁהוּ עֲלֵי מִלְּכָּה כָּכָל הַגּוֹיֶה אֲשֶׁר Sippurah, therefore, is also not a command, but a description of future events. The rest of the וֹרֵשָׁתִי, therefore, is also not a command, but a description. Fourth,
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...points out an inconsistency in the position of those who argue that monarchy is a מנהל. If there is a מנהל to appoint a king, then this passage really records two מנהלות: the first to appoint a king, and the second that that king be chosen by God. Yet, nobody counts this passage as including two מנהלות. Finally, אברבנאל's fifth proof comes from שמואל's response to the nation's desire for a king. After rebuked them for requesting a king, why did the people not respond that they were simply trying to fulfill a מנהל? Evidently, asserts אברבנאל, there is no such מנהל.

This analysis is consistent with אברבנאל's broader political philosophy. believes that the ideal human existence is a-political, like the life of רדס הרשך, man was forced into groups that require political governance (see אברבנאל's commentary on דוד הך). understands that the purpose of government is to prevent anarchy and corruption. He views government as an unfortunate but necessary evil. Therefore, he tries to limit the power of any given political leader.

It is not impossible, says אברבנאל, that there could be many temporary leaders (as opposed to one permanent leader) who gather together and vote on policy. Justice and peace are much more likely outcomes of limited and representative government, rather than absolute monarchy. Since the leaders hold their posts temporarily (אברבנאל suggests changing leadership once a year), they would be afraid that the next leaders will expose their corruption and punish them. He says the governing body should also be limited by a constitution. He brings the examples of the kingdoms of Venice, Florence and Geneva, which in his day were representative republics, and were therefore less corrupt societies. (These states were military and political powers at the time.)

...further adds (דברים יז) that even if we would say that monarchy is a good thing for other nations, this is not the case with שמואל. The monarch serves three main functions: 1) military: to save the people from their enemies and fight for land, 2) legislative: to organize conventional law and set out the laws that will govern the nation, and 3) extra-legal punishment: to maintain law and order by punishing criminals who are acquitted on a legal technicality.

These three functions are not needed by the Jewish people, he says, because the Jews have superior institutions to fulfill these functions. The Jewish people do not require a monarch to wage war, as God Himself is their commander-in-chief. Jews do not need a king as a legislator, because God and His תורת are the laws of the Jewish nation. Nor do the Jews need a monarch to administer extra-legal punishment, because this power was granted to the בית דין.
Consequently, prefers the system of to that of monarchs, because the are temporary, limited, and chosen by the people (due to their charismatic attraction).\(^1\)

The majority of the 's approach, arguing that the king is the ideal leader, and that it is a to appoint one. The major question these must deal with is why were rebuked in the days of . These can be divided into two main categories: those who think because they requested a king and those who think that their motivations were improper.

adopts the “poor timing” approach. In his commentary on , he explains that the command to come before the to request a king should have been done after in the land. Similar to , understands the phrase as a phrase which were not commanded to say. How could God command the to emulate the nations around them? Hence, this expression must not be part of the command, but rather a hint, foreshadowing what will happen in the future. That is why the phrase includes the phrase . The predicts what the will ask of in the future.

Still, brings a literary proof that there is a commandment to appoint a . He argues that the phrase about a king — is parallel to the verse, — is most certainly a , and a person is obligated to build a fence on his roof. So too, must appoint a king.

Why then were punished in the days of ? , in his commentary on , states that the request itself was not the sin. Rather, it was the timing. emphasizes the word in the people's request. was still the leader, who had served as a and since his youth. The people should not have requested a replacement for , who was God's messenger to the people as well as their political leader.

It is interesting to note that emphasizes the very last of the verse, . Indeed, this refrain constitutes the very last of the verse. This statement sums up the continual cycles in which the sinned, were punished by , were redeemed by , and only to return again to sin. Perhaps, according to , the proper time to request a king would have been in the down point of that cycle, when there was no leader and the were sinning.

It seems, then, that believes that monarchy is the ideal form of government for the Jews, and that the role of the king is to judge the people and wage their wars.

Like , also believes that the failure to lay in the timing. When the people demanded a king, they said
Rav Hirsch explains that the word לְוָּעָה, to judge us, does not refer to internal issues of law and justice, but to foreign and military policy. The proper purpose of the king is not to conquer and capture the land. The king is not an “external” leader. Yet, this is what the Jewish people wanted their king to do. Rav Hirsch explains that “the fault lay in making the election before the proper time. They demanded a king in a time when what was demanded was first to secure establishing the possession of the land and accordingly were demanding it too early in their imagined material interest” (דברים יי).

The monarchy mandated in דברי הימים, says Rav Hirsch, was only supposed to come about after the land was conquered and settled, as it says יי וַיַּעַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֶשָּׁר־הִיא אֶל־אֵלֶּה נַעֲקַבְּכֵן נַעֲקַבֵּמָּה (דברים, יי). Conquest of the land was dependent on the people’s righteousness, and not on politics and military might, as ישעיהו stresses throughout the הנד. The requirement of a king is for one purpose only: “to make the nation of Israel into the faithful and dutiful people of God’s הנד.”

Rav Hirsch also responds to the question that יכלה והני had raised: how could the demand for the people to ask for a king to be לְוָּעָה מסתבר? He answers that just as all other nations have a “head of state” who unites all their national forces under one national goal, so too the Jews require a leader to focus all of their energies on a single goal. However, for the nations of the world, the highest goal is the maintenance of great strength and power, while for the Jews the goal is fulfilling God’s will in all areas of personal and communal life. This “consists only in the most possible complete realization internally of God’s הנד.” The Jewish people were not ready for this goal until after they had established themselves by conquering and settling the land. “Only when the whole land had been conquered and divided up and everyone would henceforth see himself on his own acres giving himself up to peaceful, carrying out the lofty mission of a Jewish life, then, similarly to the symbolic unifying point in the משך, a concrete bearer of this national unity was to be established in a king.”

ימין, יר and רבי, like ישעיהו and Rav Hirsch, maintain that there is a מתי to appoint a king. Yet, they focus not on the bad timing at the time of ישעיהו, but on the people’s improper motivation. ישעיהו in פייק א הנחת מלתם in רמב״ם (הלכות מלכאות ב הלכות ב) says that the reason that ישעיהו was angry was that the people were not asking for a king to fulfill the Divine commandment, but because they were angry at ישעיהו. ירי ties this anger at ישעיהו with an anger at God Himself, quoting the דס which says this explicitly: כי אל אери מנא אם ירא: יגפואו. Perhaps ירי means that they were upset at ישעיהו because they really opposed the kind of political structure which God demanded (see ישעיהו, יא ח and Malbim for a similar suggestion). The people wanted an ordi-
nary ruler who uses conventional methods, and wanted a greater separation of religious issues from material issues than the תור הזה, as understood by רכיבס, demands.

In contrast to the people’s request, תור הזה argues that תור הזה requires a great deal of integration between religion and politics. The reign of the תונש התה יא הפך, as mentioned above, is summed up by the phrase רכיבס, רכיבס, שבשראת איש חפש שהוא עתד. It was a time of anarchy and civic unrest. This situation, according to רכיבס, does not allow the material and political comfort necessary to achieve religious perfection. A king, representing centralized authority, must be established. The תונש התה, תור הזה, has two overarching goals: 1) תונש התה involves teaching people speculative truth, to the extent that they are capable of understanding it. 2) תונש התה involves a well-ordered and stable political community. While תונש התה is more important, תונש התה must naturally take place first. Individuals and communities can only achieve religious-intellectual success after they have achieved social, economic, and political success. The king helps to achieve both of these goals by enforcing תונש התה.

ר’ מתיאן explains that the sin of תונש התה was that they requested a king to perform the wrong duties, namely those jobs that the תונש התה had assigned to the תורה תור (דיברין, דרשתי) — רכיבס — the ideal halachic civil law — which is implemented by the תונש התה. But, says ר’ מתיאן, this system does not always result in a stable political order. Hence, the תונש התה also insisted on a king, who would have the right and obligation to circumvent the letter of the תונש התה, and employ an extra-halakhic legal system that is not as ideal, but is more practical, than the תונש התה. The תונש התה of the תורה תור is concerned with individual rights. No individual is ever mistreated or convicted falsely by the strict standards of halachic judicial procedure. But, the תונש התה does not always adequately account for the social and political consequences of its laws. The king steps in to make sure that society runs in a stable and responsible way.

Thus, had the people at the time of תורה תור requested a king in order to perform this particular function, it would have been a positive thing. כי אם ר’ מתיאן, however, specifically said that they wanted a king — לשפריסת יד על התורה — to take over the function of the תונש התה and turn the system into a single-branched monarchy.

The differences between the approaches of רכיבס and ר’ מתיאן are of utmost importance. While ר’ מתיאן thinks that two separate systems are created by the תורה תור to run parallel to one another, רכיבס believes that all of Jewish government is contained in one system. רכיבס already includes, according to תורה תור, the pragmatic flexibility that enables it to govern society properly. Yet both
agree that the reason that Ḥanan was angry with Nebi Shārāl is that they wanted to replace the institutions of government laid out by God with a human constitution. They tried to redistribute jobs and redefine roles.

Ḥanan has a completely unique approach to this entire topic, which fits neither into the pro-monarchy or anti-monarchy camps. In many ways, Ḥanan’s approach is particularly appealing to many of us who were raised in the beneficent bosom of a democratic society, and who are afraid of the potential abuses of a monarchy. While Ḥanan views the דּוּרְשָׁה דּוּרְשָׁה in מֶשֶׁכֶת דּוּרְשָׁה (similar to אֲרָבָנְאָל), he does not assume that kingship is inherently a negative thing. He compares the דּוּרְשָׁה about kings in דּוּרְשָׁה to similar language about eating meat. יִהְיוּ בִּרְשָׁה אֶלְקֹדַשׁ אָתָה בְּכֵלָדָה כֶּאֵשׁ דּוּרְשָׁה כֶּאֵשׁ דּוּרְשָׁה אִלֶּךְ בֶּשָּׁר יִוְּהַבְוָה (דּוּרְשָׁה, בִּכְלָדָה). This, like the parallel דּוּרְשָׁה about kings, is followed by a list of laws which regulate the slaughter and consumption of meat. In this case, the word דּוּרְשָׁה is clearly not an imperative. Rather, it means “If you shall say.” You may eat, provided that you follow certain restrictions. In the same way, he interprets the phrase דּוּרְשָׁה in our דּוּרְשָׁה to mean that you may appoint a king, under certain conditions, provided that the king fulfills certain guidelines.

Ḥanan argues that the דּוּרְשָׁה must leave out an absolute imperative to appoint a king, because the דּוּרְשָׁה can’t, by the very nature of things, describe the objectively ideal political structure (דּוּרְשָׁה דּוּרְשָׁה, דּוּרְשָׁה, דּוּרְשָׁה). Different societies at different times have different political needs. For some societies, monarchy may be intolerable; for others it may be indispensable. The דּוּרְשָׁה does not want to impose a political theory on any group. By definition, decisions about the nature of political authority are always decisions of דּוּרְשָׁה, which override any other דּוּרְשָׁה. Hence, if there would have been a דּוּרְשָׁה to appoint a king, that דּוּרְשָׁה would only be mandatory under those conditions when monarchy would be imperative anyway, because it would lead to good government, thereby saving lives. Under circumstances where a king would not lead to good government, considerations of דּוּרְשָׁה would override the דּוּרְשָׁה. The דּוּרְשָׁה would become redundant. The consequences of this argument are far reaching indeed. The דּוּרְשָׁה wants Jews to govern themselves in whatever way will work effectively in a given place and a given time.

The request from דּוּרְשָׁה for a king would have been fine had Nebi Shārāl honestly thought that this would be the best leadership for them at that time. Their goals in appointing a king, however, were inappropriate. Ḥanan points out that the same words — דּוּרְשָׁה דּוּרְשָׁה — describe both the legitimate request for a king in דּוּרְשָׁה and the sinful request for a king in דּוּרְשָׁה. He explains that it is legitimate to request a king in order to centralize leadership, when the people agree that this will be most effective. How-
ever, it is not permitted to appoint a king who will override the תֵּדֵה and replace them with gentile laws. Similarly, it is not permissible to appoint a king who will feel free, as gentile kings do, to declare war without God's consent (which is provided by a שֹׁפַט or a שופט).

I would like to offer another interpretation of the שופט in this, extending the explanation of בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל in directions suggested in a מַעַת by Mrs. Mali Brofsky. In the immediately preceding בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל's request for a king, the שופט records that בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל led to a religious revival. Yet, the beginning of the next שופט indicates that בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל were old, and that his sons were not following in his ways. The people decided that they needed stability and continuity, and therefore they wanted a permanent and dynastic king. Yet, they also understood that this would not be foolproof, because there was still no guarantee that the son of a righteous king would be equally righteous, just as בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל's children were sinful. Hence, בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל wanted a king who would govern based on his own laws, rather than based on God's laws. They wanted to abide by the commandments of a מֶלֶךְ מֶלֶכֶת and not מֶלֶךְ מֶלֶכֶת מֶלֶךָ. They understood that it is much harder to live up to God's standards than it is to live up to human standards. They did not want to win or lose a war based on whether or not they were followingוּ הַ ד and His laws. They wanted, like all other nations, to win or lose a war based on their king's military strength and prowess, without paying proper attention to God's demands for His chosen people.

One problem with בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל's theory is that it de-emphasizes the tragic history of the שופט, in which the people constantly reverted to idolatry, and were then attacked by military enemies. As the final שופט in the שופט indicates, בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל were not שופט מֶלֶכֶת מֶלֶכָּה. They understood that it is much harder to live up to God's standards than it is to live up to human standards.
Tanya Zauderer

Miçlal bat Shaul

Was the younger daughter of Shaul. The series of stories in her life reveals her as a bold and self-confident woman. Treated by others as a political pawn, she attempted to take her fate into her own hands, which led both to her successes and her failures.

A brief overview of the events in which she took part reveals a great deal about her personality. The first reference to נו מיכל indicates that she loved דוד, who was hated by her father, ש Saul. Saul saw this as an opportunity to get rid of דוד, so he offered מיכל in exchange for one hundred foreskins of שילה, thinking that דוד would be killed in the process of acquiring them. דוד, though, brought back two hundred foreskins, and Saul gave מיכל to דוד as a wife. Over time, דוד came to hate even more. He ordered guards to דוד’s house at night, so that דוד could be killed in the morning. מיכל let דוד out of the window, placed a dummy in his bed, and told ש Saul’s guards that he was sick. When Saul discovered the deception, מיכל said that דוד threatened to kill her if she did not help him escape. Later, ש Saul took מיכל from דוד, and gave her to מיכל as a wife, although she was still wed to דוד. דוד eventually got her back as part of a peace treaty with גש ז’ע ש שאול.

Miçlal appears next when דוד brings the ארות ה back to מיכל. Through the window, דוד saw דוד dancing with the ארות ה, and she hated him in her heart. She rebuked דוד for dancing wildly with the common people in a manner she felt unbefitting to a king. דוד rebuked her, saying that he was dancing before ה. As a punishment, מיכל had no children until the day she died.

Throughout these events, her strength of character stands out. Despite the fact that she was constantly manipulated by others, she took action and was not afraid to stand up for what she believed in. Unfortunately, her strong opinions and bold actions led to her sin and her childlessness. Miçlal never hesitated to state her opinion. She was bold in the face of kings, standing up to her father and דוד. She reprimanded ש Saul for hating דוד, and
stood up to him by helping דוד escape. She provided an unconvincing alibi when דוד escaped, as if to emphasize that she was not concerned with lying to her father. She stood up to דוד when he brought the יהושע to אזרא, rebuking him for acting immodestly. Yet, in this incident, for the first time מיכל was punished for standing up to someone.

Mical’s strength of character is even more surprising, given that she was constantly used as a political pawn, both by her father and דוד. Her father thought that offering מיכל to דוד would be a good way of getting rid of him. Furthermore, there is evidence that דוד did not marry מיכל because he loved her, but rather because she was his political pawn. The_Detail indicate twice that מיכל loved דוד (םסנאל א, ח, ד) while, מיכל loved דוד, indicating that דוד's love for מיכל, in contrast, is explicit (םסנאל א, ח). Furthermore, דוד made no attempt to bring מיכל back from פלשו, at least until it fit into his broader political concerns and the treaty he negotiated (שםואל). It seems that מיכל and דוד's intense love for מיכל was part of God's cure for מיכל's equally intense hatred for דוד. After all, מיכל always makes the cure before the misfortune.

In various places, דוד also emphasize מיכל’s independent personality, placing particular emphasis on her spiritual boldness. According to the מיכה (עם ימיה ויחי ל), מיכל didn't protest because they knew that she was on a high spiritual level. מיכל rose the ladder of awe and fear of God, until she felt a need to wear חורי. חורי said that whenever people saw מיכל, their whole bodies would tremble in fear (םסנאל, מי עיב). מיכל was very charismatic and had the strength to rule over people, and used this strength to help establish מיכל. According to מיכה (שםואל), מיכה was called חורי, meaning calf, because she loved דוד more than she loved her father, צאל. A calf does not want a yoke around its neck, so too מיכל didn’t want the yoke of her father, preferring to help דוד.

What, then, went wrong? What led to מיכל’s sin and downfall? At the beginning מיכל was drawn to דוד’s spirituality, but since she was separated from him for so long, she never had the opportunity to grow with him. They remained distant. When דוד saw מיכל dancing with the יהושע, she saw only what appeared in front of her, and not the inner spiritual act. She never broke entirely free of her father's political calculations and manipulations. She cared about outer appearances and how others would view דוד.

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She say that דוד’s clothing and behavior did not look דוד. In דוד, their sleeves covered half the palm of the hand, and when דוד was dancing his palms were uncovered. In her father's house, דוד was very important, and they never showed a heel or thumb. Therefore, מיכל thought that דוד’s clothing was too revealing (שםואל). מיכל did not see that דוד was not like מיכל. She did not see that דוד was dancing before מיכל, and not
for the benefit of other people. דוד, like מיכל, was equally unafraid to stand up for what he believed in, and he criticized מיכל. מיכל was a great person who was expected not to sin. When she did sin, her punishment was severe, and she was doomed to future childlessness. There is an aspect of מידה כנוד מיכל מידה in this punishment. מיכל represented the link that could have led to unity between דוד וישראל. Her sin, her distance from דוד והשאול, prevented the birth of the child that might have served as a more permanent link between the two.

מלכת אסתר's successes and failures can be compared to those of מיכל. They both took initiative to help others. Yet, where מיכל focused on the individuals around her, אסתר was more concerned with all of אסתר החברה, and acquired from there her ביני משאול, מיכל. אסתר, like מיכל, used her bold initiative to save the Jewish people, just as מיכל's initiative saved דוד. Like מיכל אסתר, אסתר, like מיכל, was used as a political pawn. Where דוד to מיכל ישארל for his own personal needs, אסתר, מיכל, מיכל, told מיכל אתורה to go to the king, because she thought she would be killed. Yet, once she realized what was at stake, she equally boldly defied אתורה's prohibition against coming to the king without being asked. אסתר recognized the role of ה' in everything she did, and used what she had to serve Him. She arranged a fast before going before the king for precisely that reason. She knew that ה', not man, controls events. She did not worry what others would think of her, yet was cautious in dealing with the king so as not to put herself and the Jewish people in danger. Perhaps this explains אתורה's success and מיכל's downfall. Where אתורה placed God and the good of the Jewish people in the forefront of her mind, מיכל's concerns were often more personal and petty. אתורה and מיכל are similar in many aspects. Yet, the strong-headedness of אתורה הבת שאול lead to מיכל's failure, whereas אתורה used similar characteristics to bring herself up and save the Jewish people.
In a world focused on man, in a Bible dedicated to the development of humanity, it is easy to forget that “in the beginning” man did not exist. It was only later that, through God’s instruction and decree, man was placed at the forefront of the ecosystem.

God implanted in this world the knowledge of continued life and that of good and evil. Yet, to maintain this world, and his dominion over it, man needed to maintain a connection with God, the ultimate Creator and Ruler. Man’s relationship with God was solidified, and restrictions were placed on man in paradise.

In this paper, I hope to contrast the themes of עץ הדעת and עץ החיים, focusing on what each tree represents, according to a number of different perspectives.

When we read the first two chapters of בראשית and attempt to understand man’s existence prior to consuming from the עץ הדעת, basic questions ring clear. Why was the עץ הדעת prohibited from consumption, while the עץ החיים had no such prohibition until man’s sin (נוכה)? What is the connection between the עץ הדעת and the עץ החיים? In order to address these fundamental questions, proper definitions of “good,” “evil,” and “life,” must be established, and two further questions must be answered: What change occurred in man upon eating from the עץ הדעת, and what was man’s relationship with the עץ הדעת?
Nechama Leibowitz, in her essay, “Tree of Knowledge,” suggests an approach to these issues. She views these unique topics as requiring the distinctive approach of allegory. “Some of our commentators and authorities reject the allegorizing of the Biblical narrative as dangerous, others enthusiastically embrace this approach and there are those who take the middle way. But even those who tend to reject it or reduce their employment of it to the minimum admit that it is the allegorical, hidden meaning of the story of the Garden of Eden and the tree of knowledge that we must seek.” It is perhaps for this reason, the need to employ allegory, that רפCreators, who was not allegorically oriented, refrains from addressing these topics.

In order to understand the story, to become enlightened with deeper meanings, a philosophical and allegorical approach is necessary.ארבניאל and עקדה העק, philosophical commentators of the 1400s, deal with these questions. Yet, in order to properly understand their approaches, we must also examine the classic commentators י_ver and י_g. In his attempt to explain the power of the עץ הדעת, Yi_ver identifies the immediate effect of the tree upon man. יוספดาวעי ישועה ו').'יעוהום ויתפור על יאה אמר על האגרה (יט). עץ הדעת represents sexual awakening. Adam’s first act, after covering his nakedness, was a move to experience a sexual relationship with נו. יוהוים עד את יוהו ואמר יוהו אמר.'וין הדעת, man became sexually sensitive. He experienced sexual desires and became ashamed of his nakedness, recognizing its potential to fulfill these temptations. Yi_ever explains the עץ החיים as a tree that, through its ingestion, allows man to live a longer, but not endless, existence. Yet, once אדס had eaten from the עץ הדעת, he was no longer entitled to live a longer existence in Eden, and the עץ החיים also became prohibited.

Without mentioning his name, the י-ver cites Yi_ever’s view. He later provides his own explanation. As a newly created being, man operated according to his nature. Much as a flower, a bird, or sheep proceed without questioning their respective roles, man simply existed. Adam needed to change his location, so he walked. Adam’s feet became weak, so he slowed his body to a stop, and sat down on a nearby rock. Adam’s body required sustenance, so he consumed, unselfconsciously eating whatever provided the necessary nutrients to survive. Adam was required to procreate, so he fulfilled the commandment, using the proper organs. His actions and motives were devoid of emotion and impulse, lacking intense love or venomous hatred.

Eating from the tree effected a change in man’s desires; he now had the ability to form opinions and determine that which he desired as “good”, and that which he rejected as “bad.” Adam’s eyes were opened; he realized his nakedness, and he was ashamed. He understood that his organs, sexual
or otherwise, could be used as his desires dictated. Now, when he needed to change location, he stopped and questioned, “Am I going to enjoy this new place or will I have a better time staying here?” When his body grew tired, after a long and difficult day he thought, “Perhaps I will stay up late, enjoying the sweet fragrances of the field.” After consuming vast quantities of delicacies and savory foods, man continued to eat because his palate desired additional tastes.

After studying אברכהאם,.um and אברכהאם,.accepts אברכהאם’s approach, viewing the עץ הדעות as a tree that implanted sexual desires within man. In this case, “knowledge” refers to sexual relations, as the term often does in אברכהאם.乙烯 vehemently rejects אברכהאם’s reading — that man was void of all desire and simply behaved according to nature, without exercising desire and its corollary, choice. This explanation, claims um, strips man of his complex nature — part spiritual and part physical. It leaves man as a wholly spiritual being, much as an angel, without control over his physical capacities. If this were the case, claims um, questions, why would God impart the prohibition of eating from the עץ הדעות to a being who lacks the facilities to comply with this commandment, to a being who merely behaves in accordance with his nature?

According to um, man, in fact, did have the ability to choose, to desire, to become fulfilled, in his garden of paradise. The trees in the garden were described as עץ בוים (ךכ). Adam was given the gift of food, luscious and fulfilling, without limit or effort. He was given a dwelling of intense beauty, to bask unrestrained in its splendor. And Adam also had an עץ מדיה in the midst of the garden. This tree, which Adam could eat from, provided medicine for any possible disease or discomfort that he might encounter.

In short, Adam had all of his physical and spiritual needs provided for effortlessly in the Garden. Adam’s world was complete. He knew desire and felt fulfilled. Adam had no reason to look beyond Eden because he lived in perfection, in paradise. This existence facilitated a direct relationship with God and His פשט. Each moment that God allowed man to breathe, eat, and enjoy his perfect world, was a direct gift, complete פשט. The placement of the עץ מדיה in the middle of the garden was representative of this idea. Had Adam chosen to eat from the עץ מדיה rather than the עץ הדעות, he would not have conquered death. The עץ הדעות provided continual solutions, such as medication to ailment, but did not remove ailment from the world. This perfect world was a world in which man was constantly living the עץ הדעות in his constant interaction with God’s glory and kindness.

In this world, God placed limitations, but not complete prohibition. Adam was free to use the עץ הדעות in permitted venues. He could enjoy its
exquisite beauty, could touch its pleasant texture. He was even permitted to feel its fruits, but he could not eat from the tree. So too, man’s sexual relationship with woman was condoned and even encouraged, but had its share of limitations. Adam had the ability to enjoy a redeemed sexual relationship with נשים, through behaving in accordance with his spiritual nature in a world in which material concerns were effortlessly provided, so that man would be free to focus on spiritual issues. In this world, there existed restriction to prevent man from becoming subsumed in the material, physical pleasure which went beyond man’s basic needs. By ingesting the fruit, Adam symbolically fell and became conquered by his physical desires. He desired to “know” woman in an unredeemed way, in order to fulfill his animalistic desires. The relationship became unredeemed and obscene. God created such a tree, with the potential for good if used in appropriate ways (viewing and feeling) and the potential for bad (eating). The tree’s potential was part and parcel of man’s exercise of free choice: man could choose to continue the spiritually charged relationship, experiencing God’s נשים, or choose to reject the נשים and become submerged in his animalistic and material nature.

While was reading the נשים as relaying a message against material indulgence, עקבה תחת, also a Spanish philosopher, understood the famous story in a different vein, focusing on man’s relationship with knowledge. עקבה תחת illustrates man’s possible interaction with knowledge, represented by the tree, in three possible ways: one of complete foolishness, one that is correct and beneficial, or one that is confused and dangerous. To have a relationship of complete foolishness means to refrain from touching the tree. Such a relationship is barbaric — it places man in the category of the animals, who have no ability to think, to learn, to interact. Conversely, a proper relationship with knowledge involves touching it, setting up camp near it, and enjoying its sweet fragrance. This is a relationship to the tree that is conducive to true and proper knowledge. By taking these steps, man places himself in a position to experience and learn the tree’s wisdom, to ultimately learn the lesson of “good” and “bad” in the proper fashion. Yet, man may fail to recognize the beautiful result of appropriately experiencing the tree: the heights in wisdom he can achieve through its ambiance, texture, and scent. He may attempt an alternative mechanism to achieve this wisdom: consumption. This man does not understand the true meaning behind the נשים — the fact that he has every tool to understand “good” and “bad.” His only limitation is against over-indulgence, swallowing and digesting the fruit. Such a relationship places man in the camp of absolute dependence on the tree for instant gratification of his intellectual curiosity, which is a dangerous approach.
concretizes the danger through a parable. A sick individual goes to a doctor for treatment. To cure the ailment, the doctor presents the patient with a drugged apple, whose function is to be smelled. The doctor warns the patient against eating the apple, for fear of severe danger. In this parable, there exists a sharp distinction between properly using the fragrant apple, resulting in life, or improperly using the apple, resulting in extreme danger. The patient who eats the apple clearly does not understand the illness or its remedy. He hears that the apple is “good” and therefore uses it in the most intense way, digestion, in the hope that it will effect the most extreme positive change. He does not wish to endure the gradual process of sniffing the apple, with the distant endpoint of cure. Such behavior is reminiscent, as explains, of over-indulgent eating. This individual enjoys eating, but does not understand its limit. Eating is necessary; it is “good.” The glutton therefore consumes and consumes without thought. The over-indulgent eater does not appreciate that a redeemed life is one with restraint. He becomes dependent on that continual process of eating.

Eating from expressed a desire to retreat into an intellectual life free of effort. Man did not want to attempt the difficult and gradual process of learning about God and His goodness. He refused to accept limits on what and how he could know. Adam did not want to understand God through the mechanisms of the tree that would lead to this end. Rather, Adam wanted to retreat into the simplicity of what seemed to him as “good.” He wanted simple and quick answers to objective “good” and “bad.” So he over-indulged and ate the fruit, making the choice to search for answers to the questions about God’s world in ways that God did not intend.

Yet, asserts that even after ’s sin the possibility still exists to recreate this spiritual bond with God, to have a personal Eden based on life. To achieve this existence, one must learn how to properly approach the other “trees”, or knowledge, in the world. The “trees,” which are “pleasant to see,” represent knowledge of nature. The “trees” which are “good to eat,” express the natural enjoyment that man gets from working the land to produce food, or his pleasure in creating works of the hand. If Adam is able to recognize that personal fulfillment and beauty in nature both come from the of God, than he can enter into a relationship with God based on — the special divine providence.

To explain the restriction of eating from continues his focus on knowledge. The tree exhibits the potential for “good” use of knowledge and “bad” use of knowledge. The “trees” represents in-depth philosophical knowledge, with all of its dangers. To use such knowledge
properly, one must use it to push away those who deny God as Creator, those who materialize God’s existence, and those who say there is more than one God. Improper use of philosophical knowledge is using such analysis to deny God’s existence, divine providence, prophecy, or the giving of the Torah. One must approach the acquisition of knowledge with discretion. It must be used appropriately: to touch it, smell it, taste it. But one must not become engrossed in it, thinking that knowledge is everything.

Four hundred years after שֵׂכֶדוֹת תִּשְׂכַּל and עֲרָבְנָאֵל argued over the philosophical symbolism of the עֵץ הָדַע, Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch explained the significance of the tree’s name, “knowledge of good and bad.” This name was given to indicate the result of eating from the tree, “man would decide how he wished to recognize what was good or bad.”

According to Rav Hirsch, the very commandment not to eat the tree provides man a window into the knowledge of “good” and “bad.” In order to understand the meaning of “good” and “bad,” one must, “call that good, which God stamps as being good, and bad, which He declares as such.” By complying with this condition, Rav Hirsch explains, the earth will “be able to form a paradise for us.” The existence of the עֵץ הָדַע taught the lesson of how to lead a proper life in the garden. The definition of “good” and “bad” are not subjective, at the whims of man’s desires. “The tree … [which] was endowed with every attraction for taste, for the imagination, sight, and reasoning judgment, all one’s senses declared it “good,” that it should be eaten, and yet God had forbidden it to be eaten, was accordingly designed ‘bad’ for Man.” To lead an appropriate lifestyle in Eden, to have continued interactions with God, man must accept God’s objective definitions of “good” and “bad.”

Man could not take a superficial approach to “goodness”, an approach which leaves his desires unredeemed. Whether these desires take the form of materialism or intellectual pursuit, Adam must understand that “goodness” involves limitations and restrictions. Whether the allegory is understood in עֵץ הָדַע’s perspective or in that of שֵׂכֶדוֹת תִּשְׂכַּל, God is teaching this lesson by placing man into a situation of abundant gifts, connected with limitations, in order to achieve God’s level of “goodness” in His world of paradise.

The Eternal Leaders: A Comparison of the Personalities of זד and אליהו

Leora Cohn

THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF HISTORY, the Jewish people have continually dreamed of being led by מישית זד and the descendants of אליהו. These two leaders have surprisingly different personalities. Both זד and אליהו were motivated by a deep interest in the physical and spiritual welfare of כל ישראל. Yet, their styles of leadership were diametrically opposed. זד and אליהו each served a unique role, which was indispensable at the time, and which are both necessary components of מישית.

The initial appearances of זד and אליהו

Our first introduction to אליהו reads: סעפים הוא זד אבינו, וinesser אליהו, אל י אליו: סעפים כותב אליהו, כך אליהו הוא פכתי. This was the essence of אליהו. Everything that אליהו did was caused by his intense connection to and identification with אליהו.

Contrasting אליהו’s first appearance to that of זד emphasizes how little we are told concerning זד. זד is first introduced in שמואל א, פטけて זד אליהו, ישות, ישות, ישות. He is introduced, described as a natural setting, which enables us to identify with him and his position in the family. Additionally, before זד is revealed as the מישית vero, זד describes his physical appearance as זד.
The Eternal Leaders: A Comparison of דוד and וּלְחָת. These personal details of דוד’s life before he became a מלך שבאלא grant us a more complete picture of דוד’s personality. We are able to appreciate his existence as an individual, and not simply as מלך שבאלא. Indeed the people of his time were also able to identify with דוד’s personality. Even after דוד received מלך שבאלא, the people were able to appreciate his entire personality, both the spiritual and physical. As יוחנן המנזר describes יִבְרָל, the people recognized his spiritual nature. Yet, they also realized that he was one of the people. They were able to relate to him as a person — as a son, as a member of the community of יהוה, as a warrior, as a בנו, and an איש תאו.

As דוד’s position in the nation became more glorious, he still maintained a very real and human persona. דוד’s rise to מלך שבאלא was gradual. Unlike לֹאֵל, who was already in a position of power at his first appearance, דוד worked to become established as a מלך שבאלא. There are numerous פרקים recounting the struggle between כֹּל הָאָדָם and דוד, as דוד slowly took over the מלך שבאלא. These struggles provided an opportunity for דוד to slowly mature into the quintessential מלך שבאלא.

In פרק היי, דוד proved his strength by killing לֹאֵל. While דוד’s victory against לֹאֵל was obviously a מַגָּא, still it is common and normal that a king gains power by saving his people from an enemy. This is drawn to the leader who had saved them from לֹאֵל.

In פרק היי an additional aspect of דוד’s character is revealed. The הספר describes the friendship between יִבְרָל and דּוֹד הָבָא לֶאֱלֹהִים (ספרא, א, יח), and the human friendship of דוד. Friendship is a deep emotional bond that every human being feels. Any reader of ספרא can relate to the bond which דוד experienced.

Not only does a reader of ספרא feel a personal connection to דוד, but the people themselves came to relate to דוד on a personal level. יִבְרָל gained the love and loyalty of the people by being one of them. דוד was connected with the people as he gradually established his מלך שבאלא. He fought together with the people against the אֹחֵי הָאָדָם, thereby gaining their loyalty and respect. דוד himself felt like one of the nation when he said יִבְרָל, וּלְחָת did not deem himself worthy of marrying יִבְרָל’s daughter, considering himself like anyone else in כלל שבאלא.

After דוד established himself as a מלך שבאלא, he remained a very real and approachable figure. In particular, his sins make it easier for us to identify with him. We, like דוד, fall and sin, yet we can take strength from the courage of דוד as he overcame obstacles and performed טובות בלמה. We can
identify with the fall of דוד when he sinned with אשתו, his own son, rebelled against him; connect to the emotions he expressed in פophobic חוסר.

In contrast to the approachable personality of אלוהים, דוד was aloof. We know nothing about any relationship he might have had with ישראל, as even his son was not mentioned. He was certainly not one of the people. On the contrary; he established himself as a dominating force above them. דוד’s entire personality was characterized by his תקוע. דוד himself even admitted to his distance from the people when he declared, אני משאגו של האדם אני נהנה בו אין לי לכדים, (מלכים א, חככים) א shalem א Athol. was a singular defender of, performing decisive actions to prove his presence.

אלוהים מייחס: The sudden appearance of אלוהים is related to his תקוע. אלוהים’s appearance was precipitated by an unparalleled level of בקוע in אשה ספרא and his wicked queen, יואל. The leaders at that time were יואל and his wicked queen. The יואל describes their sins as follows: יופס אתא בלא generado תקוע אתו אשל ישראל לכל מלכים ישראל, (מלכים א, חככים) אף בו החכמים אתא אתוቧו. The end of יואל describes the rampant בקוע which infested all of אלוהים. יואל saw how יואל was disgracing ישראל and, as a crypto- đỏ, he was compelled to act.

The יואל elaborates on אלוהים’s desire to defend יואל. The יואל links the last יואל to יואל’s sudden appearance in יואל. The יואל describes the sinful rebuilding of the city of יואל. The יואל inserts a conversation between this act and אלוהים’s sudden appearance in יואל, when יואל brought a drought. The יואל says:

This יואל notes the significance of the fulfillment of the curse of יואל with regard to ישראל ספרא. The יואל promised יואל, who had promised יואלても when יואל’s חוסר, (יואל, ויהו) who את יואל were before, 에PyObject. This exact use is used
to describe the punishment of חַטָּתָה, who had rebuilt the city at the time of חַטָּתָה. After observing that the curse of חַטָּתָה was fulfilled, אֱלֹהִים insisted that the curse of חַטָּתָה in the תּוֹרָה also be fulfilled. He insisted that it would be proper if there would also be an עִבְדֵּר נִמְשָׁס as punishment for the חַטָּתָה. Immediately, אֱלֹהִים appeared and swore, "I swear to אֱלֹהִים...". The קְרָא demonstrates that אֱלֹהִים's sole intention in bringing the drought was to defend the honor of חַטָּתָה.

Not only did אֱלֹהִים act on behalf of חַטָּתָה, but he acted out of a sincere concern for the future of חַטָּתָה. אֱלֹהִים brought the drought as an act of חֲזַקְוֶה in order to arouse the people to do כָּשָׂר. Had בּוּרִית not done כָּשָׂר, they would have been subjected to the כַּלּוֹזי that חַטָּתָה promised כַּלּוֹזי: אֱלֹהִים compelled אֱלֹהִים to act out of a love for חַטָּתָה to ensure the future of חַטָּתָה. In this way, אֱלֹהִים was very similar to the other famous חֲזַקְוֶה, who observed כָּשָׂר with similar motives. These similarities motivate אֲדֹנָי to say that כָּשָׂר אֱלֹהִים's action was, ultimately, a bold defense of חַטָּתָה. By defending God's honor, אֱלֹהִים saved כָּשָׂר from the plague which חַטָּתָה had brought. In this way אֱלֹהִים and אֱלֹהִים are similar. Their zealousness was caused by a desire to uphold the honor of חַטָּתָה, and by a sense of concern for the wellbeing of בּוּרִית.

This character trait of zealousness, which guided אֱלֹהִים's action, had an important function in determining the future of אֱלֹהִים. If אֱלֹהִים had not acted decisively, then בּוּרִית would have suffered even worse consequences. Yet, אֱלֹהִים could not lead בּוּרִית permanently. The approachable character...
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of זָדִד makes for a more successful leader. זָדִid refrained from daring acts of zealfulness. For example, זָדִid did not kill נָדְקָר and אֱבָשֵׁלוֹם, who were ברוקְלֵה and should have been killed, because זָדִid realized that killing them would create an uproar in כלל יְרוּאֶל.

Physical Appearances

An additional point of comparison between זָדִד and אלְלוֹוה is their physical descriptions, which reflect their contrasting personalities.

זָדִid’s physical description first appears in מְלֶכָּם ב, אָתָה shortly after his市の describe in מְלֶכָּם. This physical description comes late in זָדִid’s career, after his promise of drought, after his demonstration at רַע, and after he resurrected the young child. In contrast, זָדִid’s physical description appears before he began his career as a leader (שומואל א, טוֹב). This contrast is consistent with אלְלוֹוה’s nature as a spiritual being. His physical appearance is unimportant to his character. זָדִid, however, has a very human personality; a physical description enhances the approachable image of his personality.

This point becomes even more clear when we compare the physical descriptions. צָלַל is described as an פַּרְקְרָם מְלֶכָּם (זָדִד יָבַל מְשָׁר אָוֹר. צוֹרְפָה מְלֶכָּם, ב, א). His hair was long and unkempt, as he paid little attention to it. He was already wearing his belt, ready to react immediately to any spiritual task that would arise. Indeed, it is because of this purely spiritual image that צָלַל immediately recognized him as מְלֶכָּם ב, א (אלְלוֹוה החשוב).

The description of זָדִid is the exact opposite. זָדִid had a pleasant and congenial appearance. In fact, since זָדִid’s appearance was so discreet and unremarkable, צוֹרְפָה doubted if he is indeed the king, as he possessed no striking or distinguishing features. צוֹרְפָה had to tell צוֹרְפָה א (שומואל א), because I knew you are the king, צוֹרְפָה א. צוֹרְפָה’s physical description matches his role as a leader who was close to the common person.

A Deeper look into the Spirituality of אלְלוֹוה

Another contrast between זָדִid and אלְלוֹוה is the way in which they led כלל יְרוּאֶל to recognize. זָדִid taught the people about צוֹרְפָה’s power by killing נָדְקָר. Right before זָדִid defeated נָדְקָר he said, צוֹרְפָה made his words public... וֹא דַע הָאָדָם כֵּן (שומואל א, טוֹב). זָדִid, in contrast, helped the nation realize that צוֹרְפָה through drastic and unpleasant measures. צוֹרְפָה punished the nation with a drought in order to facilitate their gathering at הר הכפכפה, where he proved that indeed צוֹרְפָה is the זָדִid of a zealot.
Yet it is important to realize that the drought was motivated by אלוהים’s desire to act for the good of כל ישראל, because this punishment could ultimately prevent their banishment into גלות. Perhaps this is why the story of the widow whose son was saved by אלוהים appears following אלוהים’s declaration of a drought. During his stay with the widow, the text portrays אלוהים as a הרוח who sustained the widow by granting her an endless supply of oil and flour. This reflects אלוהים’s sincere motivations; even in bringing a drought upon בני ישראל, his goal was to bring life. In fact, אלוהים’s prayer when he resurrected the widow’s son indicates his ultimate concerns.

What, as an אולק, really wanted is resurrection, both for the woman’s son and also for the nation. Additionally, this story demonstrates the extent to which אלוהים’s entire essence was miraculous and spiritual. When the אלוקים complained of lack of food, אלוהים remedied this problem through a miracle (מלכים א, ימי). Indeed, performed the ultimate miracle when he revived the son of the אלוקים.

The story of the אלוקים is followed by the pinnacle of אלוהים’s success as a zealot: the events at מגדל, which end when all those present proclaim belief in the one God. At מגדל, יר כהןMale came to the realization that היה אלוהים, and chose היה אלוהים over the אלוקים. Then, they tried to make the people act on this acceptance, by instructing the nation to capture and kill the אלוקים in place. After her salvation, העדרות the אלוקים, and chose היה אלוהים. After her salvation, she sang a song of thanks to היה in which she declared her full allegiance to היה. By reminding the nation of this, hoped to ensure that the experience at מגדל and the proclamation of היה the אלוקים would leave a lasting impression on the nation.

It is interesting to note that we mimic this proclamation of היה the אלוקים every year on יום כיפור, and the אלוקים. After fasting and praying for an entire day, we too strive to relive some of the events by proclaiming היה the אלוקים. It is our hope that this will also have a lasting impression, and that we will be able to draw inspiration from it throughout the following year.

During the demonstration at מגדל, the image of fire played a prevalent role. When drenched the הר בשרון with water (מלכים א, ד), the fire still burnt it. Indeed, the fire soaked up all the water. Also used fire in other contexts. For example, when sent a fire that consumed the messengers of (מלכים ב, יב-א), and ascended to in a fire (שמואל ב, יא-ד). ‘s use of fire is consistent with his fiery spirituality. Fire, by its ephemeral nature, evokes an image of something which converts the physical into
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spiritual, just as fire consecrates a זָרָה and makes it into an עֵשֶׁה to ה. Water, on the other hand, descends from the heavens to nourish the earth. It brings spirituality into the physical. At אָלֵיהוּ, הר Consumed all the water that surrounded the זָרָה. אָלֵיהוּ expressed his relationship with ה through fire, and not water. He was a zealot who could only fathom pure spirituality.

This is, in part, why אָלֵיהוּ could not be the eternal leader and was replaced by אָלֵיהוּ. In fact, אָלֵיהוּ’s zealous style is not fit for permanent leadership. His success at זָרָה was only momentary. אָלֵיהוּ immediately hunted down אָלֵיהוּ to kill him (מֵלָכָשׁ א, אֵינוֹ). This proves that אָלֵיהוּ’s actions at זָרָה did not cause total religious reform, as אָלֵיהוּ still possessed the authority to hunt down נִכְסָאשׁ.

After this failure, אָלֵיהוּ traveled to the desert, abandoning his mission to improve מַעֲרָב. אָלֵיהוּ, like אָלֵיהוּ, went to מַעֲרָב. There are many similarities between אָלֵיהוּ and אָלֵיהוּ experiences in מַעֲרָב. אָלֵיהוּ stayed in מַעֲרָב for four days (מֵלָכָשׁ א, אֵינוֹ), reminiscent of מַעֲרָב’s stay of forty days on זָרָה. אָלֵיהוּ received a מְשָׁה at ה (מְשָׁה א, אֵינוֹ). Both and מְשָׁה in מַעֲרָב received a מְשָׁה at זָרָה. אָלֵיהוּ received his מְשָׁה at זָרָה as a leader of מַעֲרָב. אָלֵיהוּ arrived at מַעֲרָב as failed leader. He was unable to permanently raise מַעֲרָב to higher spiritual levels. It is at this point that ה asked אָלֵיהוּ (מֵלָכָשׁ א, אֵינוֹ) to receive מְשָׁה. These similarities only serve to highlight the very different roles played by כלל שירא and מַעֲרָב. מְשָׁה אָלֵיהוּ and מְשָׁה אָלֵיהוּ. This is, in part, why אָלֵיהוּ could not be the eternal leader and was replaced by אָלֵיהוּ - אָלֵיהוּ and אָלֵיהוּ declared that his zeal was linked to his failure. Immediately, ה revealed Himself to אָלֵיהוּ. ה showed that He is not in fire, noise, or storm, but in רָאשׁ. ה does not only rule through zeal, but in softer ways as well. Yet, following God’s revelation in the still voice, אָלֵיהוּ repeated his previous declaration, אָלֵיהוּ declared that אָלֵיהוּ did only lead with zeal. אָלֵיהוּ, it seems, was only able to lead with zeal, which is why ה, at this point, stripped אָלֵיהוּ of his leadership, commanding him to appoint אָלֵיהוּ as אָלֵיהוּ. אָלֵיהוּ in his work, מְדַעָּשׁ מַכָּל, views אָלֵיהוּ life as an ongoing educational process. 1 ה sent מַכָּל to the אָלֵיהוּ in order to show him that he must lead also with other מַדַעָּשׁ besides zeal. In sending מַכָּל, ה was showing him the drastic results of the drought he declared — widows and orphans were starving because of his zeal. Still, אָלֵיהוּ did not bring rain until ה commanded him to do so (מֵלָכָשׁ א, אֵינוֹ). Again, as we have noted, אָלֵיהוּ also failed to learn the lesson of the drought. אָלֵיהוּ could only approach ה though zeal. Therefore he was destined to ascend to heaven in a fire, as אָלֵיהוּ could only live a pure spiritual existence.

Yet, we should not view אָלֵיהוּ’s leadership as a complete failure, for he brought the nation to accept ה and declare אָלֵיהוּ. This declaration saved מַעֲרָב from exile, and served a very important function.
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extremely successful, as he brought the nation to the spiritual level of preparedness for בֵּין הַמַּכְתָּשׁ. In fact, both דוד and אלים are blessed with the expression מַלְכֵּים בֵּין הַמַּכְתָּשׁ (מלכים ב', יד. כב) אלћי אלים דוד This phrase, which is otherwise used to describe only the יהוח, is reserved for the ultimate leaders of בֵּין הַשְּׁאֵל. It is clear, therefore, that both דוד and אלים performed important functions. דוד was a successful leader because he related to בֵּין הַשְּׁאֵל on a practical level; he served as a realistic example in everyday life. דוד’s mode of leadership brought יִשְׂרָאֵל to the spiritual state of being, capable and ready to build the מַלְכֵּים. אלים’s style of leadership provided יִשְׂרָאֵל with an intense, even if short-lived, moment of religious inspiration. Both styles of leadership are neccesary, which is perhaps why מַלְכֵּים and אלים are the critical pair which will lead יִשְׂרָאֵל in the days of מֶשֶׁחַ.

1 הָגוֹאָל אֲרוֹם, מַלְכֵּים מִלְךָ, חָסְמוֹ, 1994.
THE STORY of פסח's zealousness (בですので, חכם) raises many questions. How could פסח not know what to do? Why was פסח not a simple murderer? What is the nature of the reward of חוזה that פסח received? Wasn't he already a כוח? The answers to these questions are deeply interrelated. Various מפרשים answer these questions differently.

The story begins by placing these events in historical context. The first reads, יחל חוש להו אל חות מעובר, פסח פדן. The fact that the women in question came from פסח implies a connection to the previous פסח, in which她们 tried to curse בני ישראל instead for the benefit of בני ישראל. A later פסח makes explicit that בני ישראל had hatched this plan to bring a plague upon בני ישראל instead. כהן learned the hard way that he could not curse בני ישראל on his own. The only way to bring harm to בני ישראל was to cause them to bring it upon themselves.

כד (כסף) כהן, כהן was a first step toward idolatrous worship of בני ישראל המופר, one of the Jews in פסח. כהן was the fact that the Jews had no involvement with בני ישראל המופר. They did not violate this sin until they arrived in כהן. The men were so attracted to the women that they were willing to do כל after קד for the sake of getting close to women. כהן explains that a woman would take out the image of בני ישראל and tell the man to bow down to it. קד, based on the כד, explains that the women would have the Jewish men uncover themselves and relieve themselves in front of the בני ישראל המופר as a means of serving it (במדבר, חכם). This angered הב so much that he sent a פסח (the פסח is only mentioned later, in פסח). At this point, בעודו was instructed to take the פסח and hang the people who had been worshipping בני ישראל המופר as a way of serving it (במדבר, חכם). Usually the execution for בני ישראל המופר is stoning, but in this case the criminals were hanged, so that everyone would see and understand the severity of the sin. Hence the requirement to hang them (פסח ד) גזר השמיש, so that
they would be visible to all. R. Hirsch adds that although not everyone was sinning, they were all responsible to try and stop it from continuing (הָעָלָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה).

When וַיָּקָּח took in front of the קְבֵי וּמִרֵי knew what to do. When וַיָּקָּח brought her to bibliography because he wanted to “ask” if she was raising וְאַלָּא מָעָה took in front of the קְבֵי וּמִרֵי explains that וַיָּקָּח was taunting מָעָה by saying, “If she is וַיָּקָּח אָסָר מָעָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה was so shocked that he forgot the קְבֵי וּמִרֵי and was unable to respond. Perhaps this explains why the people were crying (תְּפִיט). They were crying because no one, including וַיָּקָּח, understood what to do. Alternatively, וַיָּקָּח explains that they were crying and praying that things should work out properly. וַיָּקָּח, in contrast, relates the tears to וַיָּקָּח’s command to kill the sinners. They were crying over the fact that they had been commanded to kill their relatives. At this point וַיָּקָּח returned to himself, and explained that it was in fact permissible for וַיָּקָּח to marry the מַמְתְּרָה וָרָא because they had been married before קְבֵי וּמִרֵי. His wife had in fact “converted” together with the rest of the nation.

In this context, the words יָדוּתָי מַפְתָּח are understood by many מַפְתָּח to mean that וַיָּקָּח remembered the מָעָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה וַיָּקָּח went to וַיָּקָּח and said “I learned from you that when one is performing מָעָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה וַיָּקָּח with an מָעָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה וַיָּקָּח applies.” When וַיָּקָּח responded, “Since you remembered the מָעָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה, you should be the one to carry it out.” וַיָּקָּח picked up the spear and killed the two sinners. As he speared the two of them, the מַמְתְּרָה וָרָא stopped, but only after 24,000 people had already died. Rav Hirsch (תְּפִיט) notes that at the time of the מַמְתְּרָה וָרָא only 3,000 people died. There it was only a local sin of a “metaphysical” nature. But here they had become involved in the entire culture of מָעָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה. מַמְתְּרָה וָרָא summarizes the conditions under which the law of מָעָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה applies (תְּפִיט). The sinner must be killed during his performance of the sin. If the וַיָּקָּח kills the sinners after they complete their act, than it is a simple murder. וַיָּקָּח could not be asked if it is permitted to kill them, and if they were to be asked they could not permit the act. Furthermore, if the sinner kills the מַמְתְּרָה in self defense, he is not מַמְתְּרָה.

וַיָּקָּח explains the מַמְתְּרָה which says that וַיָּקָּח emerged to do the act מַמְתְּרָה וְאַלָּא מָעָה. The וַיָּקָּח refers to the מַמְתְּרָה, who were discussing what should be done about the situation. This raises a question. If the מַמְתְּרָה were discussing the issue, then why was מַמְתְּרָה permitted to act as a מַמְתְּרָה in מַמְתְּרָה in מַמְתְּרָה? כֵּן וַיָּקָּח answers these difficulties (pp. 673-674). Although מַמְתְּרָה approached מַמְתְּרָה, he never specifically asked if he could kill the sinners. The act of מַמְתְּרָה is prohibited once the מַמְתְּרָה asks permission. Asking implies that
Zealousness

the was acting in a clear mind, instead of out of the passionate zealouslyness of the moment.

says that did not act following the will of the . The actual explains that the were concerned only with the letter of the law. Another possible explanation is that it was not a good thing to carry out . Therefore, the were unhappy. However, once the act was performed, considered it praiseworthy. That was why writes instead of . himself was unable to carry out the act of killing the sinners. As , people might think that he did so because of his personal emotional involvement in the case. Furthermore, could not carry out the act of because he was considered the of those times. Since the could not ask for permission from to perform the act, himself could not kill the sinners.

Still this does not explain why part of ’s reward is, . After all, was already a future generation. explains that was given the for himself and for all future generations. was alive at the time of that promise, and he was, therefore, not a future generation. In contrast, and explain that was rewarded by being made a , because a atones for the whole just as did by killing the two sinners.

To summarize, did what he should have done. In doing so, he taught all of very important lessons about the eagerness one should have when doing something for .
and ברכות: A Story of Father and Son

Devorah Wolf

THE STORY OF the ברכות of ברכות and במשפט ומשה provides us with a glimpse into one of הָלְכִי́'s most famous and most mysterious families. Rich and complex, this pivotal episode elucidates aspects of its characters' personalities and raises many questions. Why did ברכה feel she needed to trick her husband into giving the ברכות to ברכה? How could אשה ספוק the quintessential ברכה and אשה ספוק go along with such a scheme? How does the character of במשפט ומשה fit into the story? What did ברכת think of במשפט ומשה and what were his intentions in blessing him? In this article, we will focus on the last of these questions. Using the commentaries ברכת and במשפט ומשה, we will analyze ברכת's interaction with במשפט ומשה in order to understand ברכת's opinion of his eldest son, and how that led to the ברכה he wanted to give him.

Our story is found in בשמת הלודת, the beginning of which speaks of the births of ברכת and במשפט ומשה and ברכה. Merely one month after their births, יוגמד העיטורי והוש אשת יד רני צד השם והCoreApplication באשת יד שעב (ברשהט, חבט) (חום) as both ברכת and במשפט ומשה point out, once they reached the age of maturity, it became evident that they would lead different lifestyles. ברכת focuses on the idea that the pre-existing personality differences only became visible in adulthood. במשפט ומשה explains that they only started preferring different things once they became adults. Also, we can see a difference emerging in what the two במרפש characterize: במרת explicitly says בمسرح was deceitful, while במשפט ומשה points to בMahon's worldly characteristics and rash behavior. Commenting on a later בסרוק, במשפט ומשה describes בMahon this way: "הוא לא היה אדם טוב" — "He was not an upright, good person" (ברשהט, חבט, די לעשה).

The next בסרוק will begin to tell us how ברכת saw בMahon's character: בMahon loved בMahon for this peculiar reason of במרפש. Simply, he loved him because בMahon was a hunter and brought his father food. Read this way, the word כפי (his mouth) refers to בMahon's mouth; כפי put the food in ברכת's mouth. But, as בMahon points out, we can understand כפי to mean בMahon's mouth. According to the במרפש in
and יִתְחָך: A Story of Father and Son

used to ask his father questions such as how to take אָשָׁר on straw and salt, both items from which one need not take מעשה. Skillfully crafting his words, he pretended to be unusually exacting in his performance of מעשה, and tricked his father into thinking as much. Read this way, loved because had, or the ability to deceive his father through his words, in his mouth. רְשָׁי explains that was utterly fooled by his cunning eldest child.

, however, takes a different approach. His comment on the word יִתְחָך is as follows: יִתְחָך loved more than יִתְחָך, as we had assumed; he actually loved more than יִתְחָך! The only tells us of his love for יִתְחָך because without the specification, we might have thought did not love him. רְשָׁי further comments that is not in chronological order. יִתְחָך’s love for יִתְחָך, based on יִתְחָך’s providing food for him, only occurred much later, after יִתְחָך grew old and in need of his son’s special care. When was blind and no longer capable of running household events, was able to win his affection by hunting fabulous delicacies for him, despite יִתְחָך’s clear awareness of’s reckless personality. This is not to say that was trying to trick יִתְחָך; was doing a genuine act of כְּדָר אֶב. However, he only helped יִתְחָך when the latter was weak and helpless. רְשָׁי refers here to the beginning of פֶּסְחָה. The פֶּסְחָה speak of an aging, blind, who suddenly feels an urgent need to bless his children.

explains that went prematurely blind; he was not actually about to die, but he thought he was because of the blindness. This explains the hurried nature of’s request. We can also understand why he asked to hunt to facilitate the request. This is what generated’s love for יִתְחָך when blessing him, and therefore requested the food.

’s explanation that ’s strategy involved trickery hints at the trickery that is about to follow. , who overheard all this and found it unacceptable, enlisted in a plan to trick יִתְחָך into blessing his youngest son instead of his oldest. A reluctant agreed, and the two of them prepared food while donned his brother’s hunting clothes and hairy animal skins to simulate his brother’s appearance. He appeared before
his father, posing as וָשֶׁשׁ, and a rather curious dialogue ensued between father and son. Wasserstein reads as follows:

"It was really think he was blessing וָשֶׁשׁ? If so, how was he convinced? If וָשֶׁשׁ was not positive וָשֶׁשׁ was standing before him, why did he give the רָשִׁי? anyway, with the risk that it would fall on the wrong son? We will again look at a different voice, whether to provide us two different perspectives.

What provoked וָשֶׁשׁ’s suspicion? רָשִׁי points to וָשֶׁשׁ’s voice itself. רָשִׁי disagrees, explaining that it was the manner in which רָשִׁי spoke which was unusual (וָשֶׁשׁ had had identical voices, so וָשֶׁשׁ’s voice alone was not enough to make וָשֶׁשׁ suspicious). וָשֶׁשׁ said two things that shocked his father according to רָשִׁי: יַכָּל דֶּרֶךְ גָּדָל, וָשֶׁשׁ explains that the former was unusual because יַכָּל דֶּרֶךְ גָּדָל רָשִׁי did not often mention God’s name. The latter was strange because it was spoken with soft, entreaty language, seemingly uncharacteristic of וָשֶׁשׁ. This raises a glaring question within רָשִׁי’s voice, whether וָשֶׁשׁ had told us before that רָשִׁי had been totally fooled by וָשֶׁשׁ. וָשֶׁשׁ was thoroughly convinced of וָשֶׁשׁ’s righteousness, which is why he wanted to give him this דֶּרֶךְ בְּכָרָח. If so, why would וָשֶׁשׁ’s speaking softly and mentioning God’s name be unusual? Why would such expressions arouse his father’s suspicion?

We may now turn to Wasserstein’s commentary on רָשִׁי, the אָוֶר. He explains that רָשִׁי’s suspicion actually reflected his high opinion of וָשֶׁשׁ. Wasserstein explains that יַכָּל דֶּרֶךְ גָּדָל was an act of honor, and would not mention God’s name because he was not in the proper state to do so; he was and his mind was on his hunting, disallowing proper mention of God’s name in this context would therefore actually show his nature was to serve God out of honor, as opposed to a humble, and one who has heightened fear of God will, out of awe and reverence, not mention His name freely. Wasserstein respected this type of יַכָּל דֶּרֶךְ, since he himself also served
and a great deal of אביה, who characteristically served God with abundant ברי, and was likely to mention Him in his regular conversations. Therefore, hearing his son speaking God’s name jolted אביה. Similarly, the expression ברי, spoken with אביה’s suspicion for a positive reason. אביה knew this was not the case with אביה, who characteristically served God with abundant ברי, and was likely to mention Him in his regular conversations. Therefore, hearing his son speaking God’s name jolted אביה. Similarly, the expression ברי, spoken with אביה’s suspicion for a positive reason. אביה saw ברי as a soft-spoken person, and was שג as a bold personality. When he heard ברי, or who he thought was ברי, he couldn’t believe it, not because ברי always spoke brazenly and disrespectfully, but because ברי spoke like a leader, boldly and strongly. Now, when אביה heard him speaking softly, he worried: where is my leader-son? Where is the ברי whose strength renders him capable of boldly leading a nation?

With אביה’s explanations, we can now view אביה’s suspicion as a manifestation of his love for ברי, of his knowledge of his son’s character and good qualities. Now we must figure out why, with all this suspicion, אביה gave the ברי anyway.

אביה takes us through אביה’s complicated calculation process. אביה, according to אביה, had an impeccable character, and was not sure which son was standing before him. In his mind there were now two proofs that it was ייער: לא שמע שם מזור בפיי: ברי’s uncharacteristic verbal expressions (כוםآن בשעה וענני). But there were also two proofs that it was ברי. The הכתוב states the following principle: ברי כל מילים וعجبיו לגלגל, לא מ[Testo automatico] ייער. According to this principle, people will not lie when the truth will surely be found out, because they, in turn, will be revealed as liars. אביה reasoned that if ייער has gone through all this trouble to trick him and was actually posing as ברי, he would know that he would eventually be found out, because ייער, in turn, will be revealed as liars. ייער, being the ברי that he was, would certainly not want to be proven a liar, especially not in front of his father. Therefore, thought אביה, it was unlikely that ייער would go so far to trick him, knowing the truth would be revealed. ייער’s other proof is more clearly seen in the text: his son’s hands were hairy, unmistakably ברי’s. אביה balances these proofs as follows. אביה compared שמע’s mentioning of God’s name with the principle that people who will be found out do not lie. Both acts were unusual. Nevertheless, both were possible; one can change his mode of speech and one can lie even when doing so is unwise. These two proofs therefore cancelled each other out in ייער’s mind. He was now left with another unusual verbal expression weighted against a physical sign. Like before, it is unusual but possible to change one’s mode of speech. However, to change one’s physical appearance, to grow hair on one’s formerly smooth skin, is virtually impossible.
According to this explanation, we can read אבות ush as the resolution of יוחנן's doubt. The hands convinced him. Similarly, יוחנן’s utterance in באוט must be read as a statement: יוחנן, i.e. you are my son, with the help of יוחנן, neatly resolves our questions and shows us precisely how יוחנן was convinced he was speaking toعاش.

Recall that יוחנן focuses on יוחנן’s actual voice, not his manner of speaking, as the cause for יוחנן’s suspicion. יוחנן also concludes that the hairy hands convinced that he was the son standing before him. However, יוחנן reads differently than יוחנן; it’s a question, says יוחנן, despite the fact that it lacks the grammatical יוחנן — are you my son? If יוחנן was not sure which person stood before him, why did יוחנן bestow this ברכה? יוחנן answers that יוחנן only checked the identity of his son as much as he did to spare יוחנן’s feelings should end up mistakenly blessing יוחנן, i.e. you are my son. Therefore, says יוחנן, it would not be so terrible if יוחנן received this ברכה instead ofعاش. However, it would be terrible if יוחנן were made to feel that his father had been part of the trickery, as if יוחנן had never really wanted to bless him. After all, יוחנן loved יוחנן and intended this ברכה for him for a reason. Still, it seems that according to יוחנן, this ברכה was not as important as we thought.

An earlier comment by יוחנן strengthens this point. We noted before that יוחנן referred to יוחנן as not an upright, good person. This is in fact the reason, according to יוחנן, that יוחנן needed to bless יוחנן at all. יוחנן knew both that would receive the ברכה of יוחנן to be the father of the chosen nation in the promised land, and that he would receive it from God Himself. יוחנן was aware that neither he nor his father יוחנן received that special ברכה from their respective fathers. Each received it directly from God, as would יוחנן. But יוחנן needed a different kind of ברכה in order to succeed.

We see, therefore, that according to יוחנן this was not the ברכה that would determine which son would continue the line of God's chosen nation. This was another ברכה entirely, one similar to the ברכה various fathers in gave their children, based on potential and life opportunities. This ברכה, as recorded in אבות ush, contains two elements: leadership and prosperity. It contains no mention of the two promises God bestowed upon יוחנן: a special nation and a special land. Recall that according to יוחנן knew exactly what type of person יוחנן was; he knew that this ברכה was necessary for יוחנן’s future. Perhaps יוחנן was trying to help יוחנן use his
outwardly-focused talents positively. Maybe יוחשׁ envisioned a partnership between the two brothers, with the “chosen one” and יושע being in some position of material or political leadership. In any case, יוחשׁ was not intending for this רְדָךְ to “choose” יושע; he simply wanted to give יושע a chance. But that chance was very important, and יוחשׁ certainly hadn’t given up on יושע. It would still be terrible if יושע ended up feeling the whole thing had been a setup.

Presumably this רְדָךְ was intended to “choose” יושע according to יִרְשָׁי. The painstaking way יוחשׁ tried to determine which son stood before him, as well as the drastic way he reacted upon יושע’s return, imply that יוחשׁ saw this רְדָךְ as precursor to the special רְדָךְ God would give the leader of the nation. The יִרְשָׁי says יוחשׁ, could of course only bless his son that God should bless him; still, the text of the יִרְשָׁי implies that this רְדָךְ was quite serious and יִרְשָׁי does not indicate that we should assume otherwise.

A look at the end of this story will further clarify this point. After יוחשׁ blessed יושע, thinking he was יושע, returned, bearing the meat he had hunted and prepared for his aging father, יִרְשָׁי tells us יִרְשָׁי’re response: יוהר יוחשׁ רדך גלגל העמיד איך יזמא ויאמר כי התם יד ויבא ויאמר כי יעבדボール באזר יוחשׁ. The יִרְשָׁי was shocked and flustered by what has happened. יִרְשָׁי cites a מִדְרֶשׁ to explain this יִרְשָׁי: truly trembling, יוחשׁ saw יושע opening up beneath יושע. Perhaps יִרְשָׁי here implies that יוחשׁ came to realize of the horrible consequences that would have ensued had יושע received this רְדָךְ and been the one to lead the nation. It is interesting that the מִדְרֶשׁ offers a visual reaction, since יוחשׁ had gone blind. Perhaps it would like to hint that יוחשׁ’s blindness of perception was shattered, and he now saw both his mistake and a very real image of disaster. Whatever the intent of this מִדְרֶשׁ according to this explanation was real and intense, highlighting יִרְשָׁי’s authentic shock at realizing his mistake. The words יִרְשָׁי at the end of the מִדְרֶשׁ, as יִרְשָׁי explains, mean that יוחשׁ now gave his full support to יושע as receiver of this רְדָךְ. יוחשׁ came to realize that יושע was the rightful owner of this רְדָךְ all along. יִרְשָׁי said, I had been tricked, but יושע acted wisely, as יִרְשָׁי translates. Although it is unclear what exactly made יוחשׁ realize he had been wrong all along, we can assume that יוחשׁ had some kind of insight at this time. Perhaps it was this vision of יִרְשָׁי, inspired by יִרְשָׁי, which contrasted to the רְדָךְ that had filled the room when יושע entered. יִרְשָׁי’s comments that יושע’s garments, when worn by יושע, emitted the sweet fragrance of the Garden, whereas normally they stank of animal decay). Whatever the cause, יוחשׁ now recognized that יושע was, and had always been, the one who must receive this רְדָךְ and be
the father of God’s special nation. He had been thoroughly deceived about
עָשֶׂה’s character, and was now justifiably shaken by the comprehension of his
decades-long misconception.

רָדִיק’s explanation of עָשֶׂה’s reaction follows the theme identified be-
fore. Concerned more with עָשֶׂה’s feelings than with the possibility of
iscalus mistakenly receiving this ברכה, and not entirely sure which son he blessed,
iscalus was not all that stunned to learn he had actually blessed עָשֶׂה. He was
not shaking and trembling with shock, says רדיק; he simply made it appear
that way. put on a great show of
iscalus before עָשֶׂה so the latter would not
think the former had intentionally tricked him. Similar to
iscalus explains as follows: יאדו שברךתיו כשה אני מכשף ולא ברךתיו מי裔וה י בנו היא
ל […], this explanation points to iscalus’s full retrospective support of
iscalus as receiver of this ברכה. The peculiar addendum as is certainly mysteri-
ous; of course יאדו was his son — עָשֶׂה was his son as well. Surely nobody
doubts יאדו’s claim as iscalus’s descendant. Perhaps יאדו is trying to tell us
something about what iscalus wanted for his children. This was intended
iscalus. It was supposed to help develop his leadership qualities posi-
tively, perhaps even to lead the two brothers in a partnership. came to
realize that there could be no partnership. The nation had to be led in all
capacities by one man and one man only, the chosen one, the “true son” of
iscalus and יאדו could not have the future his father had hoped for. It
was a sad realization, rather than the utter shock described by

iscalus had hopes for עָשֶׂה, and although he was ultimately mistaken, his
treatment of this ברכה shows us the love and compassion he had for his
eldest son. Perhaps he had been tricked, perhaps not, but his strength as a
father lies in the fact that he never gave up on עָשֶׂה. Only when he realized
that things could not be as he had hoped, did iscalus recognize the potential,
and the need, for עָשֶׂה to come from and be led by only one of his sons.
This son would contain within his character all the spiritual and physical
leadership qualities necessary for the nation; everything would come from
him. And עָשֶׂה would certainly go on to become a paradigm of the all-
encompassing nature of the Jewish Nation. But we should not forget about
עָשֶׂה, and the father who wanted great things for him.
The Personalities of רות ו TAMARA GAL

BOTH ננינה רות מונגלת אסתר hold a common theme: ננינה על העיסתים ענינה מידה extensively, despite some very trying circumstances and the corrupt eras in which each lived.

רות, a convert from בראשית, lived in a corrupt time. The reason the word ננינה is in plural in the firstになります is to show that the judges were judged by the people, and, in turn, the judges judged the people corruptly. אורי בני ישראל into בראשית in 2488 and the destruction of בית ראשון in 2988. The destruction of בראשית was caused because no מקדש was made on the field. desire, destroyed the first מקדש, בית ראשון, which eventually led to כִּלְסָל וּכְלָסָל, שבת קדושה, and שפכון דמים. All this teaches the evil of the time period. Despite this, רות, a convert, overcame the temptations of the sinful era and maintained an extremely high level of ננינה.

אסתר, also lived in a corrupt era. The first word of the first 나오 is עוזר אסתר. ידית is ננינה אסתרניא, a reference to the evil of the period. She was wicked from beginning to end, and only became a ruler because he married into royalty (تكوين אֲשֶׁר). His wife, שמע, made her slaves work on שבת and prance around naked while they worked. From here we see什么时候 is מֵעָלָה, and we see שמעа, who was called to appear at the מקדש, was told to come with her crown only. From here we see that the king and queen were so corrupt, and represented the opposite of the ננינה of ננינה. If the leadership of שמע was so evil, then no doubt so many of the people were corrupt as well. אסתר lived in such a shameful time, yet she displayed the utmost ננינה in all her actions.

In לעמێ ינێوەڕ واتەن, (ב:א) ננינה רות asked: What about רות made a comment that she was not only ננינה, but she was also smart, for when ינێوەڕ saw that she took two grains and not three. רות bent down to pick up these grains in a very ננינה manner; she bent her knees gracefully, for she wanted to maintain modesty so that people would not watch her.
The Personalities of וית and אסתר

This is just one example of וית being נועهة with her body language and movement.

Anot says, וית went down to the gate and did as her mother-in-law, תום, had told her. Though she had told וית to first dress herself up and then go to the gate, וית reversed the order. First she went to the gate and then she got dressed. This shows us that וית was careful to maintain נועهة also regarding dress and physical appearance.

A few ימים later 운 woke up to see a woman lying next to him. He asked אסתר and וית answered, spread your wings, for you are the redeemer. Comments that when וית said to וית, "spread out the corner of your garment and spread out your ₹ī, meaning "marry me." This demonstrates how וית was not only in body language, movement, dress, and physical appearance, but in speech as well.

In 운 we see that all the other young women went willingly to the king. Yet, in reference to 운 it says אסתר, meaning that she was taken to 운 against her will. Instead of running to the king like the rest of the women, 운 was not at all eager to go to him. 운’s hesitancy teaches that she, like וית, was נועهة regarding body language and movement.

At the end of 운, 운 overheard two of the king’s guards, plotting to harm 운, who then reported it to the king in the name of 운. Upon hearing this, the king marked it down in his מים, including the fact that it was 운 who overheard this information. 운 did not want to gain for herself credit that she did not deserve. Not only does this show that 운 in regard to speech, but this teaches us the lesson that one should always report statements in the name of the person who said them.
The emphasis on נועת is particularly interesting in light of the fact that both והות and אסתר found themselves in situations which were intrinsically not נועת: אסתר, as candidate in the bizarre beauty contest, and והות as the lone woman in the all-male מְגַנֵּי. They were not passive figures. Each took bold initiative that was critical in the positive conclusion of the stories. אסתר even maintained נועת in her role as queen of a world empire. Each woman, in her own way, maintained the highest level of נועת at the very same time as she was required to take bold initiative in difficult and uncomfortable circumstances. אסתר saved בֵּינֵי ישראל from destruction, and from והות developed the line of אסתר, which will ultimately bring מְשָׁא. From אסתר והות, we can learn that being נועת is not just one aspect of ourselves, but has to do with our every action, thought, and word, no matter how trying the conditions. Every Jew should strive to reach the levels of והות and אסתר, for then our מפעשי will show that we are truly following in the ways of these תזקיקת.

This article is based on a distinction that I learned from Mrs. Chaya Elias, who distinguished between three levels of נועת: 1) body language and movement, 2) dress code and physical appearance, and 3) speech.
A Comparison of נביאים to יוחנן

Beth Pollack

ONE OF THE MOST magnificent aspects of נביאים is our ability to meet the powerful characters who helped shape the destiny of our nation. From our רד עלוה and the נביאים that they overcame, to the fiery נביאים who suffered every indignity and persecution to relay God’s message, we find ourselves captivated and almost mystified by the powerful lives they led. However, these “larger than life” personas were also burdened with human frailties, which does not hesitate to portray. In the end, these personalities help teach us lessons not only about these magnificent characters, but also about ourselves.

גבי נביאים and יוחנן are two of the נביאים who are easiest to relate to. Even more fascinating than the closeness we can feel to these נביאים and the difficulties that they faced in trying to carry out the word of God, are their amazing similarities. In the following analysis of these two נביאים, I wish to not only unfurl these parallels, but also offer a possible reason for this uncanny connection.

Both נביאים lived in a time when בני ישראל were straying far from "דית שלום המלך". During גבי נביאים’s time, בני ישראל were devoted to the ערים מסתוריניות and his wife, יוחנן, had introduced to the nation, and in גבי נביאים time were on a downward path that would ultimately lead them to exile at the hands of שבע. In fact, the נביא says that one of the reasons why גבי נביאים ran away from his נביאים, was that he knew that בני ישראל were a city of שבע that would send בני ישראל into exile in the future, and he didn't want to be the one to tell them to do so. He hoped that גבי נביאים would not do שבע, would be destroyed, and would be unable to harm בני ישראל.

Also, both נביאים were persecuted by בני ישראל. During גבי נביאים’s time, שבע commanded that all the בני ישראל be killed. During גבי נביאים time, כל בני ישראל indicates that he was treated as a שבע after he prophesied that בני ישראל would be destroyed. When the people subsequently did שבע, and were not destroyed, they thought that he was a שבע. (They did not realize that a negative דיבר can always be recalled. גבי נביאים was, of course, a דיבר אמת.)
A Comparison of

Neither was popular among the Jewish people. Yet, both went on to do the jobs that they were meant to do. In his celebrated work, brought back to believing in the Torah, both immediately ran off to an unpopulated area. There, both found solace under a tree, and both asked the Lord to take their lives from them. Both were very frustrated and confused by the difficult situation on people whom they felt were deserving of severe punishment. Because of this, He used a magnificent lesson about the nature of the Lord.

Let us first explore the lesson given to . In ran away to the desert, and specifically told his attendant not to come with him. He found a solitary tree, sat under it, and requested that take his life. comments that the tree is often used to make coals, because a burning tree emits immense heat. I think that it is no coincidence that sat under this specific tree. The nature of the tree is a hint to the burning anger that harbored against the sinners, who, according to , had not been sufficiently punished. This anger is revealed in the ensuing conversation. When asked him, “Why are you here?” (), responded:

I have acted with great zeal for God, God of legions, for the children of Israel have forsaken Your covenant; they have razed Your altars and have killed your prophets by the sword, so I alone have remained and they now seek to take my life.

interprets this as an intimation that should take vengeance upon the Jewish people. It is a desperate attempt to comprehend why had not punished the wayward people, who were seeking to destroy ’s most devoted agent. In the next few verses, we read that was ordered to stand on the mountain, a powerful wind passed and was told that was not in the wind. Then an earthquake came and was told that was not in the earthquake. After the earthquake came a fire and was told that was not in the fire. Then, after all these tremendous manifestations of the power of nature and ’s hand, a still, thin sound passed. It was then that humbled himself, and wrapped himself in his mantle. was trying to teach that has tremendous power to do whatever He wants and cause whatever destruction He wills. Still, He does
A Comparison of the Two Figures

not always use it, and prefers to patiently wait for sinners to repent. Such was this episode in the life of Ũnayyin, and the lesson that he learned.

In the sixth of Parshat Ũnayyin, we read that Ũnayyin ran away to the desert after Mose had mercy on him. A comparison ends with the statement:

And God saw their deeds, that they repented from their evil way; and God relented concerning the evil he had said he would bring upon them, and did not do it.

The seventh of Parshat Ũnayyin begins:

It displeased Yona greatly and angered him. He prayed to God and said, “Please God, was this not my contention when I was still on my own soil? Because of this I had hastened to flee to Tarshish for I knew that you are a gracious and merciful God, slow to anger, abundant in kindness, and relent from doing harm.”

Then requested that he take his life from him. In response, God created a small tree (Eshel ri’ah) under which took shelter. God then designated a worm to attack it and cause it to wither until it died. Once this happened became very hot, and once again requested to die because he was so aggravated over the death of his tree. God then responded with a lesson about:

You took pity on the gourd plant for which you did not labor, you did not make grow; it lived one night and perished after one night. And I shall not take pity upon Ninveh the great city, in which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who do not know their right hand from their left and many animals as well?”

Such was the powerful lesson that taught.

We have identified a number of parallels between the two figures. Both lived under similar circumstances, both were persecuted, both lived at
A Comparison of אライブו to והנה

da time when כיишראל תנהו, and both ended up confused by מייתו of mercy. What is the reason for the similarities?

In זאכ, we often see parallels between fathers and sons. Fathers and sons often share the same character traits and experiences. (For instance, ידחי זכיה and יהוחי had many similar experiences. יעקב tricked his father, and יאכ's children tricked him later in his life.) Is it possible that והנה אライブו was "father" in some way?

There is a כל הנב יתפרט שמו ופרטש שםأخبار, called, "Every prophet whose name is mentioned with his father's name attached to it, is a a הבב whose father was also a a הבב, Shivne ב' אבותיה, which raises the question of who the the הנב named אライブו was? In כלכ, we read that והנה אライブו to stay with a widow who sustained him while he was in hiding from יֶשׁי. While he was there, the son of the widow became seriously ill. חַנַּן says, יוניה לא קמד דא עושר, and the widow then resurrected the dead boy. The woman said to him, יוניה לא קמד דא עושר, "I know now that you are a man of God and that God spoke truth through your mouth." In Rav Bachrach's ספר on והנה, he develops the idea that because of this, אライブו והנה was referred to thereafter as אライブו. Who exactly was this boy in the story? יהוחי says that this boy was none other than והנה אライブו. So, in a way, והנה אライブו became a "spiritual father" to והנה because he gave him life. Rav Bachrach explains that והנה אライブו became a student of והנה. After והנה's death, while worship of יֶשׁי was still popular amongst והנה, כיишראל became a student of והנה יֶשׁי. While he was a student of והנה, he was the one who was sent to anoint king יֶשׁי. However, on the words יוניה לא קמד דא עושר, he was the one who ultimately got rid of the בָּלָה. In a way, והנה helped fulfill the המקד of his "spiritual father" after והנה had died.

This is the key to our mystery. I believe that והנה learned so much from והנה, that he later acquired some of והנה's character traits. והנה saw so much of והנה's anger and frustration about those sinners who were not punished for their wayward actions. This can explain not only why the two beiden had similar feelings and circumstances, but also why והנה did not want to try to
help thought that they really needed to be punished for their actions. He had witnessed his “father’s” frustration, and did not wish to go through it himself. Ultimately, also needed to learn a similar lesson to that of his “father”.

And thus, our mystery is solved. However, as in many instances in , while we can learn a lot about these magnificent characters, it is essential that we also internalize the lessons ourselves. We can never reach the levels of the men of God like , but we see through their stories that they also had human frailties, despite their greatness. Even they did not fully understand the ways of God, and even they struggled with frustrations such as why bad people are not always punished. But we must see from this that we are not meant to understand all of God’s ways, and it is acceptable to be frustrated sometimes. However, after that frustration, we must take solace in the fact that God is there — He is with us, and He is patient. Thank God that He is, because we are far from perfect and need much mercy too. We must be open and patient, just as He is, always listening for that still, thin, sound in our lives that passes us all in different ways.

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1 המותיק בככר, או נב אבומיא אלאו, יסראל, תקנ

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Ambiguities in סֵפֶרּ בְּרָאשִׁית

Talia Wiesen

THROUGHOUT סֵפֶרּ בְּרָאשִׁית, a variety of pronouns are used to describe people, places, and events. These pronouns are often ambiguous, lacking a clear subject, which allows for multiple interpretations of a given פסוק. Different תמשות have different approaches to dealing with these ambiguities, and their approaches reflect their general approach to סֵפֶרּ בְּרָאשִׁית through. Here we will focus on examples from סֵפֶרּ בְּרָאשִׁית.

1)/red's general approach focuses on the context of the ambiguous word. For example, in יא it says, יָאשֶּׁהוּ אָבֹּד בֵּלֵטֶּהָנְמָן יאשֶׁהוּ. It is unclear who the subject of this יאשֶׁהוּ is. יאשֶׁהוּ is the sole subject, yet there is a plural verb, יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ. יאשֶׁהוּ explains that the plural language of יאשֶׁהוּ and יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ refers to יא and יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ, the elements from which the world was formed. The יאשֶׁהוּ will form the physical body into which God will impart a spiritual being. Therefore, this man will be created in both the image of God as well as that of the יאשֶׁהוּ, creating a necessity for a plural subject of יאשֶׁהוּ and יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ.

יָאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ reaches this conclusion by evaluating the subject of each יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ throughout the סֵפֶרּ בְּרָאשִׁית. This sheds light on the subject in this specific פסוק. Because the subject of this פסוק is plural, unlike in the other פסוקים, יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ concludes that this יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ is collective, and directed toward all the different subjects in the סֵפֶרּ בְּרָאשִׁית, namely the יאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ.

2) What does this פסוק refer to? This is a book of counting, a list of the genealogy of human history. This book of counting begins with בָּרָא and proceeds with בָּרָא אֲדֹם, excluding בָּרָא אֲדֹם וּבָּרָא אֲדֹמָה because neither one left children who would create a family of their own. Mankind would continue through בָּרָא אֲדֹם.

יָאשֶׁהוּ רָדָּךְ draws this conclusion from context: the prior פסוק, which deal with the birth of בָּרָא אֲדֹם, and the subsequent פסוק, which list only the
genealogy of early man.

3) In the context there are four possible subjects for this sentence, including the genealogy of early man. It remains unclear who refers to and who refers to . Therefore, the other individuals present, namely and any servants who went along, were merely followers on the journey. refers to and , while refers to and . looks towards the preceding text to evaluate the subjects of the ambiguous words. God's command from comes immediately following the words and . Therefore, concludes, the leaders of the mission are and , with playing secondary roles in the trip.

4) In , we see that makes two commands to his brothers: ( ) and ( ). Is calling to the same people in both cases, or does refer to a different subject in the two cases? explains that refers to the same group of people, namely 's family as well as and his people. again argues from context. In this and are all residing together in harmony and are considered . Therefore they are all in the process of making a , a peace agreement. Therefore, concludes, the leaders of the mission are and , with and playing secondary roles in the trip.

5) As is making his return to meet , the explains, ( ). It is unclear whether these are angels or human messengers. interprets them as actual people from 's camp. The following text gives instructions to these messengers, is a proof for this interpretation, because only humans would require directions from before setting out on an unknown assignment.

These examples indicate that has a specific approach to dealing with ambiguities in the text. He looks at the context of the general story line to explain the specific details.

reads several different approaches when explaining ambiguities in the text. These varying approaches can be placed in three distinct categories: the use of a to clarify a , the use of to explain , and an explanation based on simple . , more than , seems particularly interested in what moral lesson can be learned from the interpretation.
Ambiguities in סף בראשית

1) Above we saw אדם בלעטנניך, פסק (אנת). As noted, it is unclear who, other than God, is involved in the creation of man. אדום cites a מדרש that says הנותנוהו על הקב"ה למלכי ממא. (בראשית ב, 5). We learn the humility of God because before creating man, the ultimate creation which may cause jealousy among the angels, He consulted with His court of angels so they too would feel a part in this important creation. The מדרש continues and says, כל מי מגיח ממלכים, דרכ ארץ יפרח עוה. שיאה הגדולה מעל יפרח שני ממלוכים. God put His own honor aside, and made the honor of the angels His primary concern.

2) In פרק א, we have another example where God is the sole subject, but speaks in plural. During the incident of בכתי לבלי, God says,:numeral, פסק. אדום cites a מדרש which says, כבוד טרנ掣 ממלכיモノו התוир. As in our last example, God put His honor aside and consulted His heavenly court before taking any drastic measures in punishing the ¦ה"ע."

3) Before destroying כים, God exclaimed, סוסמ, פסק. רשם אתרדו את הצעכותה התאぬ, עם(כשת) יש כןי. What is the scream that is coming to God, and who is screaming? Furthermore, why is the scream in feminine, ascribing the scream to a woman?

אדריא cites a מדרש, that says these cries that came up to God were those of a young girl who was murdered brutally by the people of כים for giving food to the poor. God says כים. He Himself is planning to descend from His heavenly perch to observe the situation in this corrupt city and to evaluate whether they are in fact involved in such actions.

When אדריא brings a מדרש to explain an ambiguity in the text, it often contains a valuable lesson that one can glean from it. In these examples, אדריא teaches us important lessons about humility.

4) In פרק דא, אדריא begins a conversation between God and והבר with the words, והבר הרברם האליאלי. Which event does the מדרש refer to? אדריא explains this verse based on a broader principle: ביארש רב(ו), כל פסק שעומר על, פסק (מדרש). Each time the word והבר appears in the text, it means following the immediately prior event. The event that occurred prior to this discussion is the war that והבר and the five kings fought against the four kings. Hence, אדריא explains, God spoke to והבר reassuring him that, despite the recent military victory, his rewards and merits were not completely consumed. He will be protected during the remainder of his life. Therefore, therefore, states that God's appearance to והבר occurred immediately following the war.

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Ambiguities in פרש בראשית

When faced with a word such as רשיו, ראזר or אולם often associates it with the verse or event directly preceding the ambiguous word.

5) Unlike לאמנה in אָזַהוּ, and in לאמנה refers to different people. The term יִאֶמֶר טַעֲבַע לָאָזַהוּ — לָאָזַהוּ — יִאֶמֶר טַעֲבַע לָאָזַהוּ, refers to כִּיָּבוּד, his sons. In לאמנה, he explains that it refers to כִּיָּבוּד.

Why the different interpretations of the same word, אָזַהוּ? It seems that when approaches ambiguities in the middle of a verse from a perspective, he looks at the immediate of the verse and, if necessary, he will also look at preceding and succeeding verses. Therefore, in לאמנה, when the are being sent to gather stones, explains כִּיָּבוּד as כִּיָּבוּד, because when one needs work done sons are often the called upon for help. In לאמנה, however, when the are being called to gather for a festive meal following the peace agreement, it is explained as כִּיָּבוּד כִּיָּבוּד, because subsequent to the agreement they all lived in peace together.

אבן טוּורא

is extremely literal and practical in his explanation of ambiguous terms. He looks at each verse and examines it as an individual entity to decipher the simplest meaning of the ambiguous words.

1) אֲוָלָה תְוֹלְדוֹת הַשָּׁמָיִם וַגָּאוֹן הַזָּרִים (קָדָם בֵּית). Context does not provide an obvious explanation of which the refers to. posits that these are some kind of beings that developed out of the sky and earth, and which were given by God the power to bring forth other creatures. Here he takes the term תְוֹלְדוֹת in a literal sense, that which was born from the heaven and earth.

2) This literalist orientation is clear from another example. During the discussion between and about 's salary, the explains,_ballאֵמֶר יִעַט בִּיאוָלָה (לָאָזַהו). Someone gave sheep to someone's sons. Following the simplest possible explanation, explains that gave the animals to 's sons.

3) As we asked before, when sent מָלְאָכָה — מָלְאָכָה — it is not clear if these are messengers or angels. According to אֲוָלָה מָלְאָכָה מָלְאָכָה, These were simply workers in 's camp who were worthy of carrying out this important mission. Again, we see emphasis on the simplest, most down-to-earth.

A close analysis of these three highlights the basic differences in their approach to ambiguities in the text of פרש. They can be placed on a spectrum, which will measure the importance of the immediate or broader.
context of the ambiguous term. רדיק is at one end of the spectrum, because
he looks primarily at the overall context when deciphering the meanings of
ambiguous terms. פסוק can be placed next on this gradient, because in most cases his explanation
stems from an analysis of the individual פסוק whose first propensity is to analyze the overall context, רדיק is at one end of the spectrum, because he
looks primarily at the overall context when deciphering the meanings of
ambiguous terms. פסוק is at the other end of the spectrum, because in most cases his explanation
stems from an analysis of the individual פסוק. Unlike פסוק, whose first pro-
pensity is to analyze the overall context, פסוק turns to the immediately ad-
joining פסוק for his interpretation of the ambiguity. Last on this spectrum
would be מנוסה. He is the most literal and practical of these פסוק. He
makes use of the simplest reading of the immediate פסוק when explaining
difficulties and ambiguities in the text.

Though they may seem insignificant in the text, and no different than
any other difficulty, ambiguities are vital to the text. They open the story to
various interpretations, each one yielding a different lesson or insight into
the lives of the characters. תריה, in his introduction to his תריה on the
涣, says that each letter and word in the涣 was selected for a specific purpose.
One must keep this idea at the forefront of his or her mind when reading
the涣 and attempting to deal with the various ambiguities in the text.
This is what keeps涣 alive and applicable to all Jews in the past, present,
and future.
The second indicates that the main purpose of the story is to shed light on the human need to be an observer. Similarly, later passages indicate that the goal of the story is to perceive the act of the observer. The story describes different personalities who are defined by their relationship with the observer. These personalities include the ceilings, mouths, emotions, intellect, and the soul. Their respective attitude towards the observer creates specific obstacles and challenges.

The ceilings lack the observer. The ceilings indicate that the ceiling observer is singular, while the observer commentary states that the observer is young and lacks experience. His naivete leaves him vulnerable and open to influence. The ceilings is singular, while the observer is in plural. The ceilings explains that there are always many ceilings, since they act as a group and make decisions based on social pressure. The observer follows the crowd, never taking the initiative to think for himself. Therefore, when the observer sees that the ceilings’ way of life reaps punishment, only then will he gain an understanding that he has followed the wrong path.

The ceilings is equated with a fool. His words are many but the content is scarce. Indeed, it is better to be poor than to speak foolishly. The ceilings explains that this involves opening one’s mouth and confirming oneself to be a fool. The ceilings writes that fools speak a lot, but his words contain little substance. Consequently, a fool will immediately reject words of a teacher who tries to teach or rebuke him. So, as the ceilings says: There is little point trying to teach the ceilings, since he will never listen. The ceilings does not want to focus on the purpose of life, because he is not prepared to face the consequences of understanding life’s true meaning. The ceilings may understand that there is such a thing as the observer, yet he will reject it because of his foolishness and emptiness. His capacity for
Personalities in ספר משל

may exist, yet his weak personality leaves him unwilling to take advantage of it. The in many ways has attributes similar to those of a child. He thinks that he is the expert on everything; he speaks whatever passes through his mind; he does not want to be rebuked or told what to do; and his decisions are based on his immediate wants and desires. The's downfall is that he never broke out of this juvenile mentality.

The is similar to the in that he also has the hypothetical ability to gain , but rejects it. The difference between them is that the lacks , while the is motivated by foolishness and temporal desires. The is a skeptic as opposed to a fool. In , God explains that He who does not recognize is referred to as an . People are because they sin, and someone who sins does not grasp that and His commandments are true . The tries to deny the truth and make all those around him agree with his rationalizations. He, similar to the , is always talking, but the is having debates to justify his mode of thinking, as opposed to the who talks just to pass time. — "The wise conceal their knowledge (because they have nothing to prove), but the brings ruin near." The is constantly starting arguments and inciting fights, because this is his only weapon. Similarly, — "A man shows his honor in holding back from quarrels, but the skeptic reveals himself in it." The does not fully accept that everything comes from , which creates frustration, since he has no answer for why things are the way they are. He will never be satisfied intellectually, because the only true answer comes through . Ultimately, his frustration and consequent fury bring about his demise: — "Anger will kill the skeptic" (). Another personality described is a , a complainer. He is like the , because his downfall comes from the anger which derives from a lack of understanding. He does not reject the notion of . Yet, he does not use his knowledge of to help him through his troubles. He is so steeped in self-pity that he convinces himself that created man to endure a terrible life. — "When there is no complainer, strife is silenced." explains that the instigates dispute, because he finds fault in everything. Similarly, — "The words of a complainer are like blows," because his words create a negative atmosphere around him. He creates animosity toward everyone, isolating himself from his fellow Jews. The's skewed view on life derives from his inability to apply to his personal situation, which makes him incapable of living peacefully among .
The ÚˆÏ is unique in that he understands the importance of ÁÎÓ‰, but he does not obtain it because of his lack of motivation or stamina. The ÚˆÏ is inactive and totally unproductive. He lets himself waste time, not appreciating the limited moments he has to do. He never finishes a project to its end. "I passed by the field of a lazy man...it was covered with thorns, nettles covered its surface and the stone wall was broken down." The ÚˆÏ lacks the self-discipline to accomplish something of significance. His field lays in ruin because he lacks the willpower to work it. He invents imaginary dangers in order to validate his inactive approach on life. He invents a threat — a lion waiting on the path — so that he can convince himself that laying in bed is his only option. His laziness prevents him from contemplating Ú·" because he has no desire to arrive at the conclusion that he should be an Ú·" who has a responsibility to work hard in that role.

On the other end of the spectrum is the Ú¯ÂÌ, who is not at all lazy. He uses all his energy and intellectual faculties to manipulate ÁÎÓ‰ to his selfish needs. The Ú¯ÂÌ is described as Í" because he was deceitful, and tricked into eating from the field of a lazy man. The expression is a criticism. People did not say what they thought. They would hide bad thoughts behind kind words. "The Ú¯ÂÌ sees evil and hides." This shows that the Ú¯ÂÌ thinks ahead. He is aware of the consequences and plans accordingly. The Ú¯ÂÌ does not avoid wrong out of strong moral convictions or È·ÂÂ˙. Rather, he acts cleverly and cunningly in order to avoid the troubles that could result from his crooked actions. He is the antithesis of the purpose of ÁÎÓ‰. He uses ÁÎÓ‰, but ignores the fact that it is a gift from Ê=" who has a responsibility to work hard in that role.

The Ïı, like the Ú¯ÂÌ, possesses ÁÎÓ‰, but uses it incorrectly. The first Ïı praises the man who, Ú·¢· Ï‡ È˘·¢. The Ïı is a scorners. He mocks and convinces those around him to be lax with Ú·". The Ïı breaks down the morals and discipline of others with mockery. Ú·¢· Ï‡ È˘·¢ says, "One who chastises a scorners acquires shame for himself." This is because a Ïı refuses to listen to anyone. He is stubborn and closed-minded when it comes to rebuke, and will merely brush away a person’s advice with a witty comment. His sarcasm gains him short-term approval from others, but diminishes the value of genuine ÁÎÓ‰ in their eyes. Ú·¢· Ï‡ È˘·¢ explains: A Ïı and wine are similar, for they both lead one to ignore their Ú·¢·, following their Ú·¢· instead.
Each one of these personalities is affected by the way he admits חכמה into his life. Whether he vehemently rejects it, ignores it, or embraces it on his own terms, his relationship with חכמה negatively affects his life. In truth, חכמה, nostro (משלי, און) וראת ה ראה פועית. Without חכמה, רואת ה will come to nothing. רואת ה is a prerequisite to the kind of learning that leads to fulfilling חכמה. ה is a prerequisite to the kind of learning that leads to fulfilling חכמה. Without רואת ה, חכמה will make man skeptical of anything he cannot understand, which can lead to חכמה. חכמה means much more than understanding abstract ideas. Rather, חכמה has a behavioral aspect. It involves incorporating חכמה and חכמה into our lives. Man is not equipped with the capabilities to decipher everything he learns. This is why חכמה warns us, חכמה וה כל לבך, חכמה (משלי, חכם) או תשעהveal בנהד. In the final analysis, חכמה's wisdom determines right from wrong, not merely what mortal humans have derived from חכמה.
Lauren Lew

or כהן גדול זאדורו

A historic figure is one of the most enigmatic personalities in the Torah. We are introduced to him as a helper to his younger brother Mesh. However, once he became the Cohen Gadol, it became clear that there was a lot more to his character. This special status meant not only that he was in charge of the spiritual state of the people, but also that his descendants would be the holiest group of Jews, who would spend their time serving God on behalf of the people in the Temple.

How did meshes come to deserve such a role? In addition, how can this position of leadership be reconciled with his function as secondary leader of the nation, subservient to his younger brother Cohen? The aim of this study is to examine the mission he was given by God, thereby clarifying his character and role. A prophet’s first prophetic experience, when he is handed his Divine mission, can be called his קדשה (initiation). Much about a prophet’s character and objectives can be learned from studying this episode in his life. An investigation into the manifestation of meshes role and the way it progresses after his קדשה will help explain the real essence and greatness of meshes.

Unlike most Cohenim, meshes had two (very brief) קדשות, and surprisingly, the first one was not spoken to him directly. Rather, it was spoken to Cohen’s brother, Mesh. This is the only time in קדשה that a sibling received a קדשה for his brother. Indeed the only other instance of an indirect קדשה is that of meshes, whose parents received a קדשה before his birth. Yet in Cohen’s case, meshes was alive at the time of the קדשה, and was in fact the older of the two brothers.

There are also other questions regarding the קדשה of meshes. Cohen is the last member of his family to be spoken of in the Torah. Cohen is introduced into the story almost as an afterthought, after meshes voiced his hesitancy about having to approach alone (Leviticus, Chapter 14). Cohen responded by trying to comfort meshes: Why did meshes need to...
know his brother’s reaction? In addition, why is this so important that it is one of the first details that the Torah chooses to tell us about the two? Furthermore, why does the Torah tell us so much about Aaron’s role before he even appears in the narrative?

Later in the chapter, the Torah spoke directly to Aaron. This is remarkably short, including only one simple command: יִתְנָה מִצְאָה וְהַנֵּל (Deut. 33:2). This command comes without any explanation, introduction, or preparation. Yet, Aaron’s immediate response is, שָׁם לֵאמֹר (Deut. 33:2). Not only did he do as instructed, but he did it with passion and love, going and kissing his brother. These two commands teach us a great deal about Aaron’s life and character.

The fact that the Torah had given Aaron, the younger brother, the role of leading, יִתְנָה מִצְאָה (Deut. 33:2), and had not even grown up living amongst the people, Aaron was not at all jealous. Indeed, the Torah states that Aaron was rewarded for this by being granted the תִּשְׁמַח (Deut. 33:2). This points to Aaron’s overwhelming love of his brother, and by extension, for all of Israel. This is one of Aaron’s primary traits. It is not surprising that Aaron’s first action reflects the Torah’s wish to place Aaron in a position of leadership, which was so central to his personality. This portrayal is strengthened further after the second command, when the first action which Aaron performed was one of affection: שָׁם וְלֹז (Deut. 33:2).

These passages also reflect Aaron’s trait of obedience, which is magnified in the contrast to Moses. When the Torah told Moses of his task, Moses provided various reasons why he should not be given the job. He refused so adamantly to take on the task that the Torah eventually got angry with him: יָדָה אֵל וּלְכָל מֵשָּׁה (Deut. 33:2). Even though he had been given the greatest reassurance possible — שָׁם וְלֹז (Deut. 33:2) — eventually agreed reluctantly when told that Aaron would accompany him. Aaron, however, was given no such lengthy explanations. All he was told was that he must go and meet his brother (Shemot, דיב). He obeyed without any questions, in contrast to Moses’s reluctance. Aaron’s obedience is reflected by the use of the same verb root in the command, יָדָה, and the action taken, יָדָה. Similarly, when told about the nature of their task, Aaron acted immediately: שָׁם וְלֹז (Shemot, דיב). Later, Aaron became a man of action, and his calm and unquestioning presence alongside Moses gave the confidence and security he needed to lead the people.

Furthermore, these two commands give a sense of the structure that the brothers’ relationship would assume. יִתְנָה מִצְאָה (Deut. 33:2) and שָׁם וְלֹז (Shemot, דיב) both involved Aaron and Moses, in particular with their power of speech in approaching Parnassah. Despite Aaron’s very active role in this realm, it is clear from the outset that Moses was the chief, as the Torah says, יָדָה אֵל וּלְכָל מֵשָּׁה (Deut. 33:2).
Indeed, this passage encapsulates the partnership formed by Moses and Aaron. Moses was the man of action, who would represent God and speak before Pharaoh, as is seen in the words דוד בן זה עבד הזה לא היה מאוחר. His main purpose initially was to act as a source of strength for his brother, who seemed much less at ease with his new role. Moses, in contrast, was the man of God, the one with whom God would always speak. As the passage explicitly states, Aaron would be subservient to him in this regard, as he would relate the word of God, which, in turn, would have to obey. This supports this when he emphasizes that Aaron kissed Moses, but Moses did not reciprocate. Aaron’s kiss was a manifestation of his new respect and honor for his new leader.

The passage emphasizes the importance of the partnership. Each brother had his role, and their mission required both of them. The passage accentuates the three-way partnership between Moses, Aaron, and Him. The first three verses after the first verse reflects the importance of the partnership: You are the leader of these people, and you are the leader of Aaron’s sons. This three-way partnership led to success: This is the way God led the people (במדבר, ד:ג א). Aaron’s personality retained these character traits throughout his life. Moses, unlike Aaron, did not question God’s commands. For example, when Moses relayed God’s command to the children of Israel (Aaron), they implemented it immediately: The word that was told to us in the name of God who enrolled us and called us. Most fathers would have been crying out in grief, or at least trying to defend the action of their sons. Yet Aaron remained mute because he knew there was no appropriate answer or plea. His sons had done wrong, and he mourned them deeply. This astounding degree of self-control epitomizes Aaron’s calculated and sensitive way of knowing when to keep silent. The passage following this incident perhaps reflects Aaron’s reward for his silent self-control. The passage reads, פיים: Aaron’s deputy?
This is quite unusual, as the Divine command is normally given from One to Two or from Two to both. Arguably, Aaron merits to receive a command directly as a reward for his silence.

Aaron’s personality also contains another striking trait, namely his love for the entire nation. His compassion and overriding love for the people, despite their sinful actions, is seen in the rebellion of Korah. Korah instructed Aaron, his brother, to stop the plague by bringing a censer. Aaron did so immediately. Not only did he carry out the instruction precisely, but the text emphasizes that he ran to do it. He was driven not only by obedience, but by a deep-seated compassion and love for the people. Whereas, in the aftermath of his sons’ death, he calculates his response rather than acting on impulse here, when he had the chance to save Jews, he spontaneously ran as soon as God gave him the command.

It is therefore not at all surprising that Korah’s initial reaction to his rebellion was to ask, how could anyone bear such jealousy and hatred against someone who loves so deeply and thoroughly? Some interpretations interpret the question slightly differently, although the interpretation still reflects the same principle. According to this interpretation, Korah seems to be asking, how could anyone bear such jealousy and hatred against someone who loves so deeply and thoroughly? Korah interpreted the question slightly differently, although his interpretation still reflects the same principle. According to his interpretation, Korah was asking why Aaron was disguising his complaint against the whole of the people by complaining against Korah. Aaron could not possibly be complaining about Korah himself, because his pure motives and love were too apparent.

This examination of the laws concerning the crossing of the Jordan can help explain a very conspicuous event immediately after the crossing of the Jordan. When Miriam took musical instruments and led the women in a song, she was described as Aaron’s sister. Why does the text describe her in this instance as Aaron’s sister? Arguably, her behavior here was characteristic of her brother. This song denotes a certain spontaneity, an outpouring of gratitude to God with great love and confidence in leading the other women in song. We have seen that Aaron’s behavior involves love, compassion, and leadership.

**A unique partnership**

The partnership between Aaron and Moses that was outlined in the previous chapter becomes even more important later in the story. Throughout the rest of the story, Aaron’s support often helped when he wavered or hesitated in leadership.

We know that Moses was uncertain about going into the land of Canaan. The juxtaposition of this with the story of Moses and Aaron working together. When Moses and Aaron worked together. When
together, God’s will could be fulfilled and massacre’s leadership role could be properly secured. For example, when נמי זכר לאמר וماذا said no to not having food, both נמי זכר and אחרון came and said the nation that the mass was coming (שמות טו). So when מזמל turned to his brother for support at times of crisis. Similarly, when מזמל attacked the Jews, massacre did not go alone. Rather, massacre was his deputy.

As demonstrated in the massacre, the massacre remained superior to אחרון in this partnership. Yet, they each had a slightly different role.

However there is one instance where massacre and his children were to be subservient to אחרון. Before massacre informed the massacre about their task, He commanded (במדבר, ידוע) to massacre to the nation that the massacre was the intermediary between the word of God and the people. He was the transmitter, the people’s person, while massacre was the talk, the man who was so close to God that it was more difficult for him to relate to the people.

Yet we should not lose sight of the differences between their personalities. The massacre oscillates between focusing on them as individuals and as a team. In particular, there are some occasions where we see a dichotomy between their two personalities. The rebellion of מזמל is one such example. He rebelled against both of them: massacre and נמי זכר immediately explains massacre’s role as the intermediary between the word of God and the people. Salvation from massacre would come when they each perform their task properly. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when massacre appears when the team is united, massacre and massacre adhered to their roles and cooperated with each other. After the massacre explained the roles of each brother — massacre and massacre — massacre immediately explains massacre’s role as the intermediary between the word of God and the people. Yet, they responded differently. massacre responded by falling on his face in prayer and distress, יז tats massacre to massacre for his action, demonstrating his overwhelming grief at the sin of the people and the distress they may cause his brother. This is exemplary of his reaction at any time when massacre sinned, and reflects massacre’s closeness to God and his shock at the fact that the people would sin in such a way. massacre’s conspicuous silence here is also very characteristic of his personality. When dealing with an unpleasant situation, he was always calm and calculated in his pursuit of massacre, a quality that he held in such great esteem due to his massacre. massacre was silent because he understood the level of the people, and was not nearly as shocked as massacre was. Neither approach was wrong. massacre needed to be focused on being massacre, while massacre needed to focus on being massacre, in order to form the balanced partnership.
which was so necessary.

There is only one instance where Ṣaḥărōn lost his focus, when he and ʾÔrōʾôr spoke about [כָּבָד, יָבֹא] (משה יושב וּרְחָת מִרְפֵּים). This incident broke the pattern of obedience which began in the [כָּבָד]. Here, we see Ṣaḥărōn’s human weakness. Shortly thereafter, Ḥôḏ reminded Ṣaḥărōn and ʾÔrōʾôr that they were not at the same level as [כָּבָד]. [כָּבָד] was capable of speaking to God at any time, while ʾÔrōʾôr and Ṣaḥărōn were not. This scolding may hint that the source of Ṣaḥărōn’s and ʾÔrōʾôr’s sin may have been a desire to be like [כָּבָד]. Ṣaḥărōn needed to be reminded that was the [כָּבָד], and that he is the man of the people. If he were to take on the same role as [כָּבָד], their team would not function effectively. Ṣaḥărōn learned his lesson and did immediate [כָּבָד] humbled himself for the sake of ʾÔrōʾôr. Hence the [כָּבָד] ends with Ṣaḥărōn reinstated, and content with his role as [כָּבָד].

The importance of Ṣaḥărōn’s role is reflected in the priestly blessing (כָּבָד). The blessing of Ṣaḥărōn was the bridge between [כָּבָד] and the people, which hints at Ṣaḥărōn’s task of connecting with the people. This contrasts with [כָּבָד], who was elevated to such a level of intimacy with [כָּבָד] that it was harder for him to relate to the people. Ṣaḥărōn’s job to light the [כָּבָד] strengthens this idea further. His purpose was to bring the light of God down to the people.

He recognized Ṣaḥărōn’s invaluable contribution to the partnership. When [כָּבָד] gave the laws of [כָּבָד], he spoke to both [כָּבָד] and Ṣaḥărōn, whereas [כָּבָד] generally spoke only to [כָּבָד]. Ṣaḥărōn and [כָּבָד] had approached [כָּבָד] as a team, and together had saved נִיוֹן יִשְׂרָאֵל from Egypt. Therefore the laws of the celebration of that salvation were given to both members of the team. Once the subject of [כָּבָד] has been dealt with, [כָּבָד]’s word once again begins to appear to ʾÔrōʾôr only.

Visits to [כָּבָד]

A close examination of the commands given to the brothers regarding the [כָּבָד] reveals a progression and evolution in their relationship. When [כָּבָד] and ʾÔrōʾôr first went to [כָּבָד], Ṣaḥărōn did the miracle with the [כָּבָד]. Furthermore, Ṣaḥărōn initiated the first three plagues by using the [כָּבָד]. Hence, [כָּבָד] was specifically told that he must tell Ṣaḥărōn about the plagues, יִאמֹר אֲלֵי תָּהוֹרָה (משה, יָבֹא) (כָּבָד, יָבֹא, תָּהוֹרָה). This reflects the status of their partnership at the time. ʾÔrōʾôr was still not comfortable with his position as leader, and needed Ṣaḥărōn to take a very active role.

However Ḥôḏ commanded the fourth plague directly to ʾÔrōʾôr (משה, יָבֹא), with absolutely no mention of Ṣaḥărōn or his [כָּבָד]
participation. This marks a new stage. After having benefited from ראוות’s assistance, משה was now able to take action himself. ראוות’s modesty and self-sacrifice become evident. ראוות was not interested in self-elevation. He sacrificed his own leadership role to help משה become the leader.

ראוות also understood that ראוות and משה were an inseparable team, yet he may not have understood the intricacies of their relationship. For example, ראוות called ראוות רפша (תניא). Yet, there is no mention of ראוות in the response, which reads יאמר משה. Once again in פָּרָעה, Moses appealed to both the brothers (וּרְאֹבֵד לְשֹׁשֵׁנָיו). Yet, ראוות’s absence is conspicuous in the response: וַיִּ מלאו אָלָיו פָּרָעה. Similarly, in פָּרָעה, Moses spoke to Moses, and Moses answered both brothers. Throughout their negotiations, Moses viewed Moses and ראוות as one entity and appealed to both of them. When פָּרָעה was finally prepared to admit his folly and repent, he called both brothers (שמות, פָּרָעה).1

A paragon of perfection?

In light of the above, how can we explain ראוות’s involvement in the sin of the golden calf? How could he facilitate an act so antithetical to Judaism? How does this fit into the picture of ראוות that has been portrayed until this point? A closer look at how the רַדָּה views his involvement in this episode will help clarify how he became a part of such an act, and how serious his involvement was. He clearly did not join with the people out of a desire to worship idolatry. Rather this was his mistaken reaction to their request for an idol.

It seems that he did not deal with the problem in the best possible way. Beside ראוות’s role in facilitating the construction of the calf at nearly every step, Moses explicitly accused莫斯 of having brought great sin onto the people, (שמות, לְבַכָּא) יִבְּאָת עֲלֵיהוֹ נְתֶנָה יִדּוּלי. Indeed, Moses was the one who demanded that the people bring their jewelry, while up to that point they had done nothing but complain.

To understand how Moses could have been involved in such an episode it is necessary to recall Moses’s interaction with the people in general. As mentioned above, Moses was very close to the people. It is therefore no surprise that he approached him when they decided they wanted to make an idol. Moses was so involved in the concerns of the nation that it was difficult for him to act against the people. This is reflected in Moses’s rebuke of Moses (שמות, לְבַכָּא) יְמֵ יְמֵ יִמְּשַׁ הָנָה הָיָה כֵּי בְּרָאשָׁי לְעַל הָעַנֶּה יִדּוּלי. The first clause attributes the majority of blame to the people, suggesting that they were the ones who persisted until Moses conceded. However, the second clause accuses Moses of being the one who caused such a grave sin to occur. This
expression reflects the interdependence of אָהָרֹן and the people. It was so difficult for אָהָרֹן to prevent the sin because of their mutual relationship and dependence.

A similar expression appears when מְשָׁה returned with the second tablets. אָהָרֹן is grouped together with the people, rather than together with מְשָׁה. This reflects the crucial difference between the brothers. מְשָׁה was the lone and pure man of God, while אָהָרֹן was the man of the people. This trait, which had been critical to אָהָרֹן’s successes, brought about his failing during the sin of the calf. This distinction between the two brothers originated in their childhood. אָהָרֹן grew up together with מְשָׁה; אָהָרֹן grew up in the palace of König, close to royalty but far from the people.

The incident of the Ú’ì‰· indicates that the partnership was necessary for both brothers. Just as מְשָׁה had needed his brother when he went to König, אָהָרֹן also needed מְשָׁה. With מְשָׁה אָהָרֹן was forced to be the sole leader. His weaknesses were exposed to a greater degree. Without מְשָׁה’s support, אָהָרֹן’s love of the people got the better of him.

אָהָרֹן’s death

The story of מְשָׁה’s death (כְּמוֹבָר, כְּכֶסֶף) matches his הקדשה and his life. The most striking aspect of his death is its simplicity, which parallels the simple love he portrayed towards מְשָׁה. He is referred to at this point as אָהָרֹן. He died without his title, but only with his essence. He earned the title König, but his essence was simple. אָהָרֹן went about his pursuit of שִׁלֵּחַ in a quiet way, and he never demanded any special status. Similarly, when he died, his clothing were referred to simply as בּוֹרְשָׁם, rather than בּוֹרְשָׁם כְּבָדִים. (That they were the בּוֹרְשָׁם כְּבָדִים is clear from the fact that they were passed down to the next מְשָׁה.) In contrast, when מְשָׁה died, many more details are given. Regarding König, we are not told his age or the like, because the narrative of his death is as simple as possible, paralleling the simple and pure love and compassion he felt towards each member of מְשָׁה’s捆. This is emphasized in König’s description of אָהָרֹן’s捆. König’s material clothing was insignificant, because König was clothed in the捆 itself, (כְּמוֹבָר, כְּכֶסֶף). The further emphasizes the dignity and simplicity of מְשָׁה’s death when König reassured König about his own death by telling him it would be like his brother König’s捆: König.

It is particularly significant that after König died, König descended from the mountain together with König捆, which evokes images of a new König捆 emerging. However, König捆 is not described here as König捆, even though this
is the way the תור פָּסָח regularly describes him. A parent’s and child’s true success comes when
the child becomes successful independently, when he or she can use his or her individual style and personality to continue in the ways of his or her parents.

There are several very powerful מְדִירֶשֶׁים which describe the death of the כֹּהֵן גָדוֹל. The מְדִירֶשׁ is troubled by the fact that משה was commanded to take his brother onto the mountain. Why did he not take אהרן himself? The מְדִירֶשׁ emphasizes the triangular relationship between אהרן, משה, andMoshe, and asked to reveal to אהרן that it was time for his death, because He did not want to have to do it Himself. In addition, the מְדִירֶשׁ emphasizes the different characters of the two brothers. The same מְדִירֶשׁ says that אהרן turned to אהרן at the time of his death and said, “my brother, when Moses died, we both buried her, and now you are dying and I will bury you. But when I die, who will bury me?” Suddenly, the immensely difficult role of being היה אש היה surfaces. משה was the one who would die alone, without children or loved ones supporting him. His legacy was not his immediate family, but the eternal למעלה and the entire Jewish people. Near his death, the מְדִירֶשׁ echoes the inherent loneliness of אהרן’s role. Yet the מְדִירֶשׁ continues. “יהי he said to him, ‘I will bury you’, and then the מת נכלה ומכה down and kissed him.” Moshe was buried by יהי Himself, the epitome of אהרן. Also יהי died embodying what he had stood for in his life, the אש שאלפָּשׁ, with his loved ones and his inheritor next to him.

However, the most telling sign of אהרן’s greatness came after his death when we hear of how he was mourned. יְאַבֵּד את אחיו שלשֵׁשָׁו הוא בוּי וּשְׂרֵאֵל (כָּכָו פָּשָׁאכָו). This is the only time in המְדִירֶשׁ that we are told that the entire nation not only mourned, but also cried for thirty whole days. אהרן’s quiet love for the people and his pursuit of шאלפָּשׁ come to the fore. Though he pursued no honor in his life, happy with his role as second to משה, he ultimately received the honor.

**Aharon’s essence**

Aharon’s overriding characteristic is his אהבת: love of both יהי and his fellow Jew. אהבת could be given only to someone who had an overwhelming love for every Jew, as the כֹּהֵן גָדוֹל had to represent them before God, offer sacrifices for them, and achieve atonement on their behalf. The המְדִירֶשׁ records the תורת that a כֹּהֵן must leave the synagogue rather than bless the כְּסִיף, if he feels any antipathy towards even one individual in the congregation (אהרן). אהרן’s greatness was that he felt sympathy and compassion towards the entire nation. He was the ideal candidate for the role of כֹּהֵן גָדוֹל,
since the המעשה of אהבה was embedded within his very being.

In conclusion, אהרן’s enigmatic portrayal is centered around one attribute: his אהבה. His inauguration, position of leadership, triumphs, pitfalls, and death all revolved around his passionate love and intense bond to his nation. Perhaps this explains the advice of ההלל: “Be amongst the disciples of אהרן, loving peace, pursuing peace, loving people and bringing them closer to ותואם” (اورנים, איה).  

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1 The only time משלח called משלח alone was during the plague of darkness. Perhaps during this time of darkness, משלח’s clarity of perception was also obscured. Hence, he failed to see the silent but fundamentally important partner, אהרן.
May a בון חוף לארץ מلاءה be performed on a ארץ ישראלי שסי on what would be considered a ים טוב שני in MMY?

Riva Preil

UPON ARRIVING in MMY, many of us were faced with a new question in הלכה. Living temporarily in ארץ ישראלי, most MMY students followed the majority opinion, and continued observing two days of ים טוב שני. The rest of the country, however, kept only one day of ים טוב שני. Therefore, the question arose — can a בון חוף לארץ מلاءה perform a ארץ ישראלי who is observing ים טוב שני? On the one hand, it isn’t ים טוב שני for the Israeli, and he can do any צווח he desires. On the other hand, the person for whom he would be performing the act is still observing ים טוב שני, and it would be prohibited for him to perform the מلاءה for himself. This issue has been addressed by the פוסקים, and there are three different ways of approaching the case.

The Lenient Position of מדריך

The first approach is that of מדריך (משה אשכנזי, הלק איה, כלל די) who concludes that not only would it be permitted for the בון חוף לארץ to derive benefit from the actions of the ארץ ישראלי, but the person observing ים טוב שני would even be allowed to ask the ארץ ישראלי to go out of his way to perform a מلاءה for him. He draws this conclusion based on מדריך’s reading of a דרשבי’s reading of a מדריך about מلاءה שבח. The דרשבי says that it would be מותר for Reuven to ask Shimon to guard Reuven’s fruit, which is located outside of Reuven’s תיהו של ירושלים, שמ. דר את (משה אשכנזי, הלק איה) quotes a מדריך’s which takes this logic one step further. He says that a Jew, Reuven, who has already accepted שבת early on Friday afternoon, is allowed to ask his friend, Shimon, (who has not yet accepted שבת) to do a מلاءה for his benefit. Since it is מותר for Shimon to do the מلاءה, therefore Reuven is allowed to ask Shimon to do the מلاءה מلاءה for him, even though Reuven could not do the מلاءה for himself.
May a man use on his festival the ma'aser of a friend? (shabbat, d'sh hebrew, zid ve'amorot) 

Reb Shimon, however, disagrees. He doesn’t believe that we can apply the reasoning behind the festival case to the case of the person who accepted ma'aser early. If he (at least according to the way he understands him) believes that we only allow Shimon to perform the ma'aser for Reuven in a case where Reuven could have been allowed to perform the ma'aser for himself under slightly different circumstances. This holds true only for the festival case, which is why the ma'aser allows Shimon to perform the act for Reuven. Had there been houses in between Reuven and Shimon’s property, the festival would have been extended, thus allowing Reuven to guard his own fruit. Therefore, Reuven can ask Shimon to guard the fruit for him. However, with regards to the case of the friend, Reuven believes that it is impossible to create such a “had been” scenario. Once Reuven accepted ma’aser, he would not be allowed to perform any ma’aser at all, and therefore, Shimon cannot do any ma’aser for him.

However, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Avroh Moshe, Rav Moshe Feinstein) supports Reb Shimon’s reading of the ma’aser, and asks the obvious question against him. It seems that Rav Moshe’s standard would also apply to the festival case. In other words, had circumstances been slightly different, had Reuven not accepted ma’aser early, he could have done the ma’aser for himself. Therefore, by Rav Moshe’s own logic, a person who has already accepted ma’aser early can ask a friend to do the ma’aser for him. Both Reb Shimon and Rav Moshe conclude that someone who accepted ma’aser early may ask another Jew to do the ma’aser for him. Based on this discussion, Rav Moshe concludes that it is exactly like accepting ma’aser to do ma’aser early. Not only would the ma’aser be allowed to perform the ma’aser early, but the person himself could even explicitly ask the friend to do so.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Avroh Moshe, Rav Moshe Feinstein) disagrees with this conclusion. He says, based on Rav Shimon’s reading of the ma’aser, that the only reason we allow the person who accepted ma’aser early to do ma’aser is because he could have not accepted ma’aser early, and would have been permitted to do the ma’aser himself. But, says Rav Moshe, this logic does not apply to the ma’aser. We cannot say, “Had he come to live in this country he would not keep two days of ma’aser” because that is not a realistic possibility. Circumstances, such as his livelihood in this country, for example, generally force the individual to return to the Diaspora. Therefore, it would not be intellectually honest to invent a hypothetical scenario such that the person himself could do the ma’aser.

The next case

The second case regarding this case, in shabbat, compares this situation to a similar one discussed by Rav Moshe in ma’aser.
May a בישילוח two possibilities exist as to his relationship to his uncooked food. The first possibility is that — meaning, it would be for him to cook for himself as well as for others to cook for him with his own flour. However, if he gives his flour as a gift to others, they would be permitted to cook for him using the flour. In other words, the flour is completely off limits until its ownership is transferred. The second possibility is that — it would be for him to cook for himself, however the flour is not prohibited, and others would be allowed to cook for him using the flour, even without acquiring it as a gift.

However, do not accept's understanding of the claim that cannot mean that a transfer of ownership permits the flour, because, how can a mere transfer of property rid the flour of the inherent which pertains to the flour? In addition to this, ask, since it would be for him to cook for himself, how can others possibly do something for him which he is prohibited from doing for himself? assume, in asking these questions, that if it is for someone to perform a מלאכה מגרמה, then it would also be to have others perform the מלאכה for him. Therefore, they find it simply impossible to understand the 's understanding. Instead, suggest an alternative understanding. If, then not only is it for him to cook, but it would even be for anyone else to cook with his flour! Even if he were to give the flour to his friend as a present, his friend would not be permitted at all to cook using the flour, even for personal benefit. Indeed, say, the would be completely ineffective. The second possibility, means, according to, that it is for him to cook for himself or for others to cook for him using his flour. However, the flour is not in and of itself, and if he were to transfer the ownership of the flour to his friend, then the transfer would be valid, and the new owner could cook with the flour for personal benefit. However, the friend would only be permitted to use the flour for himself, and cooking for the original owner would always be prohibited. The reason for this, as mentioned earlier, is because believe that when something is for a certain person, then it would also be prohibited for others to perform that action for him. Therefore, the flour could never be used for the original person's benefit. At most, the would permit the friend to cook with the flour for his own personal benefit.

The ramifications of this to our case, as the concludes, would be that the friend would not be allowed to perform for the observing. Just as the flour could never be used to
May a person benefit the person who forgot to make the melachah, so too it would be for the person to benefit from the melachah performed by the other person, even on the following day! Also, the person would not be allowed to ask the other person to go out of his way and perform a melachah for him.

Rav Moshe tries to bring proof that Rav Moshe agrees with the principle. Rav Moshe of the discussion (אוזדה צות, תרכיד, דוד וסיפס disproved the view of והכנונרב, הלקד, ד.ס.מ.ע), who discusses the uncommon practice of observing for two days (just as we keep two days of other melachot). When the first day of those would fall out on a Thursday and the second day (for those who kept it) would be on a Friday, it would be forbidden for them to cook food on Friday for themselves to eat on the second day.

Furthermore, Rav Moshe says that it would even be forbidden for others to intentionally cook extra food for them. The only case where the two-day observer would be permitted to eat from his fellow Jew's food would be if that Jew cooked food on Friday without the intention of benefiting the observer of the second day of the melachah. One might conclude from this passage that Rav Moshe agrees with Rav Moshe (i.e. that it is forbidden to have others perform a melachah for your benefit that you can not do for yourself). Indeed, Rav Moshe cites this passage as proof that Rav Moshe would agree that a person may not gain benefit from melachah done for him by another Jew.

However, it is not clear that Rav Moshe actually agrees with the blanket halakhot of Rav Moshe. First, Rav Moshe discusses the case of two days of food in the melachah, but does not cite the halachot in the melachah. It is not entirely clear that Rav Moshe would agree with Rav Moshe in terms of the halachot of melachot. Furthermore, regarding the issue of cooking food, Rav Moshe follows the reading of the proof against Rav Moshe, הלקד, ד.ס.מ.ע, against Rav Moshe, Participant may have another person cook for him, even though we hold that we are not permitted to do so. Hence, it is difficult for Rav Moshe to bring proof as a proof that we should follow Rav Moshe.

Rav Moshe Feinstein's Middle Position

After his criticism of the argument of Rav Moshe, Rav Moshe suggests an alternative way of understanding the whole issue. According to Rav Moshe, the very nature of the melachah is really the practice of which day is really the melachah. In fact, the practice of observing the melachah is no longer related to which day is really the melachah. Rather, Diaspora Jews simply maintain that their ancestors maintained when there was a question about the day. Jews who live in the Diaspora must follow their general practice of keeping two days of the melachah, even when
they are temporarily in ארץ ישראל. Consequently, says Rav Moshe, בן חור should behave on ים טוב שמי in the same way that they would behave if they would have been in ארץ ישראל. In ארץ ישראל, Jews do not generally ask others to do מלאכה for them on either day of ימ טוב שמי (except, under very restricted circumstances, non-Jews). So too, on ארץ ישראל, the בן חור should act as if he is in ארץ ישראל and not ask anybody to do מלאכה for him.

There seem to be two conclusions that can be derived from this פסוק. First, the בן חור would be permitted to ask the בן חור to do מלאכה under the same kinds of circumstances where ארץ ישראל would be permitted to do מלאכה. Second, it would follow that the בן חור could derive benefit from a מלאכה that was done by a בן חור who had not been asked to do so. For example, if the בן חור cooked something, even if the בן חור took initiative to cook for the בן חור, then the בן חור would be allowed to benefit from this מלאכה. There is no derivation of deriving pleasure from the actions of the בן חור, and it would only be for the בן חור to ask him to specifically go out of his way and cook extra for him.

1 This question againstività יריז seems so strong that יריז suggest an alternative reading of the passage in גירין. When גירין says that “had there been houses in between, then he [Reuven] could have guarded [the fruit] himself,” he does not mean, as יריז explains, that Reuven could have done the מלאכה under different circumstances. Rather, יריז means that Reuven did not ask Shimon to do a מלאכה, because Shimon did not have to cross a גדר in order to watch the fruit. Reuven could also watch his own fruit had he not had to cross the גדר.
Blessed are You, Hashem our God, King of the Universe, who casts the bonds of sleep upon my eyes and slumber upon my eyelids. May it be Your Will, Hashem, my God and God of my forefathers, that you lay me down to sleep in peace and raise me erect in peace. May my ideas, bad dreams, and bad notions not confound me; may my bed be perfect before You, and may You illuminate my eyes lest I die in sleep, for it is You who illuminates the pupil of the eye. Blessed are You, Hashem, who illuminates the entire world with His glory.'

Jews are commanded to serve God with all our heart and soul. In order for one to reach this level of observance, one must be aware of ה presence at all times, forever feeling a sense of א and awe. The necessity to be aware of God at all times motivates us to say ק just before we go to sleep and as soon as we wake up. In fact, this may help explain why reciting ק is one of the first ק that Jewish parents teach their children. Even if the children do not understand the meaning of the prayer, reciting ק instills in them the concept of being aware of ה both day and night.

Sleep is the bridge between life and death. By saying ש страхов us, because sleep rejuvenates us and allows us to function, but we are also
scared of the physical and spiritual dangers that we may encounter while we sleep.

A similar idea is expressed in the blessing that we say early in the morning: “…We are afraid of the physical and spiritual dangers that we may encounter while we sleep.” Both prayers are similar, in that they both relate to the notion of sleep, and request from God that He provide us the strength and ability to continue studying and performing mitzvot, and fulfilling His will. Both prayers precede learning. Both underscore the idea that study and mitzvot are the essence of our being and should be the paramount force from the beginning to the end of the day. Another similarity between these two prayers is that both are written in the first person singular. Each is a personal prayer to God to grant us the opportunity to be an individual, engrossed in study. Yet, there are differences between the two prayers, with the morning emphasizing themes associated with sleep and night, while the morning emphasizes things associated with the upcoming day. For example, in the morning we say: “We are afraid of the physical dangers which menace our peace of mind so much that they cause us physical discomfort, such as bad dreams which wake us or cause sleepless nights. Rabbi Munk suggests that if we are engulfed in study as we yield to sleep we will be in the most pure mood and state of mind, which will protect us from these dangers of the night. Also, by taking part in study until we go to sleep, God will be more inclined to raise us up again in the morning.” This is why the morning is juxtaposed with the morning. By ending our day with study we ensure ourselves a greater chance that we will carry us through the night soundly to see another day of learning.

Each word of the prayer of the morning carries extraordinary significance and meaning. According to Rabbi Dr. Eli Munk, in his book *The World of Prayer*, the phrase “We are afraid of the physical dangers which menace our peace of mind so much that they cause us physical discomfort, such as bad dreams which wake us or cause sleepless nights. Rabbi Munk suggests that if we are engulfed in study as we yield to sleep we will be in the most pure mood and state of mind, which will protect us from these dangers of the night. Also, by taking part in study until we go to sleep, God will be more inclined to raise us up again in the morning.” This is why the morning is juxtaposed with the morning. By ending our day with study we ensure ourselves a greater chance that we will carry us through the night soundly to see another day of learning.

The morning emphasizes the themes of darkness and the fear of the uncertain night. Only in the morning can save us from these fears. Take, for example, the expression המוסר, which originally comes from , which speaks of an individual who feels abandoned and forgotten by God. He begs from the morning that He will carry us through the night soundly to see another day of learning.

At night also, when we can’t
easily see the dangers that may come to us, we may feel lonely and abandoned. We must understand that only the light of God can save us from those dangers. Furthermore, the term '覚醒' indicates that we hope to wake up not merely to a new day, but to a new day guided by God. Without awareness of God and His protection, we have little hope of being saved.

In the first line of the prayer, we ask God to lower the barrier. The verse says, "נכה שלג על ימין". We often think that when we fall asleep at night it is a mere biological function. Perhaps we fall asleep because we are tired, while at other times we lay awake because of noise or distraction. We may forget that God is in control of our sleep patterns. He intervenes in our lives at all times. When we cannot fall asleep we must recognize that God is telling us something. Maybe He is allocating time for us to reflect on our day, so that we can discover, and do for, a task that we did (God forbid). God may be keeping us awake so we can ponder more thoroughly and discover a solution.

A few lines later we say, "אשה תכחין הפרעה". Perhaps we can explain this expression based on a verse from Genesis, "And the Lord brought forth a nurse to Rebekah in the house of Abraham" (Genesis 21:21). The verse explains that the nurse was a perfect bed, meaning that all his offspring were pure and steadfast. Perhaps in the same way, as well, the "perfect bed" is a reference to one’s offspring. God may grant us another day if He understands that the future generations which we will bring into the world will be "perfect" and righteous. We remind God that our lives may have value for the future of Israel. We ask God to allow us to live another day in order to instill more values and meaning in the future of Israel.

In addition, the prayer emphasizes the themes of light and unification. Each term appears three times, emphasizing the light which we need in order to see our direction clearly, but which is missing at night. By asking God to “enlighten my eyes,” the individual admits that he is not capable of lighting his own way, particularly at night. Furthermore, "אורה" is a euphemism for "הורה" (as in the expression "אורה מברך את תחנת" from "ירה מברך את תחנת"). The term "אורה" is God’s messenger to enlighten our eyes. "יכ אורות: הר kone סזר עלול תומד" takes this further. The verse says, "If You illuminate the pupil of the eye." explains that this phrase expresses the idea that God can enlighten even the blackest part of our eyes. Even at night, when we are lost and do not see any direction, when we are caught in dark worlds such as nightmares, God is still able to shed light on our lives. The blessing both starts and ends with images of light. It begins with the phrase "נכה שלג על ימין", it concludes with the phrase "נכה שלג על ימין". This sets up a literary parallel between the beginning and end of the prayer, indicating that God and His directions will guide us from the beginning to end of the day. We conclude the prayer and the day with devotion to God because He is the only one who can genu-
inely move us and the world from darkness to light, from night to day. May we be worthy of laying down to sleep and waking up to many days of dedication to הוה, to ה, and to His משוח.

2 ההר שבמצע מדרכי הופנהר, ספר עלת המשוא, ירושלים, תשרי, עמי רחל.
Tamar Pruzansky

According to רמב״ם and Rav Hirsch

THERE IS a classic debate among Jewish philosophers about the extent to which we can understand the reasons underlying the מצוות. Can we understand? Should we make the effort to do so? What role do the reasons play in our obligation to observe the מצוות?

Both רמב״ם and Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch discuss this issue. Each scholar probes this question, and they arrive at two markedly different approaches. Both agree that a person cannot observe the מצוות because he understands or accepts the reasoning; the reason to perform the מצווה is because God commanded us to observe them. But they substantially diverge about the background of the מצווה, and the mentality of the one who performs them. Do we observe מצווה only because God commanded them, or do we also observe מצווה because of the inherent value and benefit of the מצווה themselves?

רמב״ם understands that man’s highest goal is the pursuit of knowledge of God, and therefore he perceives מצווה as more intellectually grounded. Man, he writes, serves God through מצווה because knowledge of God creates recognition of God’s transcendent greatness. Although God is ultimately unknowable, man begins his quest for knowledge of God through observance of the מצווה. Fulfiling the commandments contributes to that quest because man must first be virtuous before he can properly become knowledgeable. מצווה work to perfect one’s character and ensure one’s physical well being. מצווה, therefore, are part of the search for God, the beginning of a journey to knowledge of God, which remains the final (albeit unattainable) goal.

According to R. Hirsch, מצווה are an end unto themselves, simply the expression of loyalty to the Master by His faithful servants. We are obligated to do the מצווה because God commanded them; that is the duty of the servant.

There is a difference, however, between the basic obligation to do the מצווה and the reasons for the מצווה. In Volume III, chapter 26 of the
According to Rav Kunkel and Rav Hirsch

מְצוּות פְּרֵית וּפְרֵיס They prefer to believe that מְצוּות are simply the will of ה'; further inquiry is not relevant. Others maintain that every commandment and prohibition is based upon the infinite wisdom of God, and therefore must have some utility (benefit or purpose). Rav Kunkel, however, holds “that all the laws have a cause, though we ignore the causes for some of them and we do not know the manner in which they conform to wisdom.”1 In other words, although every מְצוּות has a cause or purpose, humans do not necessarily understand it. Some מְצוּות are classified as חוכם, which are מְצוּות that have a useful purpose “but it is hidden from us either because of the incapacity of our intellects or the deficiency of our knowledge” (Guide, 2:26, p. 507).

בָּחַיֶּד (תַּחְתַּת הַחַדַּשׁ) describes מְצוּות as the quintessential דָּבָר אֲלֵיהוֹ民航. Clearly there is a meaning to the מְצוּות in general — but we will never be able to understand why the מְצוּות must be red, or a heifer, or how it conveys purity on those who are sprinkled with its ashes. But our inability to understand all the particulars implies no limitation on ה', or on our obligation to fulfill the מְצוּות.

What would be the value in having מְצוּות whose ultimate meaning is beyond our comprehension? Rav Kunkel explains this based on the verse, וְהִיא בָּרֶנֶס (זרעיהו, כלמה), and the הִסְדָּר of дер הר הארי, that “if it appears vain it is because of you.”2 Perhaps, says Rav Kunkel, some מְצוּות were hidden from us so that we would not trivialize any of them or undermine their performance by commingling the מְצוּות and the reason — as שלמה המלך did, and therefore sinned (Guide, 3:26, p. 507-508).

R. Hirsch defines חוכם as “statutes, declarations of justice towards subordinate creatures by reason of the obedience due to God; that is justice towards Earth, plants and animals, or if they have become assimilated to your own person, then, justice towards your own property, toward your own body and soul and spirit.”3 R. Hirsch believes that חוכם need to be special secrets that man actively obeys to uplift himself and nature, not just “rules of health inculcating sound feelings or protecting against passing aberrations.” R. Hirsch attempts to explain the purposes of even the חוכם, as there cannot be a מְצוּות which does not have some beneficial idea. ה' is not capricious; every מְצוּות, even its details, are tools by which we serve Him and become better people.

Rav Kunkel recognizes מְצוּות whose utility is apparent to all, and which lie on the opposite end of the spectrum from חוכם. These are called מְצוּות. R. Hirsch defines מְצוּות as “Statements concerning justice toward creatures similar and equal to yourself, by reason of this resemblance and equality; that is of justice towards human beings” (Nineteen Letters, p. 75). These generally are that govern human relations, and can bring about

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According to Rema and Rav Hirsch

a harmonious, just society. R. Hirsch clearly explains the value and purpose of mitzvos, as those mitzvos which will perfect a human being and make him a better servant of God.

Rema certainly agrees that one should “seek in all the laws an end that is useful in regard to being,” (Guide, 3:26, p. 508) since every mitzvo has utility. Yet, he says, one should not search for any meaning in the details of the mitzvos. Rema even goes so far as to say that “those who imagine that a cause may be found for suchlike things are as far from the truth as those who imagine that generalities of a commandment are not designed with a view to some real utility” (Guide, 3:26, p. 509). One should not ask why this mitzvo requires the offering of seven lambs instead of eight or twenty. God chose one number or detail for inscrutable reasons. If indeed the mitzvo required eight lambs, we would have the very same question: why eight and not seven?

Such an approach is anathema to R. Hirsch. R. Hirsch maintains that despite Rema’s greatness, his approach in discounting any meaning in the details of the mitzvos, and generally Rema’s elevation of knowledge of God as the primary goal of Jewish life, led over time to Jews performing them by rote or abandoning the observance of mitzvos. After all, if the knowledge of Hashem is the goal, and one attains knowledge of Hashem, then why continue performing the mitzvos? What motivation would rational man have for performing mitzvos that he did not and could not understand?

R. Hirsch said that some people, including Rema, attempted to understand the mitzvos not by analyzing the mitzvos themselves, but by adopting a foreign, alien viewpoint (like Greek philosophy) and imposing that structure of thought on the mitzvos. They judged the mitzvos based on an external standard, and thereby molded the mitzvos to fit their needs. R. Hirsch in his Nineteen Letters says,

His [Rema’s] own intellectual tendency was Arabic-Greek and so was his conception of the purpose of life. He entered Judaism from without, bringing with him views of whose truth he had convinced himself from extraneous sources… [Other] people took up their standpoint outside Judaism, and sought to draw Judaism over to their positions. They conceived a priori opinions as to what the Mitzvos might be, without troubling themselves as to the real nature of Mitzvos in all their ramifications. What was the consequence? The natural result of such a mode of thinking was that men who believed themselves the possessors of the knowledge which the commandments had been designed to teach, thought themselves now absolved from the fulfillment of the commandments, which were, after all, only guides to that knowledge (Nineteen Letters, pp. 119-121).
According to רמב״ם and Rav Hirsch

Beyond R. Hirsch’s מכתשף with רמב״ם, he is also referring to the Reform movement of his time, which misinterpreted רמב״ם’s words and used them to support their abandonment of מנה as the unique character of Jewish life. R. Hirsch, throughout his book Horeb, as well as his commentary on הוריה, expended great energy in explaining the symbolic meaning of every מנה, and how the particulars of every מנה flowed naturally from its general purpose. In addition to this, R. Hirsch said that if the details of מנה were unimportant, there would not have been so much emphasis placed upon them. Regarding כרבנות, he says, “How absurd is it, then, to fill three or four folios with investigations concerning the manner of offering sacrifice, which parts thereof may be used, the persons who may officiate, and the times which they can be offered!” (Nineteen Letters, p. 125).

The dispute between רמב״ם and R. Hirsch can be seen most vividly in their differing explanations for the laws of כרבנות. R. Hirsch comments that the common translation of כרבך as sacrifice does not capture the essence of the word. כרבך means “offering”, whose root is כרב, meaning “coming near, approaching”. A כרב is the means by which we come closer to God and elevate ourselves. R. Hirsch says that once a person reaches that level through כרבנות, he can achieve true happiness and closeness to God.

Rav Hirsch understands כרבנות much more practically, even providing a historical explanation. He says that the whole institution of כרבנות exists in order to wean us away from idolatry. Since it was customary for pagans to sacrifice animals in serving their idols, the הוהר feared that the Jews would succumb to the same pagan instinct. So הוהר instituted a system of כרבנות within a specific framework — how, what, where, when — with limitations and detailed instructions. This way we would serve הוהר through כרבנות and not be tempted to serve other gods.

Through all the controversy, debates, and criticism of רמב״ם, R. Hirsch still finds room to praise him for his outstanding achievements. In his Nineteen Letters, Rav Hirsch explains that,

The age gave birth to a man, a mind who, simultaneously brought up in the environment of uncomprehended Judaism and Arabic science, was compelled to reconcile in his own manner the conflict which raged within in his own breast, and who, by proclaiming it to the world, became the guide of all in whom the same conflict existed. To this great man, and to him alone, do we owe the preservation of the practical Judaism down to our own day. Because he sought to reconcile Judaism with the difficulties which confronted it from without, instead of developing it creatively from within, he is responsible for all the good which blesses the heritage of modern
According to Rav Hirsch and Rav Hirsch

Judaism as well as for all the evil which afflicts it (Nineteen Letters, p. 119).

It is important to note that R. Hirsch derives Rav Ashkenazi's philosophical framework primarily from the Midrash Nevi'im, and less from the Midrash ha'Eleh. In the Midrash ha'Eleh, certainly, Rav Ashkenazi pays close attention to the details of Midrash ha'Eleh, and reveals less Greek philosophical thought than in the Midrash Nevi'im. Indeed, at the end of most of the books of the Midrash ha'Eleh, Rav Ashkenazi summarizes the particular area with a reference to the underlying reasoning of the Midrash. This may seem like an internal contradiction within Rav Ashkenazi's writings, however, the Midrash ha'Eleh was written for a less philosophically educated audience, whereas the Midrash Nevi'im was written for the more philosophically sophisticated. If R. Hirsch had judged Rav Ashkenazi's approach based solely on his writings in the Midrash ha'Eleh, he might have reacted less harshly to Rav Ashkenazi and his views.

In a sense, perhaps this highlights the dangers involved in merging the halachic and the philosophical, and in blending the halachic with the reasoning. R. Hirsch sees that the great failing of his time is those Jews who abandoned the "letter" of the law because they assumed they had — and only required — the "spirit" of the law. R. Hirsch makes clear: without the spirit, the letter is dry and lifeless, but without the letter, the "living" is already dead. According to Rav Hirsch, the true and faithful servant of the "living" infuses the spirit of the law — his observance of every detail — with the spirit that animates it. This perfects him, and connects him to the "living"'s divine source. That is the הוהי's mandate to every Jew, and that is our obligation.

2 יושלבמי יתעפות, חיים.
5 This point was raised by my father, Rabbi Steven Pruzansky.
Malka Adatto

THE CONCEPT OF Divine providence is one that is interpreted differently by almost everyone. Rav Eliyahu Dessler, in his book (مصباح מאליח, מכתב, Vol 1 p. 178), maintains that there is no distinction between nature and miracles. Everything that occurs in this world is a result of God’s will: every blade of grass, every animal, every individual is constantly being watched over by Him. The apparent regularity of the event is what makes us mistakenly distinguish miracles from nature. Yet, there are other philosophers who maintain that God created the world and then abandoned it, never interfering with its function. דובדוב, Divine intervention or providence, is often misinterpreted as fitting into either of the two aforementioned extremes. However, after much careful investigation of the seemingly contradictory passages throughout his works, the דובדוב’s complex theory becomes clear.

By definition, דובדוב is miraculous. It is not necessarily a miracle that openly contradicts the laws of nature, but more commonly a slight manipulation of nature to the benefit of the individual. God created the world ויהיישמה שלום — there was nothing and He created something to fill this nothing-ness (שם ויהיישמה שלום). As God preceded the world and created it, He can interfere with it at any point in time. All creations are subject to the laws of nature that God established. However, since God instituted the system, He has the ability to supercede any law He desires at any point in time. The question that must still be examined is whether God exercises His ability to interfere in the world and dictate certain occurrences within the world that He created. Simply stated, does God play any active role in a person’s life?

If there would be a change in anything created by a person, it would imply that there was an imperfection in the creation. For example, if a person built a chair to sit on with three legs that were placed in three of the four corners of the seat, it would not serve its purpose as a chair. The person sitting in it would not be properly supported and would probably tip over.
The craftsman would have to add a fourth leg on the fourth corner of the chair, or change the placement of the other three legs, to support the person, allowing the chair to serve its function. The fact that the chair needed to be “adjusted” implies that it was created imperfectly. However this is not the case with God’s creations.

But, the actions of God, since they are the end of perfection, it is not possible to have any addition to them or to take something away, they certainly exist like they are (רמב”ם, ברכות).

Anything that God created was perfect and had a purpose. Anything that would temporarily change in the future was not a result of an imperfection but rather a miracle. Rav Yosef Kapach, one of the most authoritative scholars of הרמב”ם, explains that the purpose of such miracles is to demonstrate God’s superior control over everything. When people would see God perform a miracle, they would “fear God and know that everything is in His hand and ability to do as He wishes” (שם, ברכות). This shows how the miracles that occurred, both openly and subtly, displayed something about God’s omnipotent control over this world.

There is a הרמב”ם in וידוהי that seems to contradict the theory of miracles just presented.

Ten things were created on the eve of Shabbat, at twilight. They are: The mouth of the earth, the mouth of the well, the mouth of the donkey, the rainbow, the manna, the staff, the shamir worm, the script, the inscription, and the tablets. Some say also the destructive spirits, Moshe’s grave and that of our forefather Abraham. And some say also tongs which are made with tongs (פרקי אבות, מה).
water the ability for it to temporarily contradict its own nature. Usually, water flows based on the laws of gravity. However, at this moment, it would flow in a counter-gravitational flow. The ten things specified in this were not the only miracles that were created during Creation, but rather the only ten things created on Friday afternoon.

This view seems to leave no room for any “unplanned” miracles to unfold, because all miracles were built into nature. However, in the Midrash discusses this same idea, quoting this opinion in , but arrives at a different conclusion about the nature of miracles. Rav says that explained that everything was put into nature during Creation, just like he himself explained in . However, in addition to citing the position of , he also adds two further ideas. First, he distinguishes between nature and miracles. There are certain things that were built into nature, but then there are also . Rav Kapach points out that needs to reiterate and stress this point in this discussion, — “So that they won’t come to deny miracles and say that it was the nature of the thing to change” (5 ). comments in and his comments in seem to contradict each other. Rav explains that miracles were not a part of nature. The changes in nature were not natural consequences but rather God’s intervention. He quotes the opinion of , but he disagrees with the simple interpretation of their concept.

Hol’s second addition in is an explanation of why were compelled to claim that everything was part of nature. He explains that did this to help the less sophisticated philosophical minds. It is difficult to understand how there could be an initial will of God and then, at a later point, there could be a seemingly different will. This implies a fallacy in God’s knowledge and an imperfection in the creations. For if God knew everything, then all later alterations surely should have been anticipated and subsequently implanted into nature.

Our Sages, however, said very strange things as regards to miracles; they are found in Bereishit Rabba, and in Midrash Koheleth, namely,
that the miracles are to some extent also natural; for they say, when
God created the Universe with its present physical properties, He made
it part of these properties, that they should produce certain miracles at
certain times, and the sign of a prophet consisted in the fact that God
told him to declare when a certain thing will take place, but the thing
itself was effected according to the fixed laws of nature. If this is really
the meaning of the passage referred to, it testifies to the greatness of
the author, and shows that he held it to be impossible that there should
be a change in the laws of nature, or a change in the will of God after
they have once been established.

בּוֹרֵזֶה expressed their position in this way so that people would not de-
velop faulty ideas about God’s knowledge. בּוֹרֵזֶה said that everything was built
into nature to reconcile two problems. Firstly, they wanted to explain to
people that there is a system that governs everything that God set in place
during the six days of Creation, otherwise known as nature. The second
problem it solved was the inability to explain God’s knowledge in terms
that people could understand. בּוֹרֵזֶה explains in the
ףַלָּחַת השַׁבוֹא (משנה תורה רמב”ם
)— a book where the philosophical sections are presented in sum-
mary form for the masses — that no one can ever understand how God can
know everything. Yet, at the same time, free will is not diminished. Since it
is incomprehensible to the refined human mind how such a phenomenon
can exist, בּוֹרֵזֶה could not convey this concept to the masses. The
ףַלָּחַת השַׁבוֹא helps explain complex ideas to the masses. Instead of going through a
philosophical dissertation in
ףַלָּחַת השַׁבוֹא,
בּוֹרֵזֶה explained miracles in terms that
the masses could relate to, in an attempt to avoid arriving at terrible mis-
conceptions of God and His knowledge.

In order to properly summarize these ideas,
בּוֹרֵזֶה says:

For we believe that this universe remains perpetually with the same
properties with which the Creator has endowed it, and that none of
these will ever be changed except by way of miracle in some indi-
vidual instances, although the Creator has the power to change the
whole universe, to annihilate it, or to remove any of its properties. Its
nature will not change, except in some instances regarding a few de-
tails. This is our opinion and the basis for our religion.
He clearly reemphasizes that there is nature and there are miracles, two separate things. Rav Kapach also deems it necessary to stress this point. “Listen, miracles are not nature” ( เมษายน ביהודה). Once it has been established that God performs miracles in this world, one must understand the conditions under which an individual warrants such events to occur in his favor. As was previously stated, шנאה פרשית is by definition something outside the realm of what should normally occur to a person within nature. It does not necessarily need to be a contradiction of nature, but rather a form of Divine protection. One does not always recognize that this is not nature, because God performs miracles through nature.

There is a common misconception amongst many people. They maintain that the bad things that happen to a person are a result of God’s causing them to happen. However, they are often really a result of man’s free choice ( מצה). For example, if a person smokes two packs of cigarettes every day for thirty years, how can he attribute his premature death at the age of 46 to God? The lung cancer was a natural outcome of his choice to smoke. One who does not understand nature and perceives himself as immortal has no valid claim against God. Such a person is solely subject to nature and does not merit Divine intervention.

רבי משנה בריס maintains that there is a connection between השנאה, one’s understanding, and השמיעה, Divine protection. According to רבי משנה בריס, true understanding means to understand “the nature of existence and the statutes of the Torah and to know their purposes” (שם יג). One must investigate the way the world works and the systems through which man is controlled. Once a person has reached a high enough level of perfection in his understanding of how these systems work, he merits השמיעה.

One of the purposes of הקדמאת למדות תלמוד is to help a person correct his personality. One must be constantly working on himself and his emotions. When a person’s emotions are flawed, he cannot perceive reality and correctly investigate the fundamental truths. Therefore, one’s level of perfection determines his level of Divine protection.
In another place, however, רכבי הנפש seems to contradict this theory of השכחה. He contends that humans are the only species that receive רכבי הנפש. Animals do not get any form of individual intervention, nor do plants or vegetation. He continues by saying that everything that happens to a person is an expression of רכבי הנפש through reward and punishment. If the only people who get השכחה are those who have reached a certain level in their intellectual pursuit, then how can the רכבי הנפש maintain that everyone gets השכחה through reward and punishment? Furthermore, in the next chapter, לקיומם השכחה returns to his theory that providence depends on knowledge.

Here clearly states that השכחה is not equal for everyone, but is greater for the perfected individual.

In order to reconcile this apparent contradiction, one must first examine how reward and punishment in this world works and how that system therefore extends to every individual, in contrast with the type of רכבי הנפש that only get. In הלהב, we see that לקיומם רכבי הנפש takes the position that the positive and negative events in an individual’s life are guided by a scheme of Divine recompense. Yet, in קיומם, he states that the degree of providence in a person’s life is a function of the person’s spiritual perfection.

Although believes that each of us experiences justice, this is not always the result of God’s intervention. The level of intervention or providence is a function of our spiritual perfection. However, he also administers justice through exposing us to our natural fate. The outcome is that justice is served. Sometimes the justice is a result of God’s interference, as in the case of the righteous. Sometimes justice is the result of nature.

This idea explains the contradiction by redefining reward and punishment, with respect to השכחה. When the לקיומם is discussing רכבי הנפש he continuously discusses the notion of justice. Justice is something that extends to everyone. However it is not necessarily a result of a manipulation of the laws of nature. Sometimes is a result of God’s intervention. Often, however, it is a result of our decisions and their natural consequences, as השכחה, Divine providence, only occurs to those who have achieved a certain level of perfection.
The concept of prophecy begs mentioning in its relationship to perfection. דבק in many places, and is strikingly consistent about his views. He explains that prophecy can only occur to a person who is on a certain spiritual level. Since prophecy is one of the most fundamental expressions of perfection, its connection to perfection is necessary. Therefore, דבק maintains that people like דבק, who were not in a perfected state, were not prophets.

Dekel explains in פסוד על ( perfection) that a prophet reaches a certain level and then waits for God to give him prophecy. However, משה's prophecy was qualitatively different in several ways. One of the biggest distinctions is that all other prophets received prophecy whenever God wanted them to have it. משה, on the other hand, received prophecy whenever he wanted. This statement requires explanation. How can משה get whenever he wanted, if the prophecy is an expression of משה? משה says that there are two ways a prophet merits prophecy. One way is when he is the leader of the nation. God needs to relay a message to the people. Therefore, He relays it through the most perfected individuals, even though on their own merit they may have not received prophecy. The second reason that a person may receive prophecy is due to his own personal level of perfection. He himself deserves such a high form of prophecy.

The remarks of Dekel about the nature of prophecy can extend to the words of משה as well. This explains the differences between the prophecy of משה משל נבואה and the other prophets throughout history. משה received prophecy for both reasons. He got משל נבואה as a result of his position as the leader of the Jewish people. He also received משל נבואה because of his own personal perfection. All other משל נבואה only got prophecy because they were leaders of the Jews. Therefore when משה says that משל נבואה could receive prophecy whenever he wanted, he is describing משה's personal level of perfection.

The last concept that must be addressed is the purpose of prayer. It is difficult to claim that God will suddenly change His will just because a person asks for money, health, or to destroy heresy. This would imply that God temporarily forgot something, and that this person is reminding God. Thus, the institution of פסוד must be for the purpose of achieving a different goal; it cannot be that prayer is used for manipulating God.

When a person prays, he is performing a type of introspection. He is essentially examining his character so that he will hopefully merit a higher level of perfection and his requests will subsequently be answered through משל נבואה. Dekel phrases this idea in terms of משל נבואה. He explains that the "first purpose" is a specific type of commandment that will "establish in our
intellect true philosophies" (מדרש תוביס). maintainsthat prayer will enable one to achieve this goal. A person’s false perception of reality prevents him from properly achieving that prevents a person from achieving a higher level of (שם, ולי). Prayer is a method through which one can better his perception of reality by understanding what is really needed in the world. It is a system through which one reviews the way the world works, thereby impacting on one’s emotions so that the person will function properly and merit providence. This approach explains why one would ask for personal requests. If one is healthy then he can be constantly working towards his ultimate goal. If one has money then he can take the energy that would have been used towards making a living and spend it on learning.

However, why would one ask for someone else’s health or sustenance? How does that help him achieve his ultimate goal and raise his own personal level of (שם)? Before the world existed there was nothing to challenge God’s supremacy and majesty. When God created the world, there were beings who could now “contest” God’s prevalence. In an ideal world, everyone would investigate and draw proper conclusions about God. God is ultimately glorified by human recognition. When one prays, he phrases his requests in such a way that if God were to grant his request then He will be more glorified in the world. If a person prays for health, sustenance and knowledge for others, he is expressing the notion that through these things people will better be able to properly investigate God. There needs to be a capital city, (ירושלים וידויד). There needs to be so that people can successfully change their incorrect ways. When one asks of God to grant other people these things, he is asking that the world have the opportunity to move towards a more perfected state. The more perfected the world, the higher level of there will be. Therefore, prayer on all levels is to better the individual and the world.

In conclusion, view of requires much analysis. Everyone starts out as subjects of nature. Everything that occurs is a consequence of one’s (בריאה). At a certain point of perfection, the natural consequence is ( метро). However, the actual expression of is an intervention and manipulation of the laws of nature for the benefit of the perfected individual.
comments on this: It seems that had inflicted with an evil eye. He became sick and was unable to walk on his own.

Later on, in the discusses the descent of the . The wonders why the emphases that they arrived amidst the others who were coming to buy food in Egypt. He explains that had commanded the brothers to mingle amongst the others, and to enter the city separately from one another, so that an could not have any affect on them.

We see from these two accounts that not only did our forefathers give credence to the dangers of , but they also acted upon it. While feared that his sons may be harmed by , it seems that had actually used to harm .

The explains the concept of and how it operates. He distinguishes between a ל and an . A person with a desires to bring benefit to others. Conversely, someone with an wishes that others be deprived of all good. The is a person who is not satisfied until he sees that others receive and appreciate all the good. In contrast, a one who has a “narrow eye.” This person receives his powers to affect others because he has an exceedingly evil spiritual power. explains that this power can affect the elements out of which the world is constructed. When the elements become imbalanced, people’s this-worldly experiences change for the worse.
A Closer Look

The principle that comes from this מדורל is that one must have the same attitude toward one’s own loved ones and property as toward those of others. As in the statement of מדורל, the consequences of not having this attitude can be fatal.

We see an idea similar to this in מדרשו. The מדרשו asks about the fate of the בצשא, whose children were saved from the הרעה, but are not mentioned after that. דר רבי explains that רבי ר 页面 מפורט everyone would look at them, wondering how they had been saved. From this it follows that in order to prevent הרעה, it is necessary to avoid standing out and to prevent people from feeling jealous of you. The מדרשו emphasizes, therefore, that one method to avoid הרעה is to avoid situations in which one person might become jealous of another's success. דר רבי cites a מדרשה that, מדרשו clarifies that everyone would look at them, wondering how they had been saved.

Similarly, מדרשו reports that a father and son should not receive consecutive powers of הרעה, in order to avoid other people's jealousy and a consequent הרעה. דר רבי also emphasizes this idea. In מדרשו explains why a man went up to the רבי ר 页面 by himself. Had someone gone with him, there would be danger that that person would become jealous of him, and place an הרעה on him. דר רבי indicates that כנימות is the best prevention for הרעה, for a modest attitude prevents jealousy.

If a person should find himself in a situation where he is concerned that he might already be on the receiving end of an הרעה there are other solutions. מדרשו says that someone scared of an הרעה should say, מדרשו. According to this מדרו learn that people are immunized from the powers of הרעה. מדרשו learns this from מדרשים statement, מדרשו explains that מדרשה is above the eye, and is not influenced by הרעה. However, it is puzzling that מדרשה did not bless all of his children to be above the evil eye. Why did מדרשה feel that מדרשה needed this blessing more than his eleven brothers?
If we look at the life and personality of ושם, we see that he had a disposition towards ושם ו שאת. In his youth, ושם gave the cloak to his brothers, which flaunted in front of his brothers. The cloak was a special gift from ושם, which represented his unique love for ושם. Because of this, his brothers became envious of him. Because of this, his brothers became a ruler over his brothers. This aggravated his brothers so much that they eventually threw him into the pit. Once he had been taken to ושם, he was so beautiful that he caught the attention of ושם, because he had so many extraordinary talents and gifts that made other jealous of him, and made him particularly prone to זיע ו setHidden.

Rav Chaim Friedlander, in his work ספה חכם (p. 197), explains that ושם understood that the brothers could kill ושם with this power of זיע ו setHidden. Therefore, he suggested throwing him into the pit, where the brothers could not see him or cast an זיע ו setHidden on him. ושם knew that this would appease his brothers, because they assumed that ושם would be killed by snakes and scorpions in the pit. ושם hoped that the scorpions and snakes, which are directly subject to the will of ושם, would not harm ושם.

Rav Friedlander asks, how it is possible that if ושם has already decreed a person's fate another person can change that with an זיע ו setHidden? He answers that, ושם основан ו созда את המלך והיווה את האלוף מבית ושם, ושם מוסים בטבע ו 의해 את המלך והיווה את האלוף מבית ושם,肸ות, ושם מעופת ו 의해 את המלך והיווה את האלוף מבית ושם. He explains where this זיע ו setHidden emanates from. ושם has the ability to create with His will alone. His desires automatically and immediately become reality. זיע ו setHidden is ingrained in mankind a bit of this זיע ו setHidden. In some cases, our own desires can be translated into reality. Our desire to harm another person can be so strong that ושם will enact it. Yet, the desires of the other person to protect himself or others also have power, and the זיע ו setHidden to avoid the trouble can also affect reality. In cases such as these, the deciding factor is whose זיע ו setHidden is stronger — the person who wishes to give an זיע ו setHidden to another person, or the person who would have received the זיע ו setHidden. Consequently, says Rav Friedlander, if a person makes others jealous of him, he has played a part in his own downfall. By arousing feelings of jealousy in others, he incites their זיע ו setHidden for bad.

There are many זיע ו setHidden designed to protect people from זיע ו setHidden ו setHidden. These reflect the attempt to avoid flaunting talents, beauty, or wealth. In Europe, many families would not sit for a family portrait because of the fear of זיע ו setHidden. ו setHidden says that preventing זיע ו setHidden is the reason you break a glass at a wedding, in addition to the element of יי ו setHidden. Breaking the glass dispels the perfect happiness, so that the guests should not become jealous of
the happily married couple and give them an an עיני רュー. In אגרות משנה עני רュー, Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses theonesia, who says that two sisters should not get married at the same time (ואדעי, ד, פס). Rav Moshe explains that even though did not provide his reason, it is logical to assume that it is because of עני רュー. Rav Moshe was also presented with a situation in which two grand-
mothers had the same name (ואדעי, א購物, עמ כב). If one grandmother died, may a newborn girl be named after the deceased grandmother? Rav Moshe answered that one should refrain from naming the newborn after the deceased grandmother, to avoid עני רュー for the living grandmother. He further explains that, עני רュー דוא גישה לשון אל יפקוד הרוח כי בריחים (פשתים, ו) וכל לכלום ומ אפק אל פשדיני בהדריה, עני רュー, one should feel and consider it, but not be overly concerned with it. The principle is that if you are not overly concerned with it, it will not be overly concerned with you”. Rav Moshe, apparently, acknowledges that עני רュー exists, but he tells us not to place too much importance on its dangers. The more one emphasizes the powers of עני רュー, according to the הגמרא, the more one is susceptible to it.

In רבי יוחנן אמור עני רュー יוני חזון ושנאתו ביריה, it says: וסרק אבן, בד. In his commentary on this עני רュー, רבי יוחנן explains why this evil power is called עני רュー. He explains that it is through the eye, the sense of vision, that man realizes what others have, and becomes jealous. It is interesting to note that עני רュー, רבי יוחנן placed at the beginning of the list of things that drive a man from this world. Perhaps רבי יוחנן considers עני רュー more dangerous than the itself.

In his commentary on this עני רュー, מ浚א, רבי יוחנן explains that desire is a bitter, black sickness. A strong, ongoing desire for an abundance of money will bring a person to hate whatever his eyes see. This character trait removes the person from the world, because in order to cure himself the person should dwell alone in a desert, forest, or any uninhabited area. This is not merely a מית אמת. Rather, it is absolutely necessary for the עני רュー. If he does not learn to control his jealousy and desires, he will become ill and eventually die.

There seems to be consensus that the root of עני רュー is in jealousy. The best way to avoid receiving עני רュー is to act modestly and refrain from flaunting wealth and talent. A good way to avoid becoming jealous of others is to understand that everything comes from ה. He provides for all of us what we need, so there is no reason to be jealous of others.
At the Edges of the Law:
An analysis of מורת הדין והטרמה

Shira Bloch

WITHIN PRACTICALLY every area of הלכה, there are legitimate halachic options which lie between the poles of extreme כלא and extreme חומרא. At the edges of this spectrum lie two categories of הלכה: מורת הדין והטרמה. מורת הדין lies at the edge of the lenient end of the spectrum. Literally the term means “trickery,” and it refers to finding loopholes in the law. By performing a מורת הדין, a person is not simply holding by a more lenient standard. He is circumventing the הלכה, changing the conditions of the situation so that the usual requirements do not apply.

הטרמה lies at the stringent end. This term refers to behavior which is beyond the call of duty. This approach is more than a חומרא; it is a way of adding to a law and observing it to a stricter standard than anything the law actually requires, according to any opinion.

As the term itself implies, מורת הדין is not חומרא, the most ideal halachic practice. All things being equal, it is not a proper option. For a מורת הדין to be either permissible or required, the situation must be extraordinary in a way that justifies it.

The שובה (פָּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל) discusses the case of a barrel of wine on a roof which breaks on the שובה. It is forbidden for the owner to place a vessel near the roof to catch the dripping liquid. This is a חוק הדבון, because of the concern that one might come to carry the vessel through a מסת והבש, which would constitute חוק הדבון. However, the owner is permitted to place the vessel if guests will be visiting him, so that he can serve the wine to them. Furthermore, the owner may invite guests and then bring a vessel to collect the wine, but he may not save the wine first and invite the guests afterward. According to one opinion, it is forbidden to perform a מורת הדין: to invite as a
pretense guests who have already eaten, and who will therefore not drink the wine. Another opinion in the הוראה 금 allows this type of הוראה

The הוראה 금 compares this case to another מחלקה concerning an animal and its child which fall into a pit on שר. Normally, it is forbidden to pull an animal out of a pit on שר. However, if the animal is to be brought as a קרבן, then it is permitted. In this case, one animal may be pulled out of the pit to be offered as a קרבן, but the same pretext cannot be used for the second animal, due to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day (יוֹסֵר, בעיס). According to one opinion, one animal should be pulled out and sacrificed, and the second animal should be provided for inside the pit to ensure that it does not die. According to another opinion, one may perform a הוראה by pulling out one animal, not slaughtering it, then pulling out the second animal under the same pretext — in case it is more suitable for sacrifice than the first. Whichever animal the owner chooses can then be offered as a קרבן.1

The הוראה 금 concludes that the two cases are not necessarily parallel. The opinion which permits a הוראה in one case might not permit it in the other case, and vice versa. In the case of the spilled wine, הוראה may be permitted because there is no other way to prevent financial loss. This consideration does not apply to the animal case, because one can care for the second animal without actually pulling it out of the pit. Alternatively, הוראה, צער כלל היהש, a consideration which is not applicable to the wine case.

The הוראה 금 here suggests two conditions which may permit a הוראה: financial loss and צער כלל היהש. Yet, it is interesting to note that in each of the cases, the הוראה 금 assumes that a lesser הוראה is permitted. In the wine case, the הוראה 금 relates to the type of guests who may be invited — those who will drink the wine or those who won’t. But everyone permits the inviting of guests who will drink, even though the guests are only invited to provide an excuse to save the wine. Similarly, in the second case, both opinions agree that the first animal may be pulled out of a pit to be used as a קרבן in order to save it from the dangers in the pit, even though that was not the original intention. Perhaps the consideration in each of these cases is צער כלל היהש, financial loss which will result unless a הוראה is used.

Another הוראה 금 (שבץ, כלל) 금ב想象力 to remove the sediment from wine. Normally it is forbidden to set up the strainer on שר, because this is considered ערבב חזרה. Yet, if the strainer was already set up it is permitted to strain wine with it. The הוראה 금 explains that it is permissible to set up the strainer for another purpose on שר, i.e. to place pomegranates in it. If someone needs to strain wine, he may perform a הוראה
by setting up the strainer and first placing pomegranates in it, making it appear as though this was his intention in setting up the strainer, and only then straining the wine. The Gemara compares this to a discussion about brewing beer on Pesach. This is permitted as long as the beer is needed during the festival. Someone who has beer at home may perform a kefilah, by brewing some fresh beer and drinking from it, pretending that the new beer was really necessary for the festival. The Gemara asks: why is no pretense required in the beer case? The Gemara answers that the pomegranate and beer cases differ in an important respect, namely how the situation appears to others. In the case of brewing beer, the observer does not know that the person already has beer at home. As far as the observer is concerned, this is the only beer he has, and his actions are perfectly permitted. However, in the case of the strainer, if one immediately strains wine in it, even if he claims that it was really set up for pomegranates, the observer recognizes immediately that the real purpose was to strain wine. The person must first validate his claim by actually putting pomegranates in the strainer, so that the observer will not recognize the kefilah. Here the consideration allowing the kefilah is the fact that it is not obvious. The way something appears to others is important. Even if the act itself is fundamentally permissible, it is not allowed unless the kefilah can be hidden.2

Another Gemara compares with an intentional sin (ביכטר, י"עב). When a shabbat falls on Pesach, one may not cook on shabbat (unless one makes an exception on Pesach). One may cook on shabbat for that day, and if there is food left over, he can eat it on shabbat. If he intentionally cooks on shabbat for Pesach, he has committed a sin, but the food is permitted. However, one may not perform a kefilah by intentionally cooking too much on shabbat so that there will be leftovers, or by inviting guests as an excuse to cook more food. If he does this, the food is prohibited. The Gemara explains the difference by saying that, "חטא חטאת אינית ברבן טפי מ規定, חטאת חטאת הוא ואינו חטאת". He explains this harsh statement. An intentional sin looks like a sin. Others are unlikely to imitate that sin, and the sinner is more likely to recognize the sin and do so. A chesed, on the other hand, appears legitimate. Hence, others may imitate the behavior, and the sinner may not be as quick to repent. Because the effects of a kefilah are ultimately worse than those of a chesed, the Gemara treated it more stringently.3 Hence, a kefilah is prohibited under conditions where the act may cause a ripple effect by setting an example which leads others to sin.

A similar idea appears in a Gemara which describes two questionable acts which were performed by Rav Huna bar Yishmael. He once placed a...
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garlic peel in a hole in a barrel on קדשה, which appeared to be a prohibition of סתם. However, יואל claimed that he merely wanted to store the garlic there. On another occasion he went to sleep in a small boat next to the field of a non-Jew, even though sailing is prohibited on קדשה. He knew that the owner would push the boat across the water to his own field, which would allow יואל to guard his fruit on the other side of the river. Yet, he claimed that his only intention was to go to sleep. The 结果 claims that יואל did nothing wrong, for two reasons: Firstly, in both cases, even without a קדשה he would only be violating an Lv זהב. Secondly, as he was a אסיר דרבן, there was no reason to be strict and forbid these acts. A למתה יאסר will not come to make a mistake and perform these sins Lv, without a קדשה.

It seems that the הדבון factor on its own is not enough to justify קדשה, because both the cases of the wine on קדשה and the animals in the pit deal with Lv דרבון קדשה. If הדבון was enough on its own to permit קדשה, then those cases would be permitted without reference to the financial loss or Lv על כטל חיס.

In summary, we have seen several conditions under which קדשה may be justified:
• If there is a good reason for it, such as Lv על כטל חיס.
• If there is no other way to avoid financial loss.
• If the trickery is not obvious, and could not mislead people.
• If the actor will not come to sin in the future because of the קדשה.
• If the actor avoided is only Lv דרבון קדשה, this is a mitigating factor, though it is not sufficient on its own.

Despite these considerations, we should not assume that קדשה, in the instances in which it is allowed, is always an improper way to behave. Often קדשה is the recommended approach under certain conditions. It seems that קדשה — while not an ideal in terms of attitude to Lv הלל or standards of Lv הלל observance — is the best way to deal with certain extraordinary situations, where other considerations impact upon the Lv הלל.

All the cases we have considered so far deal with Lv איסור ויתרה. In terms of financial law, קדשה takes on a different meaning. It refers to loopholes found in the law to save someone money or to avoid some sort of payment. For example,Lv מוסס mentions קדשה in reference to Lv הנפתLv הנפת. The notion of קדשה means that if A sells a field to B, and A owes C money, C can claim payment from B and A must pay B back. Now, Lv הנפת applies to cases where the property is sold, but not if it is given as a gift. Hence, if A claims to have given the property to B as a gift, we do not believe A. We assume that it is a קדשה, that A was simply trying to remove C's rights to the field.

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To avoid this we treat the gift as a sale, thereby disallowing A to remove C’s rights. In these cases, is a way of circumventing something which should not be circumvented. It is an attempt to find a technical loophole and ignore the moral problem. Were the to be accepted, it might possibly satisfy all the legal requirements, but it would not satisfy the moral spirit of the .

is a positive phenomenon. We should always be eager to go above and beyond the call of duty, volunteering to do something extra can be seen as an ethic beyond . means that ethical considerations prevent someone from taking everything that he can according to the letter of the law. It includes doing something decent or moral, even when one is technically from it. In these cases, is not a part of the law. It involves looking beyond the technical details of the to the spirit behind the law. can be approached very literally, demanding that one only looks to fulfill a set of technical obligations. describes an attitude wherein one sees in its moral and spiritual context, and enhances it accordingly.

Yet, we may be mistaken if we assume that is merely an option. In fact, the says that is an obligation. The quotes the , which says: (which might appear redundant, actually refer to ). It explains that the words , which were destroyed because the only judged according to the strict letter of the . This seems to indicate that is more than an optional extra. It is so essential that the existence of is jeopardized if it is not followed!

On the other hand, there are sources which indicate that is not an obligation. The tells us that and another man stopped their meal early so that they could join in a with his son, who had already finished eating. Normally, two people do not have to stop their meal because one wants to make a . The goes out of its way to say that was acting . This suggests that is an optional extra. It is a nice way to behave, but it is not compulsory.

A similar approach to appears in financial law.
needed the money. By the end of the transaction process the seller no longer needed the money, so he returned the land, even though it was legally his (וֹחָרַת, יִדְעָ). The Talmud explains that this was a case of לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי and פָּרְשָׁה יְהוּדִי. Similarly, a man, who worked as a money changer, once gave a woman a refund because he had made a mistake in the exchange, even though he was not required to do so (בַּכָּא קְפַס, צַע עִבָּ). Here too this behavior is described as לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי.

There are many other examples where לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי seems to be an optional practice. For example, if one returns a lost object that, technically, he is not obligated to return, he has acted לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי (וֹכֶל פָּלוֹזָל שְׁלָח תָּבָב). Similarly, it says that someone who wishes to act לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי will return a lost object, or help someone else load or unload an animal, even if he is exempt (הלכות גוֹלוֹת אוֹבְיוֹדָו, אֳיָהוֹ הלכת רַבָּה, יַדוּ). לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי is explained as an optional practice.

Perhaps the difference between the sources which see לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי as obligatory and those that see it as optional can be explained by distinguishing between different people. רבן גמליאל outlines the behavior which results in מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי. After listing a number of מקורות, he says: יָדִיל נְפֶל גַּזְל שְׁלָח תָּבָב, מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי (טוֹרֵי תַּנָּךְ, שַחְתָּא). יָרְדִי שִׁדְּרִיבָךְ עַל עַטְמוֹ טוֹעֵש לָמֵשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי explicitly uses the term מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי here, indicating that the greater the person, the more לֵפֶןָמשוֹרָה יְהוּדִי becomes an obligation. This idea is consistent with the מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי above which blames the destruction of וֹסָלֶפָא on the judges, who did not act מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי. It is also consistent with a מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי that states that מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי, מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי, would tell others that they can be מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי, while he himself would act מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי (שַׂחְתָּא, קְלַדְעַ יָאָ) מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי. This does not reflect an inconsistency on the part of מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי. Rather, מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי is understood that behavior which is appropriate for common people may not be proper for מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי. מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי is clearly positive, there are times when מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי is not a good thing, especially, as in the case of the wasp, where they might lead to מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי. In these cases the issue is not מְשָׁרֵת יְהוּדִי, which is always positive, if not...
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mandatory. The חומרא here is opposing the concept of senseless, of creating unnecessary restrictions in the quest for piety. Often חומרא, due to its character as a חומרא, is mistakenly associated with חומרא, by people who imagine that imposing extra חומרא automatically increases righteousness. A ridiculous חומרא is not חומרא, but only disguised as such.

The מדרש relates that the reason נא sin was because she initially tried to be יתקי (`לעופת מה`). Whereas היא only commanded them (`לעופת מתים`), porém added a new prohibition (`לעופת prohibes, `לעופת prohibes`). According to the מדרש, the snake pushed her against the tree, demonstrating that she would not die if she touched it. Because the two prohibitions had become equated in her mind, however, she believed the snake when it told her that just as she did not die from touching the tree, she also would not die from eating its fruit. This is an example of the statement in the מדרש: `לעופת prohibes and חומרא (and certain kinds of חומרא) are good, and unnecessary חומרא is bad, how does one know where to draw the line? A good guideline is provided in the above מדרש: `לעופת prohibes, which is disproportionate to the law it serves. One should not emphasize the fence around the law more than the law itself. The fence may fall, and pull up the roots of the plants which the fence was protecting. One must differentiate between something extra which serves to enhance the חומרא, and a ridiculous חומרא which is disproportionate to the law it serves.

Conclusion

לפנקו חומרא וÿגמה and וÿגמה חומרא lie at opposite ends of the halachic spectrum. חומרא, which lies at the lenient end of the spectrum, has certain negative connotations. וÿגמה חומרא, at the strict end of the spectrum, is seen as positive. A person ought to approach חומרא וÿגמה with an attitude of חומרא וÿגמה, trying to fulfill the highest standard in the practice of חומרא וÿגמה. The approach underlying `לעופת prohibes is less desirable, where one looks for loopholes to get out of difficult situations. In a sense, however, the two notions function on similar principles. They both stand at the extremes of the halachic system, finding solutions to difficult problems at the edge of the limits of the law.

1 The חומרא does not even require one of the animals to be sacrificed eventually. It is enough for them to be pulled out of the pit on the basis that they might be sacrificed.
2 This argument is also mentioned in the above מדרש in יתקי to explain why one opinion...
might permit a חָריָה in the case of the two animals but not in the case of the spilled wine.

3 This is not the actual מַחֲפֵפִים. This statement is only brought to show how the law is according to one opinion. However, we can probably assume that the concerns regarding חָריָה are common to all opinions.

4 Even here, as we will discuss below, there are extremes that are inappropriate. מִבְּנַע states שָלוֹא וַטְרָךְ וָרָבָּה וָלָא יִשְׁמוּשׁו מַדְּוִי. As גוֹתָל explains, he should be sure not take these מִדוּיו to such an extreme that he appears abnormal.
The Halachic and Hashkafic Implications of
Destroying קֵמָלָק

Avigayil Rosen

ONE OF THE MOST ethically disturbing commandments in the Torah is the command to wipe out the nation of קֵמָלָק (דְּבֵריוֹת, חֶזְיָה). To our 21st century mindset, this command sounds almost barbaric and sub-human, for a number of reasons. First, this command seems like pure genocide. Especially after Hitler’s recent systematic attempt at murdering all of the Jews, the idea of wiping out an entire nation — men, women and children — cannot be borne. Even tells שְּמֹאֵל, א שְּמֹאֵל (קֵמָלָק) to destroy the animals of שְּמֹאֵל. How can animals be tainted by this nation enough to make them worthy of death? They have no שְּמֹאֵל. Second, modern people are uncomfortable with the idea of linear or genetic transmission of evil. Why should later generations be punished for the sins of their forefathers? Third, the שְּמֹאֵל do not explain what was so bad about קֵמָלָק relative to other nations that attacked Jews throughout history. We know that קֵמָלָק’s ancestor and namesake was a grandson of רָבָּשִׁיתוֹ, חֵי (קֵמָלָק). and commands Jews not even to fight against the other nations that descended from דְּבֵריוֹת, בָּה (קֵמָלָק).

To help answer these questions, we should examine closely the שְּמֹאֵל which describe the war with קֵמָלָק and the שְּמֹאֵל to wipe them out. We should examine how the classical שְּמֹאֵל understand these issues. We will discover that קֵמָלָק is both a biological nation and the representation of the ideas of שְּמֹאֵל and pure evil. The biological nation of קֵמָלָק no longer exists as an identifiable group, but the Jews’ eternal battle against קֵמָלָק continues.
The Halachic and Hashkafic Implications of Destroying אָלָם

The hands of מֶשֶׁחַ are emphasized greatly, and are mentioned six times in this short passage. Furthermore, his hands are described by the adjective מֶשֶׁחַ. How can מֶשֶׁחַ’s hands have “faith”? The Bereshit Vayishma explains that it wasn’t מֶשֶׁחַ’s hands that had faith. Rather מֶשֶׁחַ’s hands pointed towards the sky, which would direct יְהוָה’s attention heavenwards, and remind them that victory against אָלָם could only come through יְהוָה. Despite the fact that מֶשֶׁחַ sent מֶשֶׁחַ to fight this war, clearly מֶשֶׁחַ also had his “hands” in the battle, and his hands functioned supernaturally. There is a unique aspect of מֶשֶׁחַ in this war, as if there is something personal between מֶשֶׁחַ and אָלָם.

This supports the notion that the war with אָלָם transcends the physical. He explains that the word אָלָם is written without the א because מֶשֶׁחַ’s throne is incomplete until אָלָם is completely destroyed (דרשי על מֶשֶׁחַ, יוהו מֶשֶׁחַ). Similarly, the word מֶשֶׁחַ means, מֶשֶׁחַ’s throne was only able to attack us because we were weak in מֶשֶׁחַ at that time (לוכָם מֶשֶׁחַ פָּרָשָׁת בּשָׁלָה). In ובימיה, we have the more familiar account of the war with אָלָם, which is read as פָּרָשָׁת וּכְרוּ, כִּשָּׁמְתָּן.

This passage, which contains the positive commandment to wipe out אָלָם, is juxtaposed with the negative to have honest weights and measures. This contrasts with the deceitful and tricky picture painted here of אָלָם; they sneaked up from the back and attacked us when we were down.

When comparing these two accounts, Nechama Leibowitz asks a number of questions. Why are we commanded to attack them, if it is God’s מֶשֶׁחַ who is doing the fighting? Also, the two accounts of the war with אָלָם paint very different pictures. The first account paints the picture of a proud victorious battle, which is recorded in ה’s Book of Wars. The second account portrays כי ישראל as weak and tired and no mention is made of the
The Halachic and Hashkafic Implications of Destroying עלול היי אובלות

victory. Also, why is the command to wipe out עלול היי אובלות included only in the account in ברכות (דרכיה)? In addition, why is portrayed as אושר קר מגרד, if no other nation is so condemned?

Prof. Leibowitz answers these questions by distinguishing between the purpose of the two accounts. נביה contains the facts of the battle, and נביה contains a moral analysis of עלול היי אובלות. נביה points to their wanton aggression against a weak and defenseless nation, which was not bothering them. She also cites רashi, who explains the nature of עלול היי אובלות’s aggression, by shedding some new light on the words מיטל הקור. He brings a parable of a hot bath. No one wants to touch the hot bath, because he would burn himself. But if one fool comes into the bath, he cools down the bath for everyone else, even though he is burnt. So too, when left they were indestructible — no one was willing to attack them. But when they started the war with us, some of the aura wore off. Up until this point, נביה the nations of the world were so scared of נביה and נביה, and they realized that נביה must be true. The hand of נביה had been shown to the nation, but עלול היי אובלות’s attitude of total disrespect and obstinate denial of נביה, caused the world, according to Prof. Leibowitz, to “return to its former rut, to its idols of gold and silver, its faith in mortal power and brute force.” The nations of the world were ready to recognize the truth of נביה’s dominion, but עלול היי אובלות prevented this from becoming a reality. This reasoning helps to explain why נביה would want to destroy עלול היי אובלות.

Also addresses the theme of עלול היי אובלות in explaining עלול היי אובלות (משומש, אשת) that there are three reasons that one nation would attack another: 1) to save their own land, 2) to take the other nation’s land, and 3) to embarrass the other nation, not necessarily because of anything that the other nation did. עלול היי אובלות’s war on נביה falls under the last category. He further explains that there are two ulterior motives for עלול היי אובלות’s attack. 1) They wanted to prove that they could defeat the nation for whom God had just shown the whole world His dominion. נביה emphasizes the theme again. 2) They were used, and they knew about the which were originally for נביה but were given to נביה. They understood that they have the power of the sword over נביה when we are sinning. They were concerned that this may be their last chance; once The Jews enter נביה, their chance will be lost. Both explanations focus on the inflated egos of עלול היי אובלות quotes and who further expands on this theme. He says that sent out to fight עלול היי אובלות to embarrass them.

continues the theme of עלול היי אובלות in explaining עלול היי אובלות. The permanent war with עלול היי אובלות stems from the fact that, God’s throne and honor, is not complete before the destruction
The Halachic and Hashkafic Implications of Destroying גמל

Therefore, "ותשבי בשם ושם ועדן," it was necessary for this mitzvah to be passed on to the next generation of leadership.

Rav Dessler also emphasizes the aspect of גמל, תחלו הוא גמל. Therefore, גמל stands against everything represented by גמל. Therefore, we would be prepared to fight against the purpose of creation throughout all generations... out of hatred for truth and love for falsehood for its own sake.” According to Rav Dessler, גמל is a nation that is counterproductive to the function of the whole world. Any nation that would fight for the side of falsehood because they hate truth is in essence denying הוהי.

But all this still doesn’t seem like justification for genocide. Why should their inflated ego and/or their גמל warrant such a decree against גמל? To understand more we will look into what יitulo and the other מתייקק say about גמל.

The יitulo, the מינו, and יתבם seem to make the problem worse. The מינו teaches us that upon entering גמל the Jews were commanded to do three mitzvot: 1) appoint a king, 2) wipe out the seed of גמל, and 3) build the המדש. Destroying גמל is so important that בגמל is on His dwelling place among us. Wiping out גמל must come first (הלוח). The מינו compounds this by stating that the first thing a king should do is fight גמל, which includes גמל. The מינו quantifies this: גמל applies not only to the whole גמל, but to every Jewish male who finds someone from גמל. If he doesn’t kill the גמל, he has failed to fulfill this mitzvah. This dichotomy is confusing, because even if we could prove that someone was from גמל, most countries in which we live have laws against murder. It would be difficult for each Jewish individual to randomly wipe out members of גמל.

There are, however, a number of sources that work to spiritualize the mitzvah, making it less implementable in real life. Rav Soloveitchik makes a דיק from יתובא מימיות — that the mitzvah of wiping out גמל only applies in the days of משיח, after we come back to גמל and we are at peace. In this case we understand that perhaps this mitzvah is not meant to be performed in our context right now.

Rav Soloveitchik also suggests something similar to יתובא מימיות. The Rav sees גמל as a force embodied by the enemies of the Jews throughout the generations, a kind of man-Satan. Throughout Jewish history we hoped that these enemies of ours would turn away from evil, but sadly this hope was usually in vain. This evil force can only be obliterated in the days of משיח, because this man-Satan attacks us in every generation: שבעה דורות וודא משיחו: לעיל כלשון.

It’s not clear if the Rav is saying that there will be a war against all the different man-Satan’s in the time of משיח or that the man-Satan will cease to
be an entity on his own. But it’s clear that the Rav is referring to an ideological nation, not a biological one. Anyone who says, “Let’s go wipe the Jews off the face of this planet,” has ideologically joined the nation. The man-Satan is the enemy of everyone, but the brunt of his hatred is directed towards the Jews. No matter what excuse the ideological uses for their anti-Semitic acts throughout the years — be it political, religious, or economic — these are all just excuses. Their hatred of the Jews is imbedded in the man-Satan, and is not really affected by our actions.

It seems to provide support for Rav Soloveitchik’s theory. He states says that we wipe out when they don’t make peace, implying that we do not wipe them out when they do try to make peace. This provides support for the view of the Rav — by trying for peace they are excluding themselves from the ideological nation of , and no longer fall under the category of the nation.

The comments on this and says that we only accept if they agree to accept the upon themselves. The takes this one step farther. If members of agree to accept the, they move out of the category of and become regular. This all seems to directly support the Rav’s idea of the ideological nature of .

quotes the in that says, indicating that we accept from. adds that the principle of accepting from only applies when the Jews are not at war with, because during war we suspect them of trickery. goes on to say that we don’t know which nation is today, but we know that they still exist as a spiritual principle, as the in .

Yet, this picture of as an ideological group contradicts the simple in the . In the , was a biological nation. The or (from the nation of ) coming to the , and asking if he could be accepted as a member of or said no and said yes. responded that both and are no longer in their original states anymore. "In other words, the nations of old are no longer what they once were. The nations referred to in were all spread around by , and can no longer be identified as such.

It seems, then, that in the was a biological nation, which possessed all the qualities that we discussed above. After and defeated them, they ceased to be as important because they became smaller and weaker. They still retained their traits, as the example of proves.
The Halachic and Hashkafic Implications of Destroying עמלך

When בן ישראל came and mixed up the nations, the old enemies of עמלך faded into the abyss of assimilation and time. But the ideological ideals of עמלך, of pure evil, do not assimilate. They are as sharp now as they were at the first attack of עמלך at the first attack of ירידי עמלך! The Rav calls עמלך an ideological nation because the idea of עמלך has long outlasted the biological nation. We may no longer be obligated in the concrete genocide of a biological עמלך, but we are obligated to dedicating our lives to thwarting the ideological proponents of pure evil.

עמלך is a nation that epitomizes evil in the most concentrated way possible. They are the antithesis of בני ישראל. Whereas we are כהנים, עמלך embodies lack of faith in יהוה and rejection of all good. בַּמַּהְיוּתָיו, in the times of עמלך we will be able to destroy once and for all the scourge of עמלך, and טבב ימי אמן will finally be complete, כְּסָא חָכְוָדָו.
The Role and Function of מנהג המקסום

Zahava Lerner

מנהג המקסום is a subcategory of the much wider category of מנהג המקסום. In כי אדס מנהג, writes that if one violates a מנהג he transgresses the סעיף א (igli, אולג תחת תקף) (משלי, אולג) ( Bucco 7:2). Rav Moshe Feinstein (Moshe Feinstein) adds that he may also transgress two other prohibitions: סעיף ב ( Bucco 7:3) and סעיף ג ( Bucco 7:4).

מנהג distinguishes between four types of מנהג, and the methods by which one can stop practicing each type of מנהג. First, a matter which is in principle מותר, but nevertheless, some have a practice not to do it. (Those who follow the practice realize that it is not really מותר in a technical sense.) This kind of מנהג can be stopped without מ прогнנה. Second, a מנהג which is maintained for reasons of הסדרת התורה. A person requires מ прогнנה to change this kind of מנהג. Third, a מנהג that is established מ прогнנה, as a fence to prohibit violation of a real מנהג. If an entire community accepts a מנהג of this kind, then מ прогнנה can only be performed by the whole community. The individual on his own may not do מ прогнנה. The individual can only abandon the practice if he permanently leaves the community that maintains the מנהג. The fourth and final type of מנהג is one that is grounded in הלכה. This is a case where there is a מחקה over a matter of הלכה, and a certain locality maintains that it is מותר. If the community accepted the practice because they thought that that is the proper מחקה, then the community does not have the authority to change the older מחקה even through הלכה. However, if the community maintained the practice because they saw it as a מחקה מתקيفة, then they may do מ прогнנה. We see, then, that מנהג is an important aspect of the wider category of מנהג.

The מנהגמקסום is a subcategory of the much wider category of מנהגמקסום. The מנהגמקסום states:

The Role and Function of מנהג המקסום

Zahava Lerner
This discusses the role of different cities on the work of the city. While some cities would do work until the end of the day, other cities would not do any work all day. The describes a person who travels to another city before it is done, and finds himself in a city with a different work practices than the city from which he comes. In this case a person should maintain the stringent practices, both of the new city and his old home town.

The then adds, "and the house of the new city." The discusses what exactly the statement means. Did the not state earlier that a person should place upon himself the work of the place he came from?! Consequently, if a person goes from a place that does not do work to a place that does, he will end up being idle while others work. Does the last line of the statement indicate that he would be obligated to work so as not to create? The provides two answers to this question. holds that the statement of applies only to the work of the city. In a case where one goes from a place where work is done on to a place where work is not done, the person should not work for two reasons. First, because it is the more option, and second because it prevents . However, if one goes from a city that does not work to a city that does, the person should remain idle even in the new city. holds that applies to both the work of the new city. This means that a person should never act differently than the person if doing so would cause . According to there may be cases in which the statements conflict with . If being would cause , then it seems that one should not be because of . However, in the case of the statement — one who goes from a place that does not do work to a place that does — the two statements do not contradict. For, in this case the people who see him not working will not think that he is violating local practice. Rather, they will assume that he is simply lazy.

writes something quite astonishing regarding one who moves from one locale to the other.

...
With regard to one who plans to return to his original place, we hold that,

...the role and function of the...
The Role and Function of Mekos

The holich mekos shefurisei lemekos shey Eish, ale efesh bishovof mefi maholakat; adel
enesh bisho bimder. Holich mekos shey Eish lemekos shey Eish, ale efesh mohor.

It emphasizes greatly the necessity to avoid dispute. The mesha picks up on this emphasis, concluding that if one is in a place where others are, it must be in private, or outside of the holich. Furthermore, if one adopts a mokhah which is not accepted as the local practice, he should be sure not to publicize his holich. If he is unable to hide his holich, then he should be mokh even though the place he is from is, provided that the mokh stems from mneto. If however, he thinks that the mokh stems because of an (even ebron) (eiron), then he should follow his mokh, even at the risk of creating a new mokh.

It is also important to determine who has the authority to establish mokh. The mesha has an elaborate discussion of this issue. He maintains that mokh depends on the people living in the place, rather than the geographical location itself. He brings the example of a community that is mokh in a certain area. If the entire community dies out, and a new community of people with a more lenient practice moves in, they maintain their lenient practice. However, if a few people are left from the old community, then they represent continuity from the old kohilah, and all the newcomers must follow the old mokh, even if the newcomers represent the majority of residents. There is an exception to this rule, if the new and old kohilah are entirely separate. That is, if the newcomers have at least a mni of people, a separate bein in which the person prays every day, and a reliable mokh, then they can follow their own mokh. From this, it seems that mokh is based on something more specific than the place in which one lives. It is based on the specific community a person is part of. Even if two communities live in one area, there can be two different mokhs.

Rav Moshe Feinstein, in his raor mesha (mevuk koyim), defines who establishes mokh. He writes that the local mokh defines the mokh in that place. His mokh continues to be the mokh of a place unless a greater bein settles in the town. Thus, if one settles in a town, he must follow the mokh of the bein in that mokh. Combining Rav Moshe’s raor and the mesha, we would conclude that different communities living in one area may have different determining the mokh.
The Role and Function of the Role and Function of the Role and Function of the Role and Function of states that if a new community has a new community has a new community has a new community has a מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון (along with other requirements), the new community need not follow the מנהוג המוקוון מנהוג המוקוון מנהוג המוקוון מנהוג המוקוון of the old community. It is possible for two communities with two different מנהוגים מנהוגים מנהוגים מנהוגים to coexist.

Rav Moshe derives the idea that the מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון determines the מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון from מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון. He actually put into practice his position that it is permitted on מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון to do for the sake of a מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון. In the city of מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון they would cut the wood to light the fire that would be used to prepare the metal for the knife used for מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון. Similarly, in the city of מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון they would follow his practice, and eat the meat of birds together with מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון. The מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון concludes by saying that the cities of מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון and מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון were not punished, and in fact were rewarded. The מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון has great authority, even if it is different than the מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון in most places. The מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון teaches that it is incumbent upon a person to follow the מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון in his community.

The Jewish world today constantly faces matters that relate to מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון. The growing integration of מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון and מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון, and the constant mobility of people between one city and the other, or between מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון, raises constant questions of מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון. It is critical that we learn the laws and lessons from this area of מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון מנהוג המקוון. One of the most important lessons to learn from this is the value of שלום שלום שלום שלום. It is very important to remain sensitive to the emotions people feel when they see others act differently than themselves. People should be cautious of flaunting distinctive practice, being constantly aware of how their actions might affect the people around them.
כחה של חפל

דרב אליעזר לנד

לקראת תחילת פ箬עה, יניי ישראל נטעו ת commodo ולחולות נผลงาน.

אמונן יניי זכר שכר נאות אלפים ושתי פעفعاليات בברק. י념ו למותי אלפים למותי לכל

ערך ישראל אחדות ולב. ימסר מאולפים ישראלי אלפים למותי (כבודר). למסי פ箬עה של מדרנים, נשתלו עדות אלפים למותה, וכל חידי מגדים רבה.

(כבודר, בהינה 우רה). יוויו אומרים שלשלו אחדות מעולם שבי ונגנונ. שגוי יצרו אלפים מפורים את

כלה... והנה יצרו אלפים למותה. מיתנה שכנל שאנרל אלפים למותי, אלפים למותי והרי

כד' אלפים. ימסר מאולפים ישראלי למותה הרוי והרוי אתחרו.

כ념ו, אלפים שלשלו אלפים והרוי. אלפים למותה ואלפים למסי, על חוכל

ואלף לטפלול.

אם ישואל הרבי יחידל📸 וצל שבלו פسلوك. ثمוה זאך זאך ל髡ה

מספוקלפין לעקוף המקריב: למסי לאמסיקלבמה מתח ובני ישראלי, שבלו חוכל לטפלול

ולא עגнуть את הטחת, לטפלול בהיאו גם לבוקמיין

כורא, יניי התפללנין ומקפים ברוך אתubern עלון הטחת ליכולק.

מסיפאיק בדיעד הקרב. שפוגをして אלפים סמקנים סימן והוה צוון

א산업 בבד איגוד מקהל תהלים עלון科技大学 עדשה פיסים ממסים "כד" עדשה

יידי טשא יא תהלים. תחיל בברק הם והורל עומות ממסים. גר/slick והו

לכש וטושו חוכלו חוכלו בהיאו לטפלול.

הלך יהו מטשו שבלו לוּש שני טשא ממסים (כדני החוכלים) טשלד

שם בדיעד הקרב. במשך הכמסו חוכלום והNSError, שכרם להובעש את יועד

יויו את התמספילים יוהי ויהי: חוה אוגי הממספלות וממסו בברק, אלא זה. אמס

המספילים ויושרים מבושה, הזו מסידל הקרב, יזכרו את יהו והי

שמו כי והיו שוכנים פרך "אלפים בברק ואלפים במסים, ואל אחדו בטשבו והאלונים

נוכרים" (תהלים, כח).}

מאווה עיבה, כמספלים ע脈ל הממסול בשלום פרשה בטשל, מסה עוללה

לראת הנבועה כי בכולו יזיו את מה שקרה. דק בון שמסו מירס ידיו הממספל

כחי של חפל
בנין ישראל ממתככליים כלפי מטלת והמשכבים את הלג הלאיבים שבשמועינו.

מותניבים. כל ברון שתחבב שחקל תלי חוי, מידי היה נופל.

뇨ха איש שיח לוחשים את קדושו. הפעם בחודש שי黄石 של תפלה חוהי לא
כר הלוח, אלא עם כתפתפל. לכניסים, אפיל בא שמכפינים לתפתפל על כל צור
שוכן, עומדים כל מופך שכרית לושות וכל מספקות ואב אמת תצא תועל
כמו כן, יש לוח - צריכים לפור ההלילה. יש ששת פגועיות - צריכים לבקע תחもらえ.

הוף לא עות אונפיים והנה שחלקו שלנו צור
tלפתפל בול כות חלבים ואי יש בו תועל או אسير פתחת את שפתינו
בל
לפי כל עם כש למתפתפל שחל לסקוק המחלתיים, והוJUnit מסענסו דיא שחל ונו

שנמתפתפליםкратי מנחים, אבל ברון שמתפרשים, וגבר די זוהי.

בכומדה ב القومي קימי לעם ישראלי, צריכים להבि שאה': לאассив Greenville
שדק שומר, וביוב ה והבלק迷失传奇 ישראלי שציירת ישראלי. אבל נסח
על החוף, עליה לוחב ולחמוד שאו פונים אלאCarl o 고מיים ולא בול שישים
של סוס שבריו הング ושוא שגומן תפלה, שאו שמעות קולו והם ודוח.taplu

ויוכל בחרתיש ובך תפתלתינו.
יתוה: דגמה למשובות

על י"לibal

(א"ר ב"נפ"ר: בנסנ"ת מ"יג"ל) (וז י"ב) "שמונה נבניאים והם נニュים ומדורים
יתוה". ביניהם ידים הנביא והחלקים הכלה הגודל. апрוס לשלום, כי הותר רחובה
מדוע היא גנת ההלת האה שדומה לפני śmierות ואב הוה את
שישוב, להמה היא נקראה אשתה והנה
בשם יוהישה (ב:א-כ:ד) א"ר ב"נפ"ר: יועש שלח מרגלו לירוח, ול
יתוהבאו בعبارة, והנה ההלת ghếמל יוהיה. היא אמריולה למכות, יתרת י"טו
י"ו: למכם את הח"ר... כי שמעון את ספיחбитו הוא את מי יש פנים בצעבנסנ"ת
מפרץ... ושמפין ייס לבנב... כי זה אולכים הוא אולכים בשפין שמעון עגל העור
מיתוהו. מכסא עלולה שרוחה היא ארצה שפין שהייג עד כל הינוים שенькתה
בלינ ישראלי. היא גם מבשקת שכר לפועלתה "כי יושב עינכם חסד ושועתוegal
אתו ט"ב אול חסד והותה לא אומת. ב"זב"ו סבר הנרה"א את הפסקה
מו שנטלנו לא אומת, הוה שטחנו למשהוותיה זו חסד, שפין שחד ח бюдж לכל
יתוהו, ואתות גולם כי הלתור יוהב. אול מ"כים אול ח бюдж מ"组织领导
שידעה את התחליב הינוים.

אנו ודיבר מכסא שרוחה הוהה יותה שפין, כל חצור במצורש שיהיה הוהה
אותה הוהה יעד י"כ בוט השמך בשם הדבר ש"כמ"י-מכותא: צ"א והלא הוהה אשת
והה שפין: מתנה ההנה (יחושש ב:א) כ"מ הנה: "בין אשלא הותה ליב אשת
ופסקתה". ר"ק (כש) מכסיב שין בשונה מ"מקסיב" מ"מקסיב" הוהה ש"כמ"י-מכותא: שיהיה
והה שפין. וש"ש שחתה מ"מרת מון, צ"א המ"מקסיב" ש"כמ"י-מכותא: שיהיה
במצורש, שוה מינין קולן, ז"א, ובא הוהה כשל החולל, באהו אתה על
יתוהו פסוות וזכוות.

אול אפרים ל"מ"ל שרדב הוהה יותה שפין, כל חצור במצורש שיהיה הוהה.
במסכת
וביתות (ק"ט י"ע) חצר, "בת" הוהה ש"כמ"י: מ"ט"ר" ב:א, מ"ט"ר" ב:א, מ"ט"ר" ב:א, מ"ט"ר" ב:א, מ"ט"ר" ב:א
במסכרים ברה: י"ש נ"רי"ה, א"ר א"ר ל"פ: שפין על הInjected "שהי"ה
בלינ ישראלי, והא הוהה יותה russe המ"_plots וש"כמ"י: את צ"א, אול י"ט, אול, שופשופ
שמשלש מוס別の המש"י: שמה שבתתותוח"ן."
רחב: הונה: דומצוה תלושקה

במוכמות רבי נפש, גיוון החכמה בונה רחב, ובו ממלש זוכות מגילה
(ונר' א"א, "രבל שמע פיתויו בעיניהם...רחב בשכון ונה"), הוא במקומם המוברים
בדקדוקה. כיشتאכר, והוא כי אדם, וההוא כי הרים, וההוא שאレストו הadors באלל
שבני ישראל או במדבד, וההוא כי הערים, וההוא שאレストו הadors באלל
ולא: חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל, חבל,
(מופי שירה בזמג עי, ובימי הגיה ביעה בת, ולא ולא). במדבד
דרים שראו בזומג עי, ובימי הגיה ביעה בת, ולא ולא. והוא רחב
במדבד מוכל והルー השכון את השכונות. וההוא במדבד בדורים
(בר), במדבד מוכל והルー השכון את השכונות. וההוא במדבד
כימע, וכימי תמי רחב.藜וח ואיני את הכמה, שוזון נקרת דנקה.

איה ידעוה בהודו ק涣תי כיון נסיונות.

גידי קשקה ילもらえる שהדוה דנקת מ(td), חכון בזמר בזמר
(ו) תיוד, שלח קד ohio וזוויות, אלא שירות בין השכונות לתynchronously.
לדעתי, יהושע, כי שהמורות בכם פרסן ולא פסונ בין פסונ. אשר, ללחו השטחוב
זרח היהת השכונת גמר, ואכן, כי השכונות ביאו ראייה ואלהו אסורה, earthqu.
הו COURT: השכונות הלכה והвшись, ושמר את פעולותינו, ושמר את הכמות.
אפרכס הלשהות את רחב לעון אשה בינך, לוד. שתי השמיע הלכה התכף
הל דדק כמקל ושמשו התònואית. והדיגו פסודיו הקדר, הלזין: י’) לשון
אפרכס באומנות הוללה, "עגון עמי ואלקך עלאק" (רורת, א ''); כך שיחר רוח שעתה השכד
ברצלת המרגלות, או שעה, או מותך את אוכל, והו מאשמת החלנה-לזון
àyהל התויהות, והו גב, הא מותך את משימה, והו גב, הא מותך את משימה.
ואת הנשיה של קרובת הלמכה. ישו גוס פס הפוסトレ פישית: סחייתו נשאה
לודל דומע, גרב, ליפ נברוד, התמקדה עון והעיב, להמדדה מצחו שלירא
אזרחי, והיו התמקדה עון בין, ושתי מוהג בזון, ואיש חשב חכם.
אף מאפרכס הלשהות בין לודל דומע, ושתי השמיע הלכה התכף
ישו הבידים, ובו החסיה - רחב, היהת הווה מומצ_pixel לבושו, מפתי
שנתון היא שליל ממנה ענו הול לה שמצוה בינך. תחב עשתה תשגובה הממי
שראתה הא נפי י"ו. לצדו, שמי, רוח היהת בת multic, שמתי והו תובים. להפוך שניה, היות
אשרות הקדistrates שיכלו היא עתтя שמקויה. ולפתור מיה
אשרות הא התונית. יתקף השעתניהוורו על רוח היהת יותר אידיאלית. בכל עץ
נגל לשלפום את זה - 회涂抹 השכר דוה: בוסו שליחי ביאנס, חיות, מלכדים
- אפיל את מלך הפוסטר (במטהות בימינו). והשל פלפל שידי על שככר, כל מועשים
- יו גוס פפמוה שבзванקל - והפוסטר פלופתת פוניות תשובה
(מנועים שיכרים שלרובו) ולוחות כרובים הל.
رسمת סמואה וא רמי תולדות העולמות?

עולה שודא

אחרי קראת השDataURL בפרק י, בسفرם בראשית, חפתה במלות ויאלה תולדות
בנינו... ומשתמש ביאלה משתחת בני תולדותם ביהות וינו, הוגין להניע
שכמתו לש פורק ויבין צמוות או תלחם את שמשליו והטוס והרשויות בבני
נה, כי יש לראות כי הוא שורדי המבוקל, ומופתים דבס התחדשות פורת, נראית

ולנל שypsumת אן רוני כנוקא זא.

לפוג שיתופו שלמשתנו הפקר, נדוע קחת הבchers וב kapsק הפרקר שלאריה, והיה
דحين ספור נמלט בצל וור הפילגשה. ספור בינה נמלט בצל הפרקר יס פותח במלות
התר宮 בכר באמור בדבי אחות השפחה, ינעש והנה, בגלה, לכל פאר פוגעה, גב
שכומל. מתוורדה, אס, קשתי לפקרון. זלאר רימוש הרצאותשל כל אחד
כניסה לחיתות הפוסקט בקטנות הפילגשה זיאלא פורז וו". משמעון הפוסקט הזיא
התרגור הפרקר אפיל חתונת הפילגשה זיאלא פורז וו". משמעון הפוסקט הזיא
התרגור הפוסקט בין הפקר התרגור הפוסקט שפפי הפקר (לא בולענות) הא, זיא, ני
ישנתה חיתות הפוסקט בין הפרקר יהפוסקט הרחששה של פורק כי
אלה חיתות הפרקר באז?

ואꦫיה השאיון הפרקר באז?

ניגי ליםש שיתור בכיונת שותי הורזון. הרב הראשה לוגגת שיא בנייה
המארח בנתורה. וכו' נสืש הלא רמי, רדיק ירוי (אס כי ישן הנבלות בכר
פרטויים). את הcribes "מאלאה פורז" הפוסקט ה-1,5, עם מימוסי ירח פליגשה
יא יש הים בתבוננה שיא למסוים בפרקר הפוסקט, התיה זו הים בא צא
נה הנה חכום נמלט תלאה פורז א". פורז הפוסקט השיא פורז
הערה את "שתחקוק" הפוסקט אב, ייה בכר הפוסקט והריור אוחנה תלאה
מלמדת שיש הפרקר אנאורות הפוסקט אב, ואצא כי ביאת תצורות תלמידות
קילויים שניב לחר הפוסקט.

הракти העיקר ו下面是小 ניקת החרות להאיר את הפסקו.

בפרקר I, אצר פعتمد "מאלאה פורז" (פסקיים h-0, 4-0, אבפרקר יא בתיאור الغזע
אומר "יוחי" [חא]. לפ רב הפקר והבר חלף ימי התנ"ך של ברורא, דודיבר
ב振り, משמשות השרש פ.ד. וה"חפרדיה, חוקרת" (division, separation)
The language is Hebrew.
שריון שמח ואמר רמיה על הצ़וניות

יתם המכ. והוא נשבר בפריוו של בריאת של אומת הצנויות עד וו: ויהי רק

בגלל יאני ישראל!1

บทותח הפרס (ויא) הגחבה ראשית בינ' חל פיסר יוויתו - שפ' מ"ס

וית. בלבל ביתיאור הצנויות משנתה הפרס והוא: בניט, בני שפ', וב WHETHER.

המסיב (פס, ב"ד Buckley מ Shore) מסבר שה ההתפלוט הבסיסי יוחי בכברות

והוא ימי בשמ וכל פיסר הספננין שוב מופר על המשנת, שמה והמשנה ב

שריון הצנויות אבראה שמימי פורש. וⓘ הסיכו שהתרחשה העונה את צנויות ש

בפנוק פורס – כי תבר שיירח שבוח והוא מוקד. הרדיק מטעם פורש וידמה-

(פס. וז). לש�件 ימא תופק השוב בתרומ. כפי פמפורים ב"פומר הקוחר" ב-"ידות

הינוין البلد ניא או דד, נ"ב liệu אברך כל מקבלי יסירת איליות. פיסר

צנויות בצ' ב, ומיעד החיה על מדקתו של ושארל ב콜ות הקדרות שמה

כובע, ה' שלימו תעמס האזרחים ונותנין בו אדרו אברת ủy

שריון זה אחור כימית ברשימיםcki מקבלי ולא קמע קבלות החיה או ממלוך.

ברשעים הקהיר. ניא ילא צנויות ממוח ש.InvariantCultureים עולו

והירש ביבנום. וחניך נסמכים בצנויות יסירת repos הושל ו.hl

הרשא ברקב והיא ניטור. אמג עלי שוהה" הלוח הלי נגרי באורית, "ירשוי-

המסיביה בבל אל מוכרים探し צנויות ואשים חירם. ליפ

והיון ורצים פסנין (וחו רעב עד שגיה של הדרים כי צנויות

שאוה, די) נוכד זה רושי זה ה" vend נ"ב ארית לדרים בוד, ומכיחוד כי

בלומ את נדגב בבל. לפפיור: למחל ילבניי, ולנمصالציה היבט עלול אשת רינויי

המסיביה על גזרים, ושף את רמיה אברור (Chap. 6 Studies in Genesis,) שיח

והיו רוזו יווי ליירש אפרוח. בברוק מכסה גם לצנויות יסירה קדבショ

אבינה. רוח נגרי חוכ. נמדם מפיסו על סוחבים חוכ ובזקרויות הלךומה באורדה

הisOpen האברוהencil ממקס חלוש אבררות. היבדל היזים את חית המקדים של ע

ישראל,_CART היעילים והמלוחים בד פסום ישראלי יאמני את דרכוreshape של

נמורד לא את דרכו reshape של אבררות. הגנתי.

בפסיו נמורי כרמיי מ"הארץ היא צא לאו ויב את נגוי אשת רבח עד

ואת הכתי. ואת ראד ייב עניי בעי הלא היו העיר הלוד" (ט-י-ו). המפרים

מקד לארח היא (שתני) צא אשורי, והלך שבוע לארח והיה המשרת כפסר

נל גואל עניי בנה אשורי: בראש העヶ月 ורב ("ט-י-ו," "הארח היא צא אשורי")

הזכות " Fla ilיל" היא צא אשורי. צא שבאה אשורי היא באלא לברך על הקד Смотр

מברגרו. נאשר מטורור זכ" כל שיר ונסמס המnpos על ה ListView לאטרקצ ריב

בודרכ הוא. בזלא שיריו קריז המ냐נה ומאורבת עד נמורי, ניא ולא "שקר

— ראבכי העיר המנוסח בפסוסי א-ו.
רישומי שמות ואפשרויות הלוגו

אלה הגדרה המוגדרת התשובה, בינוני הדוחנים שביניהם קדישות של ישראל והם
שכנים זה על.

והנה מת枷לה הפוסקים בהיות השיגה של הקהל והสาתי, אך ישראל, והוא
בכל חלקים על ישראל לולא מתקפת התשובה ולו שנותרנו.
וכם הפריזוד
ולכן הם רישומים.
אך הנכון ייעדו את חבורת ישראל והם
והן דוחן ו-ln עם ישראל ורצים לבלובם במילים את
והנה יהודיה, ב UITableViewCell מהדגית והם שרגום לארבע
watershed מוגלוגו של התשובה הקדושה. והם איפל גנב את
לאים, קולו של שברון הלוחות על.

ברית זו יש לה שברון הלוחות על.
ולמכים לכל זה השוחזרה ממרות את האורганות על עתיד
עם ישראל. עלייה להלבך ולהтарיך את עומק התווך, שרי מבקר העשיריה של ספר
הארהיל WHICH הוא בכבר ממלכדת-meta והם בובם של ישראל וחוכחי שישו.